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Foreword
This is the first of four research studies that the Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities will publish in connection with its final report. 
The studies are not a part of the final report, but the Commission 
believes that they contain useful material that warrants wide distribu­
tion. Publication does not constitute endorsement or approval by either 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants or the Commis­
sion. Authors of research studies are responsible for the content and 
recommendations.
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities was appointed in 
October 1974 to study the role and responsibilities of independent 
auditors. This study was undertaken to provide background for its 
discussion of the role that litigation and regulatory enforcement play in 
the regulation of the profession and for recommendations for changes 
in the legal environment.
The research study summarizes the current legal environment, ana­
lyzes the American Law Institute’s proposed Federal Securities Code, 
and discusses the effect of the legal environment on audit practice and 
on the profession, including the auditing standards, setting function. It 
concludes with a discussion of various proposals that have been made 
for changing the legal environment of auditors.
Since the study was particularly helpful to the Commission in reach­
ing several of its conclusions in Section 11 of its final report, “Regulat­
ing the Profession to Maintain the Quality of Audit Practice,” it may 
enhance understanding of the Commission’s conclusions in this area.
Lee J. Seidler 
Deputy Chairman
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
D. R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
Preface
This monograph was prepared as a background paper for the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities. Issue III-6 of the commis­
sion’s Statement of Issues is entitled “The Legal Environment of Inde­
pendent Auditors” and is concerned with the effect of litigation against 
auditors and the desirability and possibility of changes in that environ­
ment. The purpose of the background paper was to assist the commis­
sion in its deliberations through a description of the legal climate in 
which the auditor works, an analysis of its effect on both society and 
the accounting profession, and descriptions and evaluations of alterna­
tive means of changing that climate.
I have had the benefit of the thoughts and suggestions of several 
individuals. Richard B. Lea of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. reviewed 
an early outline of the project. Richard H. Murray, general counsel for 
Touche Ross & Co., provided useful background on the evolving’ 
climate surrounding the profession’s insurance coverage. David B. 
Isbell of Covington & Burling helped me to understand the American 
Law Institute’s Federal Securities Code. Richard Murray, Carl D. Liggio 
of Arthur Young & Company, Charles B. Hellerson and Matthew Blake 
of Hurdman and Cranstoun, David S. Ruder of the Northwestern Uni­
versity School of Law, and Alan B. Levenson of Fulbright & Jaworski 
provided helpful comments on an early draft. All members of the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities provided both suggestions 
and support as the project progressed. Thomas W. McRae of the 
American Institute of CPAs’ accounting standards division, and a mem­
ber of the staff of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, 
provided substantial assistance on the several drafts of the paper. To 
those individuals go both generous thanks and the usual absolution 
from blame for errors and omissions.
Special appreciation must be expressed to the individual who 
served as my legal counsel on the project, Jeremy L. Wiesen of the 
Graduate School of Business Administration of New York University. 
His provocative commentary on content and scholarly assistance on 
the law significantly enhanced the paper.
February 1977 H.R.J.
iv
Contents
1 The Litigation Explosion
The Extent of Litigation Against Auditors 1
Scope of the Study 2
Social Influences on the Legal Environment 3 
The Growth of Consumerism 3 
New Concepts of Insurance 4 
The Increased Presence of Auditors 5
2 Common Law Liability to Third Parties and Clients
Liability to Third Parties Under Common Law 7 
Expansion of the Class Under Common Law 8 
Requirements for Determining Deceit 14
Liability to Clients 16
3 Auditor Liability Under the Federal Securities Acts
The Securities Act of 1933 19
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 22
Class Action Suits and the Contingent Fee System 29 
The Legal Bases for Class Actions 30 
The Effects of Class Actions and the Contingent Fee 
System 35
4 Other Sanctions Under the Federal Securities Acts
Criminal Proceedings 39
Injunctive Proceedings 41
Administrative (Rule 2(e)) Proceedings 46
5 The American Law Institute’s Proposed Federal Securities
Code
Definitions 55
Prohibitions 57
Civil Consequences of Violations 59 
Limitation of Damages 60 
Assessment of Costs 62 
Liability as Aiders and Abettors 63 
Statute of Limitations 63 
Reliance and Causation 64
Administration and Enforcement 64
6 Effects of the Legal Environment on Professional Practice 67
A Framework for Evaluating the Effects 67
Benefits to Society 70 
Increased Activity of Authoritative Auditing Bodies 71 
Increased Attention to Quality Control 72
Costs to Society 73 
Auditor Reluctance to Meet Existing Responsibilities 74 
Auditor Reluctance to Accept New Responsibilities or 
Expanded Role 74 
Added Costs for Marginal Companies 75 
Creation of Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards 
by the Courts 75 
Defensive Actions by Auditors 77 
Difficulty in Hiring and Retaining Qualified Personnel 78 
Defensiveness by Authoritative Auditing Bodies 78
Conclusion 81
7 Proposals for Changing the Legal Environment 83
Limitations to Damages 83 
Statutory Limitations to Damages 83 
Liability Limitation by Contract or Disclaimer 89 
Limitation of Damages Through Governmental 
Insurance 90
Changes in the Legal Process 90 
Referring Accounting Issues to a Master 90 
Adherence to GAAP and GAAS as an Absolute 
Defense 93 
Extension of the “Safe Harbor” Concept 96 
Assessment of Costs Against Unsuccessful Plaintiffs 97 
Revised Standards for Class Action Suits and Elimination of the 
Contingent Fee System 98
Institutional Changes to Improve Auditor Performance 98 
Publication of Case Analyses 99
vi
Increased Auditor Authority 99
Strengthening Controls and Discipline Over Auditors 102
8 Acceptable and Unacceptable Proposals for Change 
Criteria for Evaluating Proposals 103 
Proposals That the Profession Should Support 105 
Proposals That the Profession Should Not Support 106
Bibliography
Citations to Court Decisions
vii
103
109
115
1The Litigation Explosion
The accountant today is living in a litigious environment where he can 
reasonably expect his every action— regardless of how right or wrong 
it may be— to be questioned in a court of law and possibly result in 
substantial damages being awarded against him.1 [Liggio, 1973, p. 2]
The Extent of Litigation Against Auditors
A 1967 law review article noted that suits “against accountants by 
persons other than their clients have been almost universally unsuc­
cessful.”2 Three cases in the late 1960s (Fischer v. Kletz, Escott v. 
BarChris, and United States v. Simon) triggered forces that changed 
that.3 By the mid-1970s hundreds of suits were filed against auditors. 
Estimates of the extent of litigation involving auditors vary, but the 
following data provide a rough indication.
•  In its 1973 annual report Arthur Andersen & Co. estimated that 
there were 500 companies with litigation or claims in process
1. Complete citations are found in the Bibliography. Citations and footnotes have been 
omitted from all quotations unless otherwise indicated.
2. Columbia Law Review, 67 (December 1967), p. 1437, quoted in Fiflis, 1975a, p. 32.
3. Complete citations to legal cases are found in "Citations to Court Decisions” follow­
ing the Bibliography. Citations and footnotes have been omitted from quoted court 
decisions unless otherwise indicated.
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involving auditors at March 31, 1973.4 Presumably, each com­
pany represents one “case,” and one case may spawn many 
lawsuits, for example, over 50 in the Equity Funding case (Lig­
gio, 1973, p. 1).
•  Liggio estimated that in May 1973 the total number of resolved 
and pending cases against auditors exceeded 300, of which 
over 170 had been reported to the profession’s largest insurer, 
Lloyd’s of London (Liggio, 1973, p. 1).
•  Liggio estimates that by 1974 there were 500 to 1000 pending 
cases and over 200 decided cases (Liggio, 1974, pp. 18-19).
Cases brought by third parties and related to alleged audit deficien­
cies may have peaked in 1975 and early 1976, but, even so, the extent 
of the litigation is awesome, particularly in relation to the almost “zero 
base” of the mid-1960s.
The extent of litigation can also be measured by malpractice insur­
ance premiums and related costs incurred by auditing firms. Conserva­
tive estimates of annual insurance premiums now being paid by the 
seventeen largest public accounting firms range from thirty to forty 
million dollars. Adding uninsured losses and loss-deductibles paid by 
the firms plus a reasonable amount for the costs of developing infor­
mation within the firms for the defense of cases would probably bring 
the total to seventy to eighty million dollars.5 Again, this is a conserva­
tive estimate and includes figures for only one segment of the 
profession.6
Scope of the Study
The objectives of this monograph are to describe the legal climate 
in which the auditor presently works, analyze the effect of that climate 
on both society and the public accounting profession, and evaluate 
possible ways of changing that climate.
Several issues are excluded. Settled or pending cases involving 
auditors are not analyzed to determine deficiencies in audit perform­
4. The 1974, 1975, and 1976 annual reports do not provide profession-wide estimates.
5. Data developed from nonpublic sources.
6. Various nonpublic sources have estimated that out-of-pocket costs for insurance 
premiums, unreimbursed litigation losses, and unreimbursed defense fees are in the 
vicinity of 2 to 3 percent of gross fees of public accounting firms. Arthur Andersen & 
Co. reported in 1976 “professional indemnity insurance and litigation expense” of 
$6,351,000, equal to 1.5 percent of total "fees for professional services” of $424,654,­
000, or 2 percent of total fees from their domestic practice (reported as 75 percent 
of worldwide fees). The $6,351,000 represents direct out-of-pocket costs associated 
with litigation. No precise estimate of personnel costs is possible, but their inclusion 
would probably not affect the total by more than $500,000.
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ance. Legal cases are cited only to identify new or evolving points of 
law or other changes in the legal environment. Also, suggestions for 
reducing the auditor’s exposure to legal liability are considered only if 
they would change elements in the legal environment. A higher level of 
performance would unquestionably reduce exposure, but that issue is 
not explored. Nor is reduction of exposure by lowering user 
expectations.7
Social Influences on the Legal Environment
Recent developments in common, statutory, and administrative 
law— technical legal developments— have enhanced plaintiffs' abilities 
to recover from auditors and, as a result, have led to greatly expanded 
litigation in recent years. But, as Sommer noted, “these somewhat 
technical legal developments are not sufficient to explain the explosion 
of litigation that has confronted accountants during the past ten years. 
Broad social developments have been the soil in which these seeds 
have become rooted, and have yielded often bitter fruit” (1972, p. 26). 
Those social developments and their influence on the legal climate 
relate to the growth of consumerism, new concepts of insurance, and 
the increased presence of auditors.
The Growth of Consumerism
Sommer noted that
First, there has been the emergence of the consumer, so dramatic that it 
has been suggested we are entering upon the “age of the consumer.” The 
whys of the broad phenomenon are too complex to narrate here, but it is 
clear that restlessness with the impersonality of technology, political neces­
sities, the emergence of a new brand of populism (Naderism is one form of 
it), have combined with legal resourcefulness to bring about an equalizing 
of the position before the law of the consumer and commercial interests (or 
perhaps a disequilibrium in favor of the consumer). The courts have joined 
with legislatures to expand the litigation potential of the class suit and 
develop other means of redress for wrongs which, while existing in the 
past, because of inertia or legal technicalities were never susceptible of
7. The level of expectations influences the nature and extent of litigation and regulatory 
enforcement. Court decisions, SEC actions, and the publicity that results when suits 
are brought or enforcement proceedings initiated in turn influence user expectations. 
The level of expectations is clearly relevant to a discussion of the changing legal 
climate and explains many of the influences on and changes in the legal environ­
ment that are discussed in chapters 1 through 5. For a discussion of the importance 
of defining expectation levels, see Liggio, 1975b, pp. 22-29. The report of the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities addresses various means of closing the 
gap between user expectations and auditor performance.
3
effective redress. Legislatures, state and federal, have tripped over each 
other providing protection for consumers.. . .
As people have become alert to the possibility of redress in their many 
roles as consumers, the potentials of the federal scheme of securities 
regulation have been explored and used. [1972, pp. 26-27]
New Concepts of Insurance
A second influence on the expansion of litigation against the audi­
tor is the increasing awareness of investors and courts that the auditor 
is an available source of funds for the redress of wrongs. Some 
auditors contend that investors in publicly held companies seem to 
look on auditors as performing an insurance function. They suggest 
several reasons for this phenomenon.
The “Deep Pocket” Theory. Richard H. Murray, General Counsel 
for Touche Ross & Co., suggested that “whenever a corporation whose 
stock is publicly traded goes into bankruptcy or experiences a finan­
cial reverse, it is tempting for the shareholders and their attorneys to 
wonder who can be sued for the losses. Obviously, the bankrupt 
corporation can’t pay, so accountants, lawyers, and corporate directors 
are a tempting alternative deep pocket. With courts inclined to accord 
investors the favored status of consumers (a difficult similarity to ac­
cept) the result is an ever-expanding area of liabilities for the profes­
sional advisor.”8 Some slight evidence to support this view may be 
found in the apparent peaking of litigation by third parties in 1975 or 
early 1976. One cause of decline in such litigation may be the eco­
nomic recovery that occurred in 1975 and 1976, although several 
recent decisions by the Supreme Court also had an effect.
The Auditor as Guarantor. Liggio stated that
the new wave of litigation that has hit the accounting profession clearly 
proceeds on the assumption that the auditor is the guarantor of the accu­
racy of a company’s financial statements. The plaintiffs and their attorneys 
simply refuse to acknowledge the judgment-making process that is integral 
to the auditing function. They also refuse to recognize that management 
has the primary responsibility for the accuracy of financial statements. 
[1975a, p. 42]
The “Socialization” of Risks. Rightly or wrongly, auditors are 
viewed as one segment of society that can act to prevent investor 
losses and are thus a logical choice to bear those losses. It is also 
believed by many that auditors can probably shift the cost of providing
8. Letter to the author dated January 22, 1976.
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this protection, initially to the client in the form of higher fees and then 
to society, as those added costs affect product prices and business 
profits. The investor is thus protected from an otherwise uninsurable 
risk by the socialization of that risk in a manner consistent with other 
means of consumer protection without regard to its appropriateness.
The Increased Presence of Auditors
As the public accounting profession has grown in numbers and in 
stature, it has become better known to the public. The popular press 
has also discovered the profession and made the public aware of its 
shortcomings. Factors such as the growth of complex financial trans­
actions, the use of “creative accounting,” the growth in the number of 
investors, and the increased importance of accounting information in 
the investment process have also contributed to increased public 
awareness (Sommer, 1972, p. 27).
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2Common Law Liability to 
Third Parties and Clients
Auditors’ liability derives from both common and statutory law. 
Common law evolves from judicial rulings on matters of law in specific 
cases. Statutory law may codify or change common law. Judicial 
interpretation of statutory law, in turn, leads to the development of case 
law precedents (Sommer, 1972, p. 25). This interaction permits the 
courts continually to define and expand the auditor’s role and duties. 
Sommer was no doubt referring to both kinds of judicially created law 
when he said,
If a professional group does not articulate its identity, its duties, the identity 
of those to whom it owes a duty, and the manner in which the duty is to be 
acquitted, and if society assigns it a role which, despite its professional 
standards, it does not fulfill adequately, the courts, vested by society with 
the responsibility to define and enforce duties, will do it. And that in some 
measure has been the fate of the accounting profession. [1974, p. 20]
Liability to Third Parties Under Common Law
Until fairly recently, auditors as well as other professionals had 
been almost immune against successful claims by third parties. That 
apparent immunity has led to concern by courts and legislatures and 
resulted in new concepts of auditor liability to third parties. Two impor­
tant changes are:
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•  Expansion of the class to whom the auditor owes a duty of care 
(that is, the required relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant auditor).
•  Redefinition of the level of care that the auditor owes to third 
parties (essentially, the issue of the necessity for intent and the 
definition of intent) (Fiflis, 1975a, p. 110; Marinelli, 1971, pp. 
116-17).
Those issues, as well as some recent developments in the auditor’s 
liability to clients, are discussed in this chapter. Liability to third parties 
under the federal securities acts is discussed in chapter 3.
Expansion of the Class Under Common Law
The auditor’s legal liability to his client is grounded primarily in the 
law of torts, but it may also be based on the contractual relationship 
between the two parties. In either case, the auditor is required to 
exercise due professional care, which may be defined as “that degree 
of care which would ordinarily be exercised by other members of the 
profession in similar circumstances. In essence, this means adherence 
to generally accepted auditing standards.”1 A failure to exercise due 
professional care constitutes (ordinary) negligence (“ flagrant or reck­
less departure from the standards of due care” ) or fraud (“ intentional 
misstatement or concealment of a material fact” ) (Willingham and Car­
michael, 1975, p. 53).
The client is in a contractual relationship (referred to as privity of 
contract) with the auditor, and negligence breaches that contract. 
There is no privity of contract between the auditor and third parties. 
Consequently, claims by third parties (under common law) were tradi­
tionally ' based not on contract law but on a common law tort—a 
wrongful act that injures another’s person, property, or reputation—and 
only fraud on the part of an accountant, not lack of due care, was 
considered a wrongful act. “ If in rendering his opinion he intentionally 
deceives third parties for the purpose of inducing them to act in 
reliance upon his deception, [the auditor] has committed a fraud and 
he is liable to third parties who can prove that they relied on the 
information and were damaged thereby” (Willingham and Carmichael, 
1975, p. 53).
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co. (1931) extended liability to 
third parties to instances of professional negligence so gross as to 
constitute fraud. Gormley analyzed the concept of constructive fraud 
as follows:
1. See, however, the discussion in chapter 7.
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Constructive fraud is a deceit which involves a (1) false (2) representation 
(3) of a material fact (4) with lack of reasonable ground for belief (5) to 
induce reliance by another (6) relied upon by the other (7) causing (8) 
damage to him. Actual fraud differs from constructive fraud in knowledge 
of the falsity of a representation, rather than a lack of reasonable ground 
for belief in its truth.
Constructive fraud may be inferred from evidence of gross negligence, 
although negligence is not necessarily constructive fraud in and of itself. 
Gross negligence is an extreme, flagrant or reckless departure from stand­
ards of due care and competence in performing or reporting upon profes­
sional engagements. There is no dependable distinction from the oversight, 
inattention, or error of judgment or perception which amounts only to 
ordinary negligence. [1974, p. 1207]
Judge (later Justice) Cardozo upheld the doctrine of privity of 
contract in Ultramares as a limitation on the auditor’s liability for ordi­
nary negligence, based on a policy decision that all imposed or as­
sumed risks should be determinable.
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to 
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may 
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeter­
minate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business con­
ducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw 
may not exist in an implication of a duty that exposes to these conse­
quences.
Marinelli asks, however,
whether the indeterminate nature of this sort of risk in this profession is any 
more fearsome than the speculative nature of the risks facing any profes­
sion. The use of liability insurance among public accounting firms and the 
ability of the profession to pass the costs of such insurance on to its 
customers, who in turn can pass on the cost to the entire consuming 
public, seems to cast doubt on the necessity of the Ultramares decision. 
[1971, p. 119]
This view, however, fails to acknowledge that the potential for loss 
to the auditor is greater and the amount of loss more indeterminate 
than for any other profession. A company’s financial statements and 
the accompanying auditor’s report may be read by or otherwise influ­
ence thousands of investors and creditors with millions of dollars 
invested. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (1976), the Supreme Court 
noted that significantly broadening “the class of plaintiffs who may 
seek to impose liability upon accountants and other experts who per­
form services or express opinions under the [federal securities] Acts 
. . . would extend to new frontiers the ‘hazards’ of rendering expert 
advice under the Acts, raising serious policy questions not yet ad­
dressed by Congress.”
Courts and federal statutes have attempted to change, bypass, or 
otherwise reduce the effects of the privity doctrine to increase the
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auditor’s liability to third parties for ordinary negligence. The first crack 
in the privity rule occurred in the Ultramares case itself with the formu­
lation of the “ primary benefit rule.” There it was held that “an auditor 
would be liable to a third party for ordinary negligence if he knew that 
his audit was being performed for the primary benefit of a third party 
and that third party was specifically identified” (Willingham and Car­
michael, 1975, p. 54).
Gormley suggested, however, that up to ten or so years ago,
the efforts of third-party plaintiffs to prove that in fact they were primary 
beneficiaries of a negligent audit were unsuccessful, even in cases such 
as that in which the auditor knew (1) that his report would be furnished by 
the client, or was to be furnished by the auditor at the request of the client, 
to a specific person, and (2) that the report would be used by the client to 
induce action by that person, such as a loan or investment, and might be 
relied upon by the person in taking action.
The primary benefit rule may thus have been applied more literally and 
more broadly than anyone would have expected. The application tended to 
turn the nonclient primary beneficiary into a theoretical abstraction with little 
existence in fact. [1974, pp. 1207-08]
Further weakening of the privity-of-contract doctrine in cases of 
accountants’ liability began in 1963, thirty-two years after Ultramares, 
with a series of cases that represented a “ frontal assault on the 
primary benefit rule” :
In 1963, the Hedley Byrne [Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, 
Ltd.] case was decided by the highest court of England, the House of 
Lords. The case did not involve auditors, but rather a negligently stated 
accommodation credit report by a bank upon which a third person relied to 
his damage. In their opinions the various justices spoke of "special,” 
“particular,” “direct” and “proximate” relationships between defendant and 
plaintiff, and said in effect that “where there is a relationship equivalent to 
contract but for the absence of consideration, there is a duty of care.” But 
the justices were not able to generalize their conception of the circum­
stances which create such a “special relationship.” [Gormley, 1974, p. 
1208]
The court’s finding, however, was intended to have somewhat limited 
application in that it extended the duty of care to only a restricted class 
of third parties, as was also the case in Ultramares. A statement by the 
Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
noted that
accountants may now be held in law to owe a duty of care to persons 
other than those with whom they are in a contractual or fiduciary relation­
ship and may be liable for neglect of that duty if, but only if, they know or 
ought to know that a financial report, account or statement prepared by 
them has been prepared for a specific purpose or transaction, will be 
shown to a particular person or class of persons, and may be relied on by 
that person or class of persons in that particular connection. [1965, p. 67]
10
The Americal Law Institute (ALI) in its Second Restatement of the 
Law of Torts (1965), partly in reliance on Hedley Byrne, interpreted the 
law of negligent misrepresentations by professionals to third parties 
more broadly than it had been interpreted in the past (Gormley, 1974, 
p. 1208). Section 552 of Tentative Draft no. 12 (1966) stated:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in 
a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false informa­
tion for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to 
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon 
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in 
obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) 
is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance 
he intends to supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends 
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the informa­
tion to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a sub­
stantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information 
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit 
the duty is created in any of the transactions in which it is intended to 
protect them.
Gormley summarized the significance of the Restatement to 
auditors:
The Institute’s notes state that its interpretation is intended to exclude 
liability “to the very large class of persons whom almost any negligently 
given information may foreseeably reach and influence, and limit the lia­
bility, not to a particular plaintiff identified in advance, but to the com­
paratively small group whom the defendant expects and intends to 
influence.” [Gormley, 1974, p. 1208, citing Tentative Draft no. 11, 1965]
The Restatement's reporter stated that as of 1966 there had been 
few actual cases that analyzed auditors’ liability to a foreseen class of 
persons for negligence. He further explained that, except for the Se­
curities Act of 1933, the law had not at that time moved so far as to 
broaden the auditor’s negligence liability, where he is “ under public 
duty,” to cover a foreseeable class of persons, as was the intent of 
clause (3) cited above (Chalmers, 1974, p. 79).
The distinction in the Restatement's interpretation of a profes­
sional’s duty to third parties between foreseen and foreseeable per­
sons is critical to an understanding of post-1965 legal decisions based 
on common law. Gormley elaborated on that and related distinctions:
The commentary and illustrations accompanying the interpretation establish 
that the interpretation applies in cases in which it is foreseen by a profes­
sional that his information will be relied upon by a specific person or class
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of persons in the specific transaction for which his information is furnished, 
but not in those in which it is only foreseeable to the professional that the 
dissemination of his information by the recipient will lead to actions in 
reliance upon it by third persons who become aware of it.
The following is an attempt to classify the factual distinctions, which vary 
from one extreme to another by infinite gradations of detail:
Primary beneficiary—the identified person whose reliance is the “end 
and aim of the transaction,” who in fact was only the client until after the 
publication of the Second Restatement.
Foreseen person—one or more specifically identified persons or entities 
who are known by the auditor to be intended recipients, directly or indi­
rectly, of his audit opinion for the purpose of reliance in a particular 
business transaction known to the auditor. If the terms are construed 
literally, the foreseen person includes not only a primary beneficiary, but 
others as well. A foreseen person includes one who is known to the auditor 
to be entitled to receive an audit opinion in fulfillment of a condition of 
closing a business merger or acquisition agreement. It also includes one or 
more institutional lenders whose loan agreement, to the knowledge of the 
auditor, requires an audit opinion as a condition of making the loan, and 
periodic audit opinions and auditor’s “compliance letters” for the duration 
of the loan. Such persons do not appear to fall within the traditional 
interpretation of a primary beneficiary.
Foreseen class—a particular defined group, any one or more or all of 
whom may rely upon an audit opinion, specifically identified to the auditor 
by class, though not known to him individually. According to the Second 
Restatement, each member of such a foreseen class is entitled to the 
same rights against the auditor as a foreseen person. For example, such a 
class might include a bank or banks which make loans to the audit client, if 
the auditor knows that his audit opinion is to be used by the client to seek 
bank financing, even though the bank or banks are not identified. The 
number of members of such a class, and the aggregate commitment of the 
class, is sometimes very large.
Foreseeable persons and classes—These are the potentially very large 
numbers of persons, not identified to the auditor by specific persons or 
class in a specific transaction, who may foreseeably be expected to 
receive his audit report when distributed by the client, and in some way to 
act or forebear to act in reliance upon it. Foreseeable persons have some 
form of business relationship to or interest in the client which makes such a 
reliance plausible. They may include public investors in equity or debt 
securities of the client, purchasers or suppliers of goods or services under 
substantial or continuing contracts, and possibly such persons as employ­
ees and taxing bodies. According to the Second Restatement, an auditor 
would not be liable to such persons for loss from reliance upon his audit 
opinion if it were a negligent misrepresentation, but would be so liable if 
the audit opinion were a fraudulent misrepresentation—actual or construc­
tive—to the extent it is determined by the trier of fact that he should expect 
their conduct to be influenced by his fraudulent deceit.
General public—The mere possibility that anyone might see the auditor’s 
opinion and rely upon it in some act or forebearance does not bring such 
persons within the group whose reliance is considered foreseeable to the 
auditor, and the auditor does not have a duty or liability to such persons. 
Examples might include retail customers, trade creditors, and regulatory 
and other governmental bodies of jurisdictions to which the client is sub­
ject. The differentiation between the general public and foreseeable per-
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sons is even more indistinct than between other classifications, if only 
because there has not yet been a great deal of need for attempting to 
define the distinction. [1974, pp. 1209-10]
Since 1965, several judicial opinions have held to the Ultramares 
primary benefit rule, generally because of adherence to earlier control­
ling precedents. But in at least two significant cases, the courts have 
accepted the concept of the ALI’s Second Restatement. In Rusch 
Factors, Inc. v. Levin (1968), the “court with characteristic caution 
diluted the force of that conclusion with alternative rulings that the 
third-person plaintiffs were primary beneficiaries of the audit work—  
although third persons had not previously been found to be primary 
beneficiaries” (Gormley, 1974, pp. 1210-11). (In that particular case, 
however, the audit was performed at the specific insistence of the 
plaintiff lender (Isbell and Carmichael, 1973, p. 41).) In Rhode Island 
Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz (1972), the court “clearly applies 
the Second Restatement but not the primary benefit rule” (Gormley, 
1974, pp. 1210-11), even though “the circumstances were such as to 
come squarely within the primary benefit rule . . .” (Isbell and Car­
michael, 1973, p. 41).
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 1976 decision (Haig v. Bam­
ford), applied the foreseen class rule to invoke a duty of care that an 
auditor owed to third parties. The issue was whether “ to create a duty 
of care, it is sufficient that the accountants know that the information 
was intended to be disseminated among a specific group or class . . . 
or whether the accountants also needed to be apprised of the plain­
tiff’s identity. . . .” The court held that “actual knowledge of the specific 
plaintiff who will use and rely on the statement” was too narrow a test, 
and instead applied a test of “actual knowledge of the limited class 
that will use and rely on the statement.” The court’s opinion in that 
case provided an excellent summary of English, American, and Cana­
dian authorities and decisions that had addressed this issue.
The opinions are at least evidence of a marked trend toward a change of 
law, even to those cautious about concluding that the change is already 
confirmed. The trend suggests the likelihood either that the primary benefit 
rule is broadening to coincide with the foreseen person concept of the 
Second Restatement, or that the foreseen person concept is absorbing 
and superseding the primary benefit rule.
The difference is more than just words. The foreseen person concept, but 
not the primary beneficiary rule, is in harmony with the foreseen class 
concept.2
2. The difference may be more than “just words” in another sense. In Rusch Factors, 
decided under the primary benefit rule, the court “found the correct measure of 
damages to be the same as that applied where the parties are in privity, or the 
amount necessary to place the corporation in the position it would have been in had
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If the primary benefit rule of Ultramares is indeed being supplanted by the 
Second Restatement, it can at least be said that a stable Restatement rule 
carefully applied and thoughtfully limited should be tolerable, though the 
size of the foreseen class and transaction is sometimes very large.
However, there is the same infinite gradation of factual differences, and the 
pressures that may be changing the test from primary benefit to foreseen 
class could continue to operate in an attempt to make a further change to 
foreseeable class. The foreseen class test would tend to protect powerful 
and sophisticated lenders, businesses and institutions whose personnel 
and counsel would make certain that the auditor foresaw their reliance and 
knew of their transaction, and to exclude from its scope the less powerful 
and less sophisticated. This could prove distasteful to judges—and to the 
public—and could lead to semantic stretching by lawyers for plaintiffs 
arguing that their shareholders, bondholders and creditors are also spe­
cific classes whose reliance in their transactions and relationships with the 
audit client is something the auditor should have foreseen. The law 
changes according to evolving thought and sentiment. How and whether 
courts would weigh the balance between fault and liability in the future is 
uncertain. [Gormley, 1974, p. 1211-12]
Isbell and Carmichael find some comfort in the fact that no court in 
a reported case involving auditors has extended common law liability 
for negligence to the vast group of merely foreseeable but unidentified 
third-party users (1973, p. 41). A glimpse of what the future may hold, 
however, may be found in the court’s speculations in Rusch Factors:
The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted .. . and this 
court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to 
carry the weighty burden of an accountant’s professional malpractice? Isn’t 
the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on 
the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the 
risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire 
consuming public? Finally, wouldn’t a rule of foreseeability elevate the 
cautionary techniques of the accounting profession?
Requirements for Determining Deceit
Third parties bring actions under common law, as noted earlier, on 
the grounds of deceit (fraud) or negligence. If the action is in deceit, 
“ the plaintiff will have to prove (1) a false representation [of a material 
fact], (2) some form of knowledge of the falsity [or its equivalent], (3) 
an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action, (4)
the account been correctly stated. For example, the accountant’s negligence pro­
duced errors of $33,069.22. The court subtracted $5,000 as the margin of error 
beyond which the accountants had not warranted correctness and added $1,380 as 
the reasonable cost of producing a corrected report, to produce a sum of $30,­
069.22. Thus the damages were the same as if the parties had contracted for the 
services” (Marinelli, 1971, p. 121). The liability to foreseen persons under the Second 
Restatement does not appear to be so limited, but would apparently extend to the 
full amount of the losses suffered by the third party.
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justifiable reliance, and (5) resultant damage” (Fiflis, 1975a, p. 103). If 
the action is for negligence, the first, fourth, and fifth elements will still 
be necessary, but the second element would be replaced by “a failure 
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or commu­
nicating the information.”3 The third element involves the issue of the 
required plaintiff-defendant relationship that was discussed above. The 
purpose of this section is to elaborate the judicial requirements under 
common law for the second element of deceit, some form of knowl­
edge of the falsity or its equivalent, commonly referred to as the 
scienter requirement.4
The requirement for scienter is essentially a requirement to prove 
an intent to injure.5 In some jurisdictions, scienter may be established 
by proof of any of the following three elements:
1. Actual knowledge of the falsity of the representation.
2. A lack of knowledge of the truth of the representation.
3. A reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the representation 
(Marinelli, 1971, p. 123).6
Fiflis noted that the definition of scienter in common law cases varies 
both between jurisdictions and from case to case within a jurisdiction. 
“Even if one verbal formula is used, the evidence to meet it varies from 
case to case” (1975a, p. 102).
The scienter requirement is closely related to the privity notion, as 
can be illustrated through the Ultramares case. If the jury were to find 
that the defendant auditors expressed an unqualified opinion on the 
financial statements when they had no knowledge of the facts, and if 
this would support an allegation of fraud, then liability for the tort of
3. Fiflis, 1975a, p. 103, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 552 (Tent. Draft no. 
12, 1966).
4. The next chapter will address the question of the need for scienter under SEC rule 
10b-5. To a large extent, the notion of scienter discussed in this chapter serves as 
an introduction to the discussion of its applicability in 10b-5 cases. The notion is 
appropriately addressed here, however, because it has its roots and formulation in 
common law.
5. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court defined scienter as “a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” In McLean v. 
Alexander (1976) the Delaware district court noted that the Supreme Court in 
Hochfelder "explicitly left undefined the parameters of scienter. . . . ” In McLean, the 
district court found “the requisite scienter. . . present in the form of knowing 
misconduct.”
6. In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court expressly left unresolved the question whether, in 
some circumstances, reckless behavior is a form of intentional conduct sufficient for 
civil liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 
10b-5 thereunder. The district court in McLean found “ little reason to distinguish 
between knowing misbehavior and reckless misbehavior under Section 10b and Rule 
10b-5.”
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deceit or fraud could extend to third parties not in a contractual 
relationship with the auditor (privity). Without scienter, the case would 
not be one involving deceit or fraud. As noted previously, the class of 
persons to whom the auditor is liable for less than fraudulent acts is 
limited. Under common law, then, the distinction between negligence 
and fraud is significant, and this distinction rests essentially on the 
requirement for scienter.
The question of the requirement for scienter and the elements that 
constitute scienter are further explored in the discussion in the follow­
ing chapter of the evolution of the auditor’s liability for negligence 
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 
thereunder.
Liability to Clients
The auditor’s exposure to liability to his client has not been a 
significant source of litigation until recently. This can be explained in 
part by the relatively unchanged legal climate surrounding that ex­
posure. As noted earlier, liability to clients (established under common 
law) is based either on the contractual relationship between the two 
parties or on the law of torts. In either case, claims against the auditor 
by his client in most jurisdictions would rest in negligence. Negligence 
results from a failure to exercise due professional care, which essen­
tially means adherence to generally accepted auditing standards.7
Charges of negligence against the auditor by the client (or by a 
bonding company under rights of subrogation) often result from a 
failure to detect defalcations or misappropriations. In 1926, Craig v. 
Anyon established the principle that contributory negligence by the 
client plaintiff would be a defense by the auditor. Baird noted, but does 
not identify, a 1937 case that refined this concept by holding that client 
negligence would be a defense “only when it has contributed to the 
accountant’s failure to perform his contract and report the truth” (1970, 
pp. 7-8). In his remarks to the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
in Toronto on July 10, 1975, K. S. Gunning reported a case, then under 
appeal, in which the client successfully brought action against the 
auditor for bonuses paid based on overstated profits even though the 
client's officers (who were not the recipients of the bonuses) were 
aware of the overstated profits. Gunning asked:
Just where does this decision leave the cherished myth which we publish
in our professional literature that the financial statements are the respon-
7. Causes of action by third parties against the auditor, such as gross negligence 
amounting to constructive fraud and deceit, would also be causes of action by 
clients.
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sibility of the client, and that we as auditors are responsible solely for an 
expression of opinion on them? If the client company itself can successfully 
sue an auditor for errors in its own financial statements, where senior 
officers themselves were aware of those errors and had not disclosed them 
to the auditors, it would seem that we should stop whistling that tired old 
tune.
The auditor is also potentially liable to his client for negligence in 
rendering an inappropriate opinion that damages the client. This 
places the auditor potentially at risk to the client as well as to third 
parties for errors in judgment regarding the type of opinion to be 
rendered and the specific wording to be used. Earle suggested that
this potential liability places considerable pressure on the auditor when he 
must make close judgments. If he mistakenly decides that the accounting 
policies of his client do not conform to generally accepted accounting 
principles, he may be sued for the damage caused by the alleged mis­
judgment. Every accountant is aware that his expression of an adverse, 
qualified, or disclaimer of opinion on the client’s financial statements ex­
poses him to the risk of litigation if his client subsequently establishes that 
the company’s accounting policies are authoritatively supported in the 
professional literature. This is not an attempt to excuse the accountant who 
too readily delivers an unqualified opinion, but to emphasize a considera­
tion that is too easily overlooked. As matters now stand, the auditor faces 
the possibility of suit whichever way he decides: by management, on the 
one hand, or by third parties, on the other. No other profession is obliged 
to pick its way through such a mine field. [1975, p. 153]
Potential liability also derives from the implicit fiduciary relationship 
between the auditor and client. Confidential client information obtained 
during an audit may be disclosed by the auditor only if that disclosure 
is required for the fair presentation of financial information in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles. Liability would extend 
for damages caused by breaching the fiduciary relationship through 
the improper disclosure of confidential information.
There are indications of a recent increase in the number of cases 
brought against auditors by their clients or by the client’s insurance 
company under rights of subrogation. Those cases are primarily for 
failures to detect employee fraud but also for alleged deficiencies in 
the rendering of management advisory services. This phenomenon is 
occurring at a time when new claims by third parties appear to have 
peaked or even slightly decreased. The cost of defending against a 
claim by a client will not be much lower than the cost of defending 
against a third party plaintiff, although the monetary exposure will likely 
not be as great in most cases. This development has been too recent 
to permit an assessment of either its cause or its eventual effect.
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Auditor Liability Under the 
Federal Securities Acts
The principal provisions of the federal securities acts that have 
determined the auditor’s civil liability are section 11 of the Securities 
Act of 1933 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(and rule 10b-5 thereunder). Auditors may also be liable under other 
sections of the acts. Section 12(2) of the 1933 act and sections 9 and 
18 of the 1934 act contain express liability provisions. Civil liability may 
also be implied under section 17(a) of the 1933 act and section 14 of 
the 1934 act. However, relatively little litigation involving auditors has 
taken place under these sections.
The Securities Act of 1933
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes civil liability on the 
auditor for misrepresentations or omissions of material facts in a regis­
tration statement. Levy summarized the effect of that section on the 
auditor as follows:
1. Any person acquiring securities described in the Registration Statement 
may sue the accountant, regardless of the fact that he is not the client 
of the accountant.
2. His claim may be based upon an alleged false statement or misleading 
omission in the financial statements, which constitutes his prima facie 
case. The plaintiff does not have the further burden of proving that the 
accountants were negligent or fraudulent in certifying to the financial 
statements involved.
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3. The plaintiff does not have to prove that he relied upon the statement or 
that the loss which he suffered was the proximate result of the falsity or 
misleading character of the financial statement.
4. The accountant has thrust upon him the burden of establishing his 
freedom from negligence and fraud by proving that he had, after rea­
sonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe that 
the financial statements to which he certified, were true not only as of 
the date of the financial statements, but beyond that, as of the time 
when the Registration Statement became effective.
5. The accountant has the burden of establishing by way of defense or in 
reduction of alleged damages, that the loss of the plaintiff resulted in 
whole or in part from causes other than the false statements or the 
misleading omissions in the financial statements. Under the common 
law it would have been part of the plaintiff’s affirmative case to prove 
that the damages which he claims he sustained were proximately 
caused by the negligence or fraud of the accountants. [1952, p. 39]
Section 11 thus expands auditor liability to third parties beyond that 
of common law in the following significant ways:
1. Privity is not a necessary element.
2. The burden of proof, beyond proving a material misstatement of 
fact, is shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant.
3. The auditor owes to third parties a standard of care described as 
the exercise of “due diligence”—a reasonable investigation leading 
to a belief that the financial statements are neither false nor 
misleading.
4. Because proof of fraud or deceit is not necessary, scienter is not 
required.
5. The plaintiff need not prove that he relied on the financial state­
ments or the auditor’s report thereon, but the defendant auditor will 
prevail if he proves the plaintiff knew of the “ untruth or omission.”
The first significant judicial interpretation of section 11 did not ap­
pear until 1968, and relatively few cases since have alleged auditor 
violations of section 11 (Marinelli, 1971, p. 123).
In Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp. the suit, based upon Section 11, 
was a class action against a bowling alley construction corporation which 
issued debentures, and against its auditors for damages sustained as a 
result of false statements and material omissions in the prospectus con­
tained in the registration statement.. . . There appears to be no need for 
privity of contract, or knowledge, or gross misconduct for liability to ensue 
under Section 11.
A defense to an action under Section 11 is a showing that the accountant 
pursued a reasonable course of investigation and had reasonable grounds 
to believe and did believe that the statements therein were true and that
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there was no omission to state a material fact. What is a reasonable 
investigation? “[T]he standard of reasonableness shall be that required of 
a prudent man in the management of his own property.” The court in 
BarChris, saying that the accountant should not be held to a standard 
higher than that recognized in the profession, held that the diligence 
pursued by the accountant did not meet that minimum standard. [Murphy, 
1973, p. 390]
Gormley suggested that this case “ demonstrated prominently that de­
fendants’ burden in public securities offerings under section 11 is 
indeed as heavy as informed persons had long supposed” (1974, p. 
1216).
A controversial aspect of the 1933 act concerns the issues of 
reliance and causation. The auditor’s liability is to purchasers of se­
curities who may not have relied on the financial statements or the 
auditor’s opinion or who may not even have known of their existence. 
Section 11(e) provides a causation defense, but it clearly places the 
burden on the defendant auditor by providing that
if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents 
other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such 
part of the registration statement, with respect to which his liability is 
asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be 
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, 
such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable.
The causation defense is onerous; the defendant must prove that 
factors other than the misleading statements caused the loss. The 
courts have rarely considered the causation defense in section 11 
cases against auditors because damages in such cases are usually 
determined in out-of-court settlements. For example, in BarChris, the 
court “ deferred decision of this issue until the claim of each individual 
plaintiff is separately considered.” Damages in BarChris were settled 
out of court, so the defendants did not have the opportunity to assert 
the existence of other factors.
George O. May has remarked,
I cannot believe that a law is just or can long be maintained in effect which 
deliberately contemplated the possibility that a purchaser may recover 
from a person from whom he has not bought, in respect of a statement 
which at the time of his purchase he had not read, contained in a docu­
ment which he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not to be 
measured by injury resulting from falsity in such statement. [1936, p. 69]
Whether the law “can long be maintained” seems moot forty-three 
years after its passage. Its justness is another matter. The issues of on 
whom the burden of proof should fall and who should demonstrate the 
link between the auditor’s work and the plaintiff’s loss are not easily 
resolved. The issue appears to have been decided by Congress on
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public policy grounds based on the climate that existed in 1933 and 
the objectives of the 1933 act taken as a whole.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court opinion noted in the Hochfelder 
decision, “each of the express civil remedies in the 1933 act allowing 
recovery for negligent conduct is subject to significant procedural 
restrictions” that are not applicable when something more than negli­
gence must be proven. ‘‘Section 11(e) of the 1933 Act, for example, 
authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit under section
11, section 12(2), or section 15 thereof to post a bond for costs, 
including attorneys’ fees, and in specified circumstances to assess 
costs at the conclusion of the litigation. Section 13 specifies a statute of 
limitations of one year from the time the violation was or should have 
been discovered, in no event to exceed three years from the time of 
offer or sale, applicable to actions brought under section 11, section 
12(2), or section 15. . . .” 1 Section 10 of the 1934 act, under which most 
1934 act claims against auditors have been brought, has no compara­
ble restrictions. The higher standard of care required by the 1933 act 
and the burden of proof it places on the auditor are, then, not without 
some compensating procedural controls.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Section 18(a) of the 1934 act explicitly imposes liability on the 
auditor for filing a false or misleading statement.2 Unlike section 11 of 
the 1933 act, section 18 exculpates the defendant on proof “ that he 
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was 
false or misleading.”3
The auditor need not, therefore, prove the absence of negligence. 
As a result of these conditions,
Section 18 seems to have added very little to the prospects of successful 
recovery by investors for false or misleading statements against account­
1. The Court also noted that “Congress regarded these restrictions on private damage 
actions as significant.”
2. “Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, 
report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation there­
under or any undertaking contained in a registration statement. .. which statement 
was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false 
or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not 
knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such 
statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by 
such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued 
shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement 
was false or misleading” (15 USC § 78r (1971), Liability for misleading statements).
3. Unlike section 11 of the 1933 act, section 18 applies to both buyers and sellers and 
requires reliance on the statements by them in all cases.
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ants beyond common law deceit actions and section 11 actions. As Pro­
fessor Loss has pointed out: “Except for avoiding any question that the 
person making the false statement or causing it to be made can be sued 
by the buyer or seller notwithstanding the absence of privity between them, 
it is hard to see what advantage §18 gives the investor that he does not 
have in common law deceit.” Regardless of the utility of section 18 in 
protecting investors, judicial authority [Fischer v. Kletz (1967)] has made it 
clear that accountants are indeed subject to its express liability. [Marinelli, 
1971, p. 133]
Marinelli may not have given sufficient attention to the effect of no 
privity requirement in section 18. The importance of that section may 
well lie in the absence of a privity requirement. The plaintiff need not 
have a transaction with the registrant. As the courts restrict plaintiff 
access under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the expressed liability 
provision of section 18 may become significant.
Implied civil liability has been recognized by the courts under 
section 10(b) of the 1934 act and SEC rule 10b-5.4 The second prohibi­
tion of the rule requires a plaintiff buyer or seller of securities to 
establish that the auditor (though not specifically mentioned in the 
section or the rule) made “an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omit[ted] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances in which they were 
made, not misleading.”
The SEC enacted rule 10b-5 in 1942 as a disciplinary weapon for its 
own use, “ for the purpose of curing a peculiar hiatus in the scheme of 
federal securities regulation that provided a fulsome system of penal­
ties for the fraudulent seller of securities, but was completely silent as 
far as fraudulent purchases were concerned” (Sommer, 1972, p. 26).
Rule 10b-5 was intended purely as an enforcement tool for the Commis­
sion. In 1946 an imaginative plaintiffs counsel and a creative court com-
4. The pertinent portion of section 10(b) reads: “ It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or of the mails, or of any facilities of any national securities exchange. 
. . .  (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors” (15 USC 78j(b) (1971)). Rule 10b-5 
reads: “ It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in 
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security” (15 USC 78j(b) (1964)).
23
bined to yield the conclusion that Rule 10b-5 was not only available to the 
Commission for enforcement purposes but was available to private claim­
ants as well who could establish they had been harmed by a violation of 
the Rule. Thus was opened the floodgate through which oceans of litigation 
have passed in the intervening twenty-six years, virtually to the point that 
other more explicit liability-creating provisions of the federal securities laws 
have been vastly overshadowed as litigants sought the benefits of Rule 
10b-5. [Sommer, 1972, p. 26]5
Sommer further points out that the rule omits many details defining 
the conditions of liability. “There is no specification of those to whom 
liability may run, there is no measure of damages, there is no limitation 
upon those who may be held responsible.” Similarly, the rule does not 
state that showing reasonable investigation and belief is an adequate 
defense. While in some jurisdictions auditors had been held liable to 
third parties under the rule for mere negligence in rendering their 
opinions, prior to the Hochfelder decision it was not clear whether 
negligence created monetary liability for a rule 10b-5 offender (Som­
mer, 1972, p. 31-32).6
5. Milton V. Freeman (1967, p. 922), the drafter of rule 10b-5, reported the origination 
of the rule. “ It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in 
the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was 
then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, 'I have just been 
on the telephone with Paul Rowen,’ who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator 
in Boston, ‘and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston, 
who is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own share­
holders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing 
very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be 
$2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?’ So he 
came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I 
looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had 
there was where ‘in connection with the purchase or sale’ should be, and we 
decided it should be at the end. We called the Commission and we got on the 
calendar, and I don’t remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch. 
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the commis­
sioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody 
said anything except Sumner Pike who said, ‘Well,’ he said, ‘we are against fraud, 
aren't we?’ That is how it happened. Louis [Loss] is absolutely right that I never 
thought that twenty-odd years later it would be the biggest thing that had ever 
happened. It was intended to give the Commission power to deal with this problem. 
It had no relation in the Commission’s contemplation to private proceedings. How it 
got into private proceedings was by the ingenuity of members of the private Bar 
starting with the Kardon case. It has been developed by the private lawyers, the 
members of the Bar, with the assistance or, if you don’t like it, connivance of the 
federal judiciary, who thought this was a very fine fundamental idea and that it 
should be extended. Recently we have seen among the people who have joined 
the private Bar in extending it the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
and I think that this is something that you can think of as either a good thing or a 
bad thing."
6. Sommer noted that “despite this uncertainty, however, it is reported that accounting 
firms or their insurance carriers have paid several millions of dollars in settling 
claims that appear to have been based on negligence.” Suits with little chance of 
success may have a settlement value because they are expensive to defend and 
may frustrate the normal business activities of the defendant. Language to this 
effect was also used by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores (1975).
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In summary, the creation and use of rule 10b-5 have had several 
consequences. It has extended the auditor’s liability to sellers as well 
as to buyers. For many years in some jurisdictions it created the 
possibility of huge damages as a result of simple negligence. There 
can be little doubt that for the thirty-four years between its enactment 
in 1942 and the Hochfelder ruling in 1976, “the legal environment 
surrounding Rule 10b-5 [was] alive with prospects for an extension of 
legal doctrines which would increase accountants’ risks” (Reiling and 
Taussig, 1970, p. 41).
Over those years a struggle took place in the courts over whether 
auditors and others were liable under rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations 
or omissions that were negligent but not fraudulent (Gormley, 1974, p. 
1221). (Fraud requires scienter; negligence does not.)
The first and third prohibitions of the rule expressly refer to fraud. But the 
second prohibition, considered in isolation, might be construed to connote 
negligence, because it refers to an “untrue statement of a material fact” or 
an “omission of a material fact necessary to make the statements made not 
misleading in the circumstances.” [Gormley, 1974, p. 1221]
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had a scienter requirement, 
which mandated a higher degree of auditor culpability than mere 
negligence. The seventh, eighth, and tenth circuits did not appear to 
require scienter, and therefore negligence alone sufficed. The ninth 
circuit had a “ flexible duty standard” that avoided the term completely. 
The disparate appeals court rulings on the scienter issue were re­
solved by the Supreme Court in 1976 with its decision in Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder.
The complaint in Hochfelder charged that Ernst & Ernst had vio­
lated rule 10b-5 by its failure to conduct proper audits and thereby 
aided and abetted a fraud perpetrated by the president of a securities 
firm. The plaintiff’s cause of action rested on a theory of negligent 
nonfeasance; they "specifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or 
intentional misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst.” The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether a private 
cause of action for damages will lie under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 
in the absence of any allegations of “scienter.” The Court concluded 
that it will not.
When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and decep­
tion, and of implementing devices and contrivances—the commonly under­
stood terminology of intentional wrongdoing—and when its history reflects 
no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the 
statute to negligent conduct.
The decision deals solely with section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. It does 
not remove the negligence standard for civil liability under the federal 
securities laws generally. The negligence standard under those laws is,
25
however, confined to those sections where Congress expressly intend­
ed it to apply or where the courts have determined that imposing 
liability without scienter in the implied liability sections of the law is 
compatible with the statutory scheme. For example, a negligence 
standard is still applicable to liability under section 11 of the 1933 act. 
Also, a negligence standard applied in a case involving the 1934 act’s 
proxy rules, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo (1973). In that case the ap­
peals court held it was not necessary “to establish any evil motive or 
even reckless disregard of the facts.”
The Supreme Court’s definition of scienter is a strict one. More than 
knowledge of the alleged wrongful act is necessary to constitute scien­
ter under section 10; there must be actual intent to deceive, manipu­
late, or defraud.
Still, the courts must determine whether scienter is present in a 
particular case, and this could lead to a possible erosion of the 
Supreme Court’s strict definition. For example, in a post-Hochfelder 
decision, Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills (1976), the court found that 
the auditor acted with scienter in failing to disclose known weaknesses 
in internal control.7
. . . with full knowledge of Chadbourn’s deficient edp and other internal 
weaknesses, defendant conducted its 1969 audit as though Chadbourn 
was as sound as a dollar used to be—clearly deviating from GAAP, GAAS 
and the provisions of Peat’s own audit manual. The court finds and holds 
the proof in this case clearly established that, with the knowledge defend­
ant possessed prior to, during and after the 1969 audit compared against 
the content of Peat’s 1969 Chadbourn financial statements, defendant 
acted willfully, with intent to “deceive” and “manipulate” and in “ reckless 
disregard for the truth.”
The Court noted in Hochfelder that “ in certain areas of the law, 
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for 
purposes of imposing liability for some act.” However, the Court stated 
that “we need not address here the question whether in some circum­
stances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5.” Liggio (1976) believed that as a result
the Court may have left the door slightly ajar to its holding that a scienter 
standard embracing intent is necessary. Most plaintiffs and the SEC will 
seize on this and argue that recklessness or complete indifference can 
raise itself to the level of scienter for liability under section 10(b). There are 
several responses to this particular line of argumentation. First, the very 
language of the holding only suggests that there “might be,” not that there 
are, circumstances where this would suffice. It does not say that such
7. This and other post -Hochfelder decisions that bear on the scienter requirement are 
discussed in Olson, 1976.
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circumstances would exist or that the Court has any idea whether they in 
fact do exist. Moreover, given the overall tenor of the opinion, it appears 
that the common law standard of recklessness would be the standard 
which the Court would apply; that standard, which has its origins in early 
New York cases, is one of complete indifference and willful disregard of 
the truth and is equivalent to a “mental state of mind embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate or defraud.”
In McLean v. Alexander (1976), decided in the Delaware district 
court subsequent to Hochfelder, the court stated that
the auditor’s conduct constitutes far more than mere negligence, but falls 
short of a preconceived actual intent to defraud. His behavior embraces 
both actual knowledge of material facts not revealed and reckless dis­
regard for the truth.. . .  Reckless disregard for the truth is . . .  a cognizable 
basis for liability in common-law fraud actions. There is no hint in 
Hochfelder that the court intended a radical departure from accepted 
principles. . . . The common law, precedent in other fields, and the legisla­
tive history of 10b all buttress the viewpoint that 10b-5 liability ought to 
attach upon a showing of recklessness.
Litigation against accountants under the securities acts may de­
crease as a result of the Hochfelder decision. However, until the 
question of recklessness is resolved, plaintiffs could plead a reckless 
breach of the accountant’s duty to adhere to professional standards. 
Private litigants may allege scienter, but there are procedural remedies 
to prevent boilerplate allegations of fraud. The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure require that allegations of fraud must be stated “with par­
ticularity.” If plaintiff and counsel are found to have not believed in 
good faith that the necessary scienter is present, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure [9(b) and 11] also provide for appropriate disciplinary 
action (Liggio, 1976).
Rule 9(b) motions to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with particularity 
were frequently granted even before Hochfelder. On the other hand, some 
judges required little or no particularity. In part, one may surmise, this was 
the result of lingering uncertainty about whether or not the law really 
required plaintiff to prove actual “fraud” in order to recover damages under 
Rule 10b-5. That uncertainty no longer exists, and one may predict that in 
cases attacking their integrity, accountants and others will now be even 
more successful in requiring counsel bringing the action to spell out in the 
complaint the basic details of the alleged fraud. [Olson, 1976]
“ Rule 11 further provides that for a willful violation the attorney may 
be subject to disciplinary action” (Olson, 1976). Rule 11 is powerful, but 
its power has rarely been applied by the courts. A notable exception is 
found in the judicial proceedings in Oringer v. Equity Funding (1973). 
In those proceedings, the court found that
at the time of signing and filing the Complaint herein, Alvin B. Green did 
not believe and had no information which could reasonably justify any
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belief that he had any good grounds to support his joinder of Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher [a law firm] as a defendant or to support any of the 
allegations of the Complaint as they relate to Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.. ..
In signing and filing the Complaint, Alvin B. Green willfully violated the 
provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the 
Complaint should be stricken as sham and false insofar as it relates to 
defendant Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.
The court ordered Green to pay Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher $2,000 as 
attorney’s fees.
It should now be clear that plaintiffs counsel must have “good ground” to 
believe a particular defendant acted with intent to defraud before adding 
him as a defendant. Unless counsel filing class action complaints begin to 
exercise more discretion, Hochfelder should result in more disciplinary 
action being taken where peripheral defendants are named simply be­
cause they have a “deep pocket,” and it is hoped that they may be willing 
to contribute to a settlement. [Olson, 1976]
The effect of the Hochfelder decision on the total volume of litiga­
tion against auditors is uncertain because of provisions similar to rule 
10(b)(5) in state laws. As Kramer noted,
a number of state securities laws contain a section which is almost identi­
cal in its language to Rule 10b-5. The source is the Uniform Securities Act, 
which has been adopted, with variations, in more than 30 states. The 
Uniform Securities Act itself contains another provision which is designed 
to assure that a violation of the section will not be made the basis for civil 
liability. In some states, however, this provision has not been adopted and 
in some there have been various other departures from the Uniform Se­
curities Act, so in certain states civil liability could be based on a violation 
of the section. The Hochfelder decision is an interpretation of the federal 
law only and will not of itself be binding on any court as an interpretation of 
the law of any state. Therefore, where these state statutes are applicable 
and could lead to civil liability, there is nothing to prevent a court from 
concluding that they can be the basis for damages based on negligence 
of the defendants, even though they may not have had any intent to 
deceive, manipulate or defraud. Similarly, the Hochfelder decision will not 
of itself control the result to be reached under state common law or other 
state statutes. It is too early to tell whether the Hochfelder decision will lead 
to an increase in the number of negligence-oriented civil securities suits 
brought under state law but it is at least possible that it may. [1976, p. 13]
Hochfelder is only the most recent of a series of cases involving the 
securities laws in which the Supreme Court has significantly limited 
plaintiffs rights in civil damage suits. In several instances the Court 
has indicated that securities litigation must be confined. Hochfelder is 
thus one further indication of the Court’s reluctance to interpret the 
securities acts in a manner that would permit the plaintiff bar to assist 
the SEC (given its budget constraints) in enforcing those acts.
Several observers have suggested that the Supreme Court decisions in the 
securities area are a reflection of the Court’s concern for its overcrowded
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dockets and the expansion of the Federal jurisdiction as an attempted 
cure-all for problems. Although no opinion has flatly stated this is the 
reason, the effect of recent securities decisions is to force cases back into 
the state court system. This process would relieve the severely over­
crowded federal judiciary and return to the state courts those cases which 
properly belong and should be litigated there. [Liggio, 1976]
Liggio also viewed the Hochfelder decision as containing
a clear warning that the courts should not seek to interpret the securities 
laws expansively (to new frontiers) and impose hazards or unreasonable 
burdens upon experts (such as accountants) who are providing services 
under the securities laws.
Notwithstanding the restrictiveness of this message, I do not view it as a 
limitation on the oft-quoted maxim that the securities laws are to be inter­
preted broadly and not restrictively. The two concepts are not incompati­
ble. The latter is designed to allow the securities laws to deal with persons 
perpetrating innovative “frauds” not comprehended by the levels of sophis­
tication present in 1934 when the Act was passed—such as those involving 
new types of securities.
Thus, the need for a catch-all section 10(b). But it should not be used as 
the vehicle for creating new responsibilities on professionals in connection 
with securities transactions or to create new causes of action not contem­
plated by Congress—e.g., for negligence when Congress only intended 
relief for fraud. [Liggio, 1976]
Class Action Suits and the Contingent Fee System
The class action suit against auditors emerged during the 1960s and 
significantly increased the risk of litigation both in terms of the number of 
suits and the magnitude of potential damages. Virtually all landmark cases 
against auditors during the 1960s and early 1970s have involved public 
companies, and accordingly, the number of (plaintiff) users of financial 
data runs into the thousands. [Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 1976, p. 94]
Class action suits and the contingent fee system, under which 
lawyers (and possibly other experts) are retained, are procedural tools 
that make damage suits under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 
and rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 economically 
attractive to the plaintiff bar.8 The attractiveness of such suits results 
from the size of the monetary awards resulting from litigation or settle­
ment and the portion of those awards granted by the courts to lawyers 
as fees. Gormley suggested that “the efforts to adapt securities litiga­
tion to the class action form is intensely controversial, and the fairness 
and efficiency of class actions in securities litigations is disputed and 
unproved” (1974, p. 1214).
8. That attractiveness would be lessened by a statutory limitation to the amount of 
damages such as the one proposed by the American Law Institute. See chapter 5.
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The Legal Bases for Class Actions
An amendment of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
effective July 1, 1966 “ liberalized the conditions under which one or a 
few purchasers, sellers or, in some instances, holders of securities 
could institute a collective lawsuit on behalf of themselves and as 
representatives of other purchasers, sellers or holders who are similarly 
situated, without the necessity for each member of the class to formally 
join the lawsuit as a party” (Gormley, 1974, p. 1214). Certain princi­
ples—some specifically stated in rule 23 and others derived from 
judicial interpretation—determine the appropriateness of class actions 
in particular cases. These were summarized by the court in Pearson v. 
Ecological Science Corp. (1973).
1. Do common questions of law and fact predominate, or are they out­
weighed by the questions of law and fact that are peculiar to individual, 
potential class members?
2. Can the present plaintiffs fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the proposed class?
3. Are the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the 
class action so great that this procedural remedy could impair the just 
application of the substantive law?
4. Are the benefits accruing to the proposed class members, through 
consolidation of the claims, sufficient to justify bringing them before the 
court involuntarily?
The requirement that common questions of law and fact predomi­
nate is subject to judicial interpretation in specific cases. Gormley 
criticized the courts’ handling of this element of class actions:
The predominance of common issues in securities cases is often thrown 
into doubt by the disparities of successive alleged misrepresentations over 
a period of time, which properly analyzed involve separate factual issues, 
and in which the transactions of individual representative plaintiffs result in 
interests which are conflicting and therefore are not representative of the 
class as required by the rule. Plaintiffs attempt to gloss over these dis­
parities by claiming that the alleged misrepresentations are the interrelated, 
interdependent and cumulative product of a common course of conduct, 
and courts have shown a dismaying tendency to accept these claims in 
the interest of supporting the class action. The result has been coercive 
pressure upon defendants to buy peace by settlement.
Auditors and other defendants may be victimized by a mass-produced 
justice which tortures separate substantive issues applicable to different 
defendants, such as issuer, executive officers, directors, underwriters, and 
auditors, into an inappropriate statement of so-called “common” issues, 
regardless of differences of time and other events and circumstances 
applicable to different defendants.. ..
If defendants are not to be deprived of their legal right to fair adjudication 
of these individual issues, cases ruled by courts to be class actions may 
subsequently prove incapable of orderly administration, because indi­
vidual, rather than common, issues predominate in fact.
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It is the understandable inclination of class action plaintiffs, and a tempta­
tion to the courts, to apply presumptions and inferences as to the various 
individual elements which must be proved in establishing a claim, in an 
effort to make “manageable” a proceeding which is inherently unmanage­
able. In a jury case, an award of lump sum damages, or the trial of liability 
and damages by different juries, raise substantial constitutional issues of 
due process involving defendants’ right to a jury trial. In all cases, constitu­
tional issues are raised by presumptions which shift burdens of proof and 
by depriving defendants of their right of cross-examination of individual 
plaintiffs. [1974, pp. 1214-16]
Private action for damages under the 1934 act requires plaintiff’s 
reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation or omissions in making 
his investment or disinvestment decision.9 A question arises of what 
the relationship between the defendant’s activity and the plaintiff’s 
injury should be in order to impose liability. As the district court noted 
in McLean v. Alexander (1976), “causation is understood to be an 
essential element of a private action for damages, lest 10b ‘establish a 
scheme of investor insurance’ by which ‘defendant could be held liable 
to all the world.’ Causation is established by “'he reliance requirement 
[which] provides the causal link between the non-disclosure [or mis­
representation] and the loss suffered.’ ”
The very nature of a class action suggests that individual proof of 
reliance by each member of the class would be impracticable. In Grad 
v. Memorex (1973) the district court noted:
Defendants argue that in order to recover, each of the potential 60,000 
class members must prove he actually relied on the defendants’ alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions in making his decision to purchase 
Memorex stock during the relevant time period. Upon this premise, defend­
ants further urge that due process requires they be given the opportunity 
to depose and cross-examine each class member. If the court were to 
accept this argument, it is apparent the cause would fail as a class action 
for two reasons; first, the individual questions of actual reliance would 
predominate over common questions, and, second, the case would be 
rendered totally unmanageable, thus preventing findings under 23(b)(3) 
necessary to certify the class.
In Societe Generale v. Touche Ross (1975), the district court noted 
three other concepts of reliance that make class actions feasible.
The first concept is found among some Rule 10b-5 decisions, wherein the 
investor’s “ reliance” is based not so much on particular misrepresentations 
as on the “artificially inflated price” of securities that may have been the 
result of a series of misrepresentations. This theory has found its most 
explicit exposition in Grad v. Memorex Corp. . . .
9. For a detailed discussion of the reliance issue, see Ruder, 1976.
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The second theory that can be utilized in this action to avoid the actual, 
individual demonstration of reliance by each claimant is found in the United 
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United 
States (1972). In that case, the Court held that when an action proceeds, in 
whole or in part, on the nondisclosure of material facts, all that is required 
is that a reasonable investor might have considered the facts withheld as 
"material” to his investing decision.10 This reasoning has been extended to 
apply to firms of certified public accountants.. . .
The final concept is the “constructive reliance principle” announced in 
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp .. . , wherein the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that “[t]he reliance 
standard also has been relaxed under certain circumstances; for example, 
if a material omission or misstatement is proven, a presumption may be 
raised that the plaintiff relied on the deception to his detriment.” This rule is 
particularly applicable to impersonal, open market transactions such as are 
involved in the instant case: "Where the transaction is accomplished 
through impersonal dealings, such as on a stock exchange, or for some 
other reasons the factors that influenced the parties are not readily appar­
ent, the decisions have discussed liability in terms of the ‘materiality’ of the 
misrepresentation.. . .  This constructive reliance principle is particularly ap­
propriate in class actions where proof of actual reliance by numerous class 
members would be impracticable.”
More recently, in Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., the court, after quoting 
the above language from the Chris-Craft case, said: "Allowing a presump­
tion of reliance by a showing of materiality—i.e., constructive reliance—in 
cases involving open market transactions follows the same reasoning as 
allowing such a presumption in cases of nondisclosure. In both instances 
there are practical difficulties in proving reliance. In ‘fraud on the market’ 
cases—as opposed to face-to-face dealings—the causation requirement 
can be satisfied if plaintiffs can show that the misrepresentations affected 
the market (artificial price inflation) and damaged the plaintiffs. As in cases 
of nondisclosure, proof of materiality leads to a logical inference of re­
liance. If the reasonable investor would have been influenced to purchase 
by the alleged material misrepresentation and omissions then many traders 
in the market may have been similarly influenced.”
In Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp. (1973), the district court in 
denying class action status took an opposite view regarding misrepre­
sentations:
Settled, however, in the view of this court, is the requirement that reliance 
be shown, in order to recover in cases such as the one at bar wherein the 
complaint alleges damages ensuing primarily from the communication of 
brochures and financial reports.. . . Yet, clearly, not every member of the 
enormous proposed class in the instant case purchased Ecological stock 
in reliance on each of the communications in issue, and it cannot even be 
assumed that any particular potential member of the proposed class relied 
on any of the specific communications.
10. In TSC Industries v. Northway (1976), the Supreme Court considered the definition 
of a material fact under the proxy rules.
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Thus, in view of the requirement of establishing reliance on the commu­
nications, judicial proceedings would be necessitated to determine 
whether, in fact, each individual member of the proposed class relied upon 
any of the alleged misrepresentations spanning nearly a three-year period. 
Such a determination would involve an analysis of the sophistication of 
each buyer, the extent of each buyer’s knowledge of the numerous alleged 
fraudulent representations. Even accepting plaintiffs’ characterization of 
their claim as one of market manipulation—i.e., that the price of Ecological 
stock was artificially inflated as the result of the totality of the misleading 
communications—the time and amount of such allegedly inflated price as 
related to each purchaser would be critical in determining the rights of 
each individual member of the proposed class.
The viewpoint of the auditor can be found in Henry Hill’s suggestion 
that there should be a “doctrine of proximate cause” for auditors’ 
liability: “ I believe there should be some requirement that the plaintiff 
has read the financial statements if he intends to sue the accountants 
or the company on the basis that they are misleading. . . . [W]e need to 
establish some connection between the misdeeds of the accountant 
and the damages to the investor. We should require the demonstration 
of some kind of association between the financial statements and the 
investment or disinvestment decision” (Hill, 1975, pp. 176-77). The 
“ some connection” or “some kind of association” would presumably be 
a causal link between the work of the auditor and the injury to the 
plaintiff.
The alternative view is summarized by Gonson:
If there is trading in the securities of a company, the current financial 
statements will, of course, affect that trading, and the persons who trade 
may be damaged by those statements proximately, even though they 
never read them. That is because analysts read them, and brokers read 
them, and other people read them, and they make recommendations to 
others who rely upon those recommendations. The plaintiff who buys is no 
less injured in such a situation. Why should the accountant’s liability be 
avoided, assuming, of course, that the financials were materially mislead­
ing and that the accountant was culpable? [1975, p. 193]
The link between the concepts of reliance and causation was also 
considered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Blackie v. Barrack 
(1975):
Moreover, proof of subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is 
unnecessary to establish a 10b-5 claim for a deception inflating the price of 
stock traded in the open market.. .. Proof of reliance is adduced to dem­
onstrate the causal connection between the defendant’s wrongdoing and 
the plaintiff’s loss. We think causation is adequately established in the 
impersonal stock exchange context by proof of purchase and of the mate­
riality of misrepresentations, without direct proof of reliance. Materiality 
circumstantially establishes the reliance of some market traders and hence 
the inflation in the stock price—when the purchase is made the causational 
chain between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s loss is sufficiently estab­
lished to make out a prima facie case.. ..
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Defendants argue that proof of causation solely by proof of materiality is 
inconsistent with the requirement of the traditional fraud action that a 
plaintiff prove directly both that the reasonable man would have acted on 
the misrepresentation (materiality), and that he himself acted on it, in order 
to establish the defendant’s responsibility for his loss, which justifies the 
compensatory recovery.
We disagree. The 10b-5 action remains compensatory; it is not predicated 
solely on a showing of economic damage (loss causation). We merely 
recognize that individual "transactional causation” can in these circum­
stances be inferred from the materiality of the misrepresentation . . and 
shift to defendant the burden of disproving a prima facie case of causa­
tion. Defendants may do so in at least 2 ways: (1) by disproving materiality 
or by proving that, despite materiality, an insufficient number of traders 
relied to inflate the price; and (2) by proving that an individual plaintiff 
purchased despite knowledge of the falsity of a representation, or that he 
would have, had he known of it.
The issue of reliance is often seen as a matter of choosing between 
options: a need to prove each investor’s reliance on the auditor’s work, 
versus no requisite showing of reliance because, presumably, the 
market price reflects the alleged misrepresentations. There may be a 
middle ground, but one that this study can merely suggest. The plain­
tiff could be required to show that the market price was affected by the 
auditor's work. However, that might be an impossible task, as sug­
gested by the controversy surrounding the contradictory evidence on 
the efficiency of capital markets in responding to information. Perhaps 
further development of the various forms of the efficient market hypoth­
esis will make this suggestion more practicable in the future.
It has been alleged that the courts have shown little restraint in 
affirming the appropriateness of class actions. The denial of class 
action status to litigants in some recent cases, however, on the 
grounds that the requisite conditions were absent lends credence to 
the views of one observer that “the courts are armed with ample 
powers to check abuses of class actions; and of late, judges seem 
confident in exercising those powers” (Andrews, 1975).11 As a result, 
“fundamental questions as to the efficacy and use of the class action 
are finally being given the attention they deserve in the courts” (Liggio, 
1973, p. 3).
The fundamental question is whether in fact the class action is unsuitable 
for most securities litigations because of the absence of predominant 
common questions and of plaintiffs who are in fact representative of the 
alleged class. This argument is now being pressed in a number of cases. 
The issue is critical to the question of whether the class action procedure 
will continue to be used abusively in securities cases. The struggle is in a 
critical stage, and the outcome is uncertain. [Gormley, 1974, p. 1216]
11. Evidence for this view can be found in Eisen v. Carlisle-Jacquelin (1974). 
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The Effects of Class Actions and the Contingent Fee System
Class actions permit a pro rata spreading of the costs of litigation. 
The contingent fee system, in turn, essentially shifts the risk to the 
plaintiff’s attorney if the suit is unsuccessful. Contingent fees generally 
range from 20 percent to 40 percent of the award, “ in most cases 
actually one-third” (Hill, 1975, p. 179; Liggio, 1973, p. 3).
With the remainder of the award often spread thinly among the 
class of plaintiffs, class actions thus “ tend sometimes to shift the focus 
of interest away from the party allegedly wronged and to the plaintiff’s 
attorney as the individual who has the largest readily identifiable finan­
cial interest in the action” (Harlan, 1974, p. 23).
Another commentator expressed it thus: “ I am sure I will be ac­
cused of being a cynic, but there is little doubt in my mind that in 
many, if not most of these cases, the only person who is interested in 
seeking redress is the lawyer; and in fact, he will be the only one that 
will benefit from this litigious exercise” (Liggio, 1973, p. 3).
The courts have also noted the relationship of class actions and 
contingent fees to “strike suits.” A strike suit is
a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of 
success at trial [but which] has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any 
proportion to the prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent 
the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judg­
ment. The very pending of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal 
business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the suit.12
The effect of strike suits has been noted by counsel for the AICPA:
Strike suits predicated on negligence are easy to begin and virtually 
impossible to end. Brought as class actions they become difficult to try 
and still more difficult to settle. Irrespective of their merits, they simply do 
not go away.
During their pendency, the charges leveled against a firm of certified 
public accountants constitute a cloud on their professional reputation and 
a threat to their professional standing. The in terrorem effect of the pend­
ency of even the more meretricious litigation creates a settlement value in 
such lawsuits having no relationship to the quantitative size or qualitative 
merit of the claim.13
In Grad v. Memorex (1973) the court noted the relationship between 
class actions, contingent fees, and strike suits.
12. From the Supreme Court’s decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 
(1975).
13. Brief for the AICPA as Amicus Curiae before the U.S. Supreme Court in Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder (1976).
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An equally undesirous effect of injudicious application of Rule 23 is the 
encouragement of “strike suits” brought by unscrupulous plaintiffs (or their 
lawyers) using the class allegations to coerce defendants— who may have 
good defenses on the merits— to settle for fear of exposure to the mam­
moth liability which a class action necessarily raises.
Another aspect of the use of Rule 23 which has caused particular distress 
and rancor in both defendants and the professional bar is the fact that 
huge recoveries are oftentimes divided in such a manner that 60% to 80% 
is distributed thinly among the class members and 20% to 40% (regardless 
of the amount of work actually performed) goes to the successful 
attorneys....
The answer to these problems, however, is not to abandon Rule 23 where 
the stakes are high (it is large cases, after all, for which it is designed), but 
rather to be more selective in its usage and application.. . .
As for attorney’s fees, if the case should settle (and the court hereby 
expresses no opinion as to the likelihood or desirability of settlement), or if 
a judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs, the court will see that coun­
sels’ remuneration is proportionate to the work done and not arbitrarily 
sliced from the total amount of recovery.
Moreover, courts have recently challenged contingent fee arrange­
ments by
limiting lawyers’ shares of damages to amounts computed by a formula 
that takes into account the lawyer’s time spent and the quality of work 
involved in a case. For example, the formula approach was recently used 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals in Philadelphia to reduce a fee from $1.35 
million to $.93 million. Clearly, such action by the courts could reduce the 
number of class action suits by reducing the lawyers’ potential monetary 
award. [Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 1976, pp. 94-95]
The contingent fee system has existed alongside common law 
notions of improper attorney conduct. This conduct is described by 
arcane legal parlance such as barratry, champerty, and maintenance. 
Furthermore, efforts to prove the existence of such improper attorney 
conduct have usually been unsuccessful. For example, in a recent 
case, Coopers & Lybrand v. Levitt (1976), allegations of champertous 
conduct by plaintiffs’ attorneys were dismissed by a New York appel­
late court because “the doctrine of champerty does not exist in this 
state except as provided by statute.”
Whether justice is served by this combination of class actions and 
contingent fees depends on one’s views of “justice” and one’s defini­
tion of the public interest. There may be no dispassionate observers on 
the issue. However, alternative views may be pertinent. First, Liggio:
I do not mean to suggest. . . that I feel securities litigation is without merit 
or that all members of the Bar seek only to pursue their own self-interest. 
On the contrary, I believe the threat of litigation and litigation itself in many 
instances serve a useful purpose; and from a social benefit standpoint 
there is much to say for it. However, as with all good things, it is abused. 
[1973, p. 3]
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Then, Hill:
I have heard lawyers assert that the failure of members of a class to 
receive the benefits of a settlement is not important and what is important 
is the restraining effect on wrongdoers. If that is an honest statement of the 
justification, the code of Hammurabi is not dead yet. The injured party is 
awarded the ear of the malefactor which has been judicially severed and 
the only party who comes out ahead is the guy who cut it off. [1975, p. 
179]
Patrick, on the other hand, sees benefits from class actions.
Much of the observer’s reaction to the dramatic increase in class actions 
depends on his point of view. It all depends on whose ox is being gored. 
Accountants, lawyers, exchanges, and brokers usually do not appreciate 
being sued. Judges who have heavy dockets and who feel over-worked 
sometimes take a dim view of class actions.
Class actions against accountants and lawyers may prove, however, not to 
be the end of the world for either the accounting profession or for the legal 
profession.
I have had friends who are office lawyers, and who do a great deal of 
registration work, tell me that they have doubled their fees as a result of 
the SEC’s action in [SEC v.] National Student Marketing.
These developments, which have been described by some as a “revolu­
tion,” may turn out to be not all that bad in the long run for public 
investors, the accounting profession and for the legal profession, since it 
will enable the professionals to improve and extend their procedures, 
improve the quality of prospectuses and reports to the public, and permit 
larger fees. The class action has achieved a useful purpose in permitting 
small investors an opportunity to seek relief, as well as some economy of 
judicial effort by compressing many units of litigation under one roof. [1974, 
pp. 164-65]
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Other Sanctions Under the 
Federal Securities Acts
Other legal sanctions against auditors under the federal securities 
acts include criminal prosecutions by the U.S. Department of Justice 
on referral from the SEC and injunctive and administrative proceedings 
by the SEC.
Criminal Proceedings
Violations of the securities acts that give rise to civil liability are also 
subject to criminal penalties (fine or imprisonment or both) under 
section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 32 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 if the violations can be shown to be willful or 
intentional. Auditors are also exposed to criminal penalties under the 
federal mail fraud and conspiracy statutes. In United States v. Ben­
jamin (1964),
the court announced that the requirement of willfulness or intent could have 
been met by proving that the defendant had deliberately closed his eyes to 
facts which he had a duty to see. Other circuits have held that the 
willfulness requirement of the Securities Acts is satisfied in fraud cases by 
proof of representations which due diligence would have shown to be 
untrue. [Murphy, 1973, p. 392]
Burton stated the SEC’s position on bringing criminal charges 
against auditors:
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While virtually all Commission cases are civil in character, on rare occa­
sions it is concluded that a case is sufficiently serious that it should be 
referred to the Department of Justice for consideration of criminal prosecu­
tion. Referrals in regard to accountants have only been made when the 
Commission and the staff believed that the evidence indicated that a 
professional accountant certified financial statements that he knew to be 
false when he reported on them. The Commission does not make criminal 
references in cases that it believes are simply matters of professional 
judgment even if the judgments appear to be bad ones. [1975, p. 28]
Perhaps because of the availability of other legal remedies (includ­
ing injunctions, administrative proceedings, and civil suits by third 
parties) and absence of the element of personal gain, there have been 
few criminal actions against accountants. Murphy (1973, p. 392) cited 
two criminal cases that were prosecuted before 1969:
United States v. White (1941) involved the prosecution of accountants, 
among others, for conspiracy and for using the mails for the distribution of 
prospectuses for the sale of stock in a scheme to defraud.. . .
United States v. Benjamin (1964) was a criminal action of conspiracy to sell 
unregistered securities and to defraud, in violation of the Securities Act of 
1933, and using the mails to defraud, brought against an accountant who 
prepared pro forma statements.
The Continental Vending, Four Seasons, National Student Marketing, 
and Equity Funding cases represent more recent and notorious in­
stances of criminal prosecutions of auditors.
The consequence of criminal prosecution to an auditor may go 
beyond the obvious ones of the costs of defense and the resultant 
fines and imprisonment. First, a successful criminal prosecution may 
help to establish civil liability.
Perhaps an analogy to the antitrust area is valid. When the government 
sustains a judgment against a company for an antitrust violation, that 
judgment can be used to establish a prima facie case by a private party 
allegedly injured by the violation. Considerable help is given to the private 
litigant. A violation of the law is tentatively established, substantially reduc­
ing the risk of an unsuccessful suit. The prospect of a criminal suit as well 
as a civil suit makes a company more willing to acquiesce to a consent 
decree or some other settlement short of prolonged litigation. Perhaps the 
government is attempting to facilitate civil suits by resorting to criminal 
action. The criminal judgment would not have prima facie civil power, but 
evidence would have been gathered and much of the rationale for a civil 
case would have been developed. Alternatively, where civil suit has al­
ready been instituted, as in Continental, the threat of criminal action might 
encourage prompt settlement. [Reiling and Taussig, 1970, p. 43]
Second, the convicted auditor may be unable to continue as a 
member of his profession.
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The prospect of criminal action is particularly threatening to accountants 
because of its potential impact on their professional lives. AICPA Bylaws 
7.3.1, as amended February 20, 1969, specify that membership shall be 
terminated without a hearing if there is filed with the Secretary of the 
Institute a judgment for conviction of a crime defined as a felony under the 
law of the convicting jurisdiction. The Trial Board of the Institute according 
to Section 7.4 of the Bylaws may expel a member if he has been convicted 
of a criminal offense which tends to discredit the profession. More signifi­
cantly, state boards have the power to revoke a CPA’s license to practice. 
However, it has been held that revocation was too severe a penalty where 
the improper conduct consisted of preparing and issuing certified state­
ments in which the corporate client’s liabilities were deliberately under­
stated when the CPA’s professional conduct had previously been 
unobjectionable and his motivation had been solely to give the corporation 
a chance to stay in business. Shander v. Allen (1967). [Reiling and Taus­
sig, 1970, p. 52]
Injunctive Proceedings
The SEC has the authority under section 20 of the 1933 act and 
section 21 of the 1934 act to initiate injunctive actions in the courts to 
restrain future violations of the other provisions of those acts (including 
section 10 (b) of the 1934 act).
The consequences of an injunction may extend far beyond an 
admonition to “ do right” in the future. The injunction can be useful to 
plaintiffs in subsequent civil suits for damages; the same language in 
the injunction may appear in the private damage suit.1 The person 
enjoined is exposed to civil and criminal contempt. An injunction pur­
suant to a consent decree may require the auditor or firm to “ adopt 
and maintain procedures to prevent future violations . . . and to take all 
reasonable steps to conduct its professional practice in compliance 
with such procedures.”2
Along with a referral to the Department of Justice for consideration 
of criminal action, the injunctive proceeding is the “Commission 
weapon most dreaded by the accounting profession” (Sommer, 1975, 
p. 37). The weapon appears not to have been used against auditors 
prior to about 1970, but in the succeeding five years at least seven
1. However, a prior injunction obtained by the SEC is not determinative on the issue of 
liability in a subsequent private suit. See “Comment: The Effect of SEC Injunctions in 
Subsequent Private Damage Actions—Rachel v. Hill," Columbia Law Review, 71 
(November 1971), p. 1332.
2. The language is from the 1973 injunctive proceeding against Laventhol, Krekstein, 
Horwath & Horwath. The settlement under the accompanying rule 2(e) proceeding 
specified the procedures to be undertaken to meet the terms of the injunction. This 
link between injunctive and rule 2(e) proceedings is of recent origin and will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
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injunctions were filed against auditors.3 “The injunctive proceeding 
often occurs in a total context which includes civil litigation seeking 
huge damages from the accounting firm. In some cases, the Commis­
sion action follows— sometimes by quite a period of time— the com­
mencement of private litigation; in other cases, it precedes litigation” 
(Sommer, 1975, p. 37).
The question also arises of auditor's culpability that is necessary for 
an injunction. Sommer generalized the conditions under which the SEC 
will bring injunctive proceedings:
The most difficult problem the Commission confronts whenever it considers 
a recommendation for the commencement of an injunctive proceeding by 
the staff is: what is the standard of conduct to which we think accountants 
should be held? Is it negligence? Is it recklessness, indifference to eco­
nomic reality? Must there be an element of knowledge or “should have 
known”-ness? What is the measure of, to use that fine old misused word, 
scienter?
The first thing I would say is this: the Commission does not consider the 
auditors the guarantors of the integrity, solvency, honesty, or conduct of 
their clients. Auditors can be duped just like investors or anyone else and 
we have refused to authorize actions when it appeared they were the 
victims of their clients, rather than actionable abettors of their misconduct. 
Likewise we do not bring actions because we disagree with the judgments 
of the auditors— unless, of course, that judgment is so bad that it leads to 
inferences of a state of mind inconsistent with the integrity demanded of 
those who practice the accounting profession. We recognize that auditors 
can differ in their judgments with regard to the propriety of the application 
of an accounting principle, or the selection of the accounting principle to 
apply. But, on the other hand, the existence of some authority to support a 
position, while persuasive, is not conclusive with regard to the Commis­
sion’s decision to authorize an action; much more is involved in a Commis­
sion proceeding. . . .
Put very simply, when the Commission discerns that the auditor has not 
been alert to his duty, that he has gone through an exercise by rote or that 
he has not been true to the duty of fair presentation, then in my estimation 
the Commission should properly authorize an action to enjoin the account­
ant from a repetition of those faults. [1975, pp. 37-38]
This is essentially an application of the flexible duty standard to injunc­
tive proceedings that had evolved in the ninth circuit in rule 10b-5 
cases. Since the injunctive action will probably cite a violation of that 
rule, this is hardly surprising.
Should the standard of care required of the auditor be the same 
under an SEC injunctive action as under a rule 10b-5 private action? 
The SEC’s position, which it held both before and after Hochfelder, is
3. Gormley, 1974, p. 1224, lists six of these suits. 
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that merely negligent conduct is sufficient in civil injunctive pro­
ceedings.
The SEC argues vigorously in their cases throughout the country that—at 
least for the purposes of their Rule 10b-5 civil injunctive actions—they need 
not prove scienter, they need not prove constructive knowledge of fraud, 
they need not prove reckless disregard. They argue that mere negligence 
is enough to enjoin a director or a broker-dealer, a corporate officer, an 
accountant, or indeed, an attorney, under the antifraud provisions of Rule 
10b-5. The typical argument that the SEC litigation attorney will make to the 
Court in this regard is that an SEC civil injunction is remedial in nature. It is 
merely prophylactic relief designed to prevent repeated statutory violations 
in the future. The SEC has prevailed in persuading at least some courts to 
credit this approach—probably because the defense lawyers in those 
cases weren’t doing their jobs. So negligence has become fraud under 
Rule 10b-51 [Matthews, 1975, pp. 105-06]
Matthews argued that this trend is undesirable because of the 
consequences to the auditor of injunctive proceedings that were noted 
above.
I think, because of the severe direct and indirect adverse consequences of 
an injunctive decree—particularly against a professional, a lawyer, an ac­
countant, or other professional—that this trend in the law is wrong and 
ought to be reversed. I think the standards ought to be the same under 
Rule 10b-5 whether the relief sought is an injunction or money damages. I 
would argue that lawyers ought to be “urging” courts that the standards in 
an injunctive case ought to be just as rigid as the standards in a private 
action—that negligence is not enough, and that a showing of scienter, 
reckless disregard, or constructive knowledge of fraud should be required. 
[1975, p. 106]
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court disclaimed the need to consider 
whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief 
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. In a “ post-Hochfelder" memoran­
dum, the SEC’s general counsel stated that the requirement for scien­
ter in private actions under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 “should not be 
construed as necessarily carrying over into Commission actions for 
injunctive relief for violations of that statutory provision and that 
rule. . . .  In Hochfelder the plaintiffs sought civil money damages from 
an accounting firm whereas Commission actions seek to protect the 
public by enjoining violations of the federal securities acts.”4
In a post-Hochfelder opinion in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb (1976), the 
district court stated “that the Hochfelder holding must be read to
4. SEC General Counsel's April, 1976 Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, Bureau of National Affairs, no. 113, June 10, 1976, p. J-2. That memo­
randum also indicates SEC strategy in seeking future injunctions until the scienter 
issue is resolved.
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impose a scienter requirement in the suit for injunctive relief brought by 
the SEC. Although not obliged to reach the question by the facts of 
that case, the Supreme Court used reasoning which appears to com­
pel that result. . . .  As the Court reads the majority opinion in 
Hochfelder, scienter must be pleaded and proved whether suit is 
brought by the SEC or by a private litigant.” The case is currently 
under appeal by the SEC, an action influenced by the appeals court 
decision in another recent case.
In that case, SEC v. Universal Major Industries (1976), the appeals 
court held that Hochfelder did not undermine that circuit’s position 
“that in SEC proceedings seeking equitable relief, a cause of action 
may be predicated upon negligence alone, and scienter is not re­
quired.” The court’s opinion was blunted, however, because of its 
assertion that scienter was present in the defendant’s actions.
Indeed, our decision need not rest on our rejection of appellant’s negli­
gence-scienter argument, because the District Court found that appellant 
in some circumstances knew and in other circumstances had reason to 
know that his client was engaging in illegal transactions with the aid of 
appellant’s letters and that appellant’s acts were performed with knowl­
edge or reckless disregard of the truth. This, we have held, is sufficient to 
establish scienter.
Until the scienter issue is finally resolved by the Supreme Court, the 
SEC is likely to seek injunctive relief if it believes it can reasonably 
assert reckless disregard, scienter, or both. If the test becomes one of 
scienter, the SEC may extend its investigations to find the necessary 
scienter. This could lead to more criminal references to the Department 
of Justice. If only negligence, but not scienter, can be established, the 
commission may be content with bringing rule 2(e) proceedings which 
are discussed later in this chapter.
An additional issue remains. At the (non-jury) trial on the final or 
permanent injunction, the SEC must prove both a statutory violation 
and “equity” for an injunction (Matthews, 1975, p. 140). The preceding 
material on the standard of care is addressed to the question of 
whether a statutory violation has in fact occurred. A demonstration of a 
need for equity requires that there be “a reasonable likelihood or 
‘cognizable danger’ that future violations will occur if an injunction is 
not imposed” (Matthews, 1975, p. 140). Matthews argued that “the 
mere establishment of a past violation will not necessarily support an 
inference of future violations, particularly where the defendant estab­
lishes good faith” (1975, p. 142).5
5. However, the SEC’s general counsel in its April 26, 1976, post -Hochfelder memoran­
dum stated that “ it may be possible to argue . . . that it is not necessary in order to 
obtain an injunction that we establish a past violation of law.”
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The courts, understandably, give great weight to the SEC’s expert 
judgment of the immediate need for injunctive relief. Ordinarily, the 
requested injunction will be issued, even, as some have alleged, on 
incomplete evidence (Guzzardi, 1974, p. 147).
But the courts have become more insistent that the weapon not be mis­
used. District Judge Harold Tyler, Jr. reproved the SEC for extracting an 
injunction when all the Commission was alleging was fraud committed by 
one person in a single instance. Under such circumstances, decided Tyler, 
“we perceive no basis for dispensing with the evidentiary hearing normally 
required simply because the plaintiff is a government agency.” In addition, 
the Southern District Court of New York criticized the Commission when it 
moved for an injunction without establishing first "some cognizable danger 
of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility that serves 
to keep the case alive.” And Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit, 
perhaps the most respected man on the bench when it comes to securities 
matters, has warned the SEC that “its practice of requesting the issuance 
of preliminary or temporary injunctions based solely on incomplete affida­
vits and transcripts of testimony taken ex parte in an SEC private investiga­
tion, in the absence of an adversary evidentiary hearing, would be wholly 
unacceptable in the Second Circuit.” . . .
Despite these rulings, the Commission continues to press obstinately for 
injunctive actions and ancillary relief. It takes the position that it is applying 
for a “statutory’’ injunction, meaning one that it must seek in order to 
discharge its statutory obligations. It argues that the standards which apply 
to private litigants need not be met by the Commission. [Guzzardi, 1974, 
pp. 147, 192]
Two recent district court cases testify to the courts’ watchfulness on 
the “ reasonable likelihood” question. In SEC v. Bausch & Lomb (1976), 
the court held that “even had a violation been established, the record 
.. . does not warrant the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The SEC 
simply has not convinced this Court that absent an injunction there is a 
reasonable likelihood that defendants will violate the securities laws in 
the future. . . . The Court finds no pattern of past violations suggesting 
that defendants should be enjoined.” In a case in which the SEC 
sought an injunction against the public accounting firm of Arthur Young
& Company, SEC v. Geotek (1976), the court concluded that “even if a 
violation of the securities laws, as contended by the SEC herein, were 
found, the evidence is insufficient to show a reasonable likelihood or 
expectation that AY would commit further violations in the future.”
An interesting argument on the “ reasonable likelihood” question is 
found in the SEC’s appeal brief in SEC v. Koracorp Indus. (1976). 
There the SEC argued that
defendants’ “continuing assertions that their past actions are blameless . . . 
must be considered by the court below in critically examining their pro­
testations that there is no reasonable likelihood of future violations.” This 
seems dangerously close to an argument that if auditors defend their 
conduct in failing to discover management fraud, their failure to consent
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immediately to an injunction against future similar failures is evidence that 
they should be enjoined from similarly failing in the future! If this proposi­
tion were carried to the extreme, the only way to defend an injunctive 
action would be to admit that you violated the statute in the past and argue 
only about the likelihood of future violations. In other words, you can admit 
your guilt and be enjoined or deny your guilt and thereby prove that you 
should be enjoined. [Olson, 1976]
Auditors may have inadequately challenged the commission in the 
past as a result of their failure to see the consequences of a civil 
injunction. The number of future challenges might be expected to 
increase as a result of greater awareness of the effect of injunctions, 
the favorable rulings in Bausch & Lomb and Geotek on the issue of the 
reasonable likelihood of future violations, and the decision in Bausch & 
Lomb that scienter, not negligence, is a necessary element for injunc­
tive relief under rule 10b-5.
Administrative (Rule 2(e)) Proceedings
Rule 2(e) of the SEC’s rules of practice is part of
a regulatory scheme by which the Commission seeks to protect the public 
and the integrity of the Commission’s own processes from incompetent, 
unethical or dishonest attorneys, accountants and other professionals and 
experts. As the agency charged with the responsibility of protecting inves­
tors in securities, the Commission is necessarily concerned that the ac­
countants, attorneys and other professionals who practice before it be 
worthy of the trust that the investing public and the Commission are 
compelled to place in them. Moreover, since the securities industry is a 
complicated one which trades in “intricate merchandise,” the investing 
public is especially vulnerable to injury by the incompetent, unethical or 
inept professional. As the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has noted, “ In 
our complex society the accountant’s certificate and the lawyer’s opinion 
can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel 
or the crowbar.” . ..  Rule 2(e) is a measure to prevent the often irreparable 
harm that untrustworthy securities practitioners can all too easily— and 
quickly— cause at the expense of public investors.6
Under rule 2(e), the commission has the power to deny, temporarily 
or permanently, the privilege of appearing and practicing before it of 
an auditor who is found: (1) “not to possess the requisite qualifications 
to represent others,” (2) “to be lacking in character or integrity,” (3) “to 
have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct,” or (4) 
“to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of 
any provision of the federal securities laws” (17 CFR 201-2(e)).
6. Touche Ross v. SEC, “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defend­
ants’ Motion to Dismiss” (1976).
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In addition, the commission may suspend from appearing or prac­
ticing before it an auditor who has been: (1) “convicted of a felony, or 
of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude,” (2) the subject of a 
revocation or suspension of his license to practice, (3) “ permanently 
enjoined . . . from violation . . .  of any provision of the federal securities 
laws,” or (4) “ found by any court . . .  or found by this Commission in 
any administrative proceeding . . .  to have violated . . . any provision of 
the federal securities laws . . . (unless the violation was found not to 
have been willful)” (17 CFR 201-2(e)).
Procedures are specified whereby the suspended auditor may peti­
tion the commission to lift the suspension. Of particular note is the 
specification that
In any hearing . . .  the staff of the Commission shall show either that the 
petitioner has been enjoined . . .  or that the petitioner has been found to 
have committed or aided and abetted violations .. . and that showing, 
without more, may be the basis for censure or disqualification; that show­
ing having been made, the burden shall be upon the petitioner to show 
cause why he should not be censured or temporarily or permanently 
disqualified from appearing and practicing before the Commission. In any 
such hearing the petitioner shall not be heard to contest any findings made 
against him or facts admitted by him in the judicial or administrative 
proceeding upon which the proceeding under this paragraph (3) is predi­
cated. . . .  A person who has consented to the entry of a permanent 
injunction . . . without admitting the facts set forth in the complaint shall be 
presumed for all purposes under this paragraph (3) to have been enjoined 
by reason of the misconduct alleged in the complaint. [17 CFR 201-2(e)]
Thus,
the Commission can suspend a professional from practice before it on the 
basis of an injunctive decree and that, in any hearing before the Commis­
sion to lift that suspension, the facts are no longer open to argument. That 
is, there cannot be a relitigation of the merits of the violation. That is 
because the professional is presumed to have been found by the court to 
have committed the misconduct alleged in the complaint, even if the 
consent decree was entered without admitting or denying the allegations, 
as is usually the case. The only matters that can be considered by the 
Commission are matters in mitigation, bearing on what sanction the Com­
mission should impose upon the professional, in the public interest.. . .
Accordingly, it is important for a professional who is named as a defendant 
in a Commission injunctive action to consider the possible consequent 
Rule 2(e) effect if he is negotiating a settlement. Often, it will be possible to 
negotiate the Rule 2(e) consequence in tandem with the negotiation for 
settlement of the injunctive action. [Gonson, 1975, pp. 195, 199]
An example of this is found in the settlement with Laventhol, Krekstein, 
Horwath & Horwath, reported in Accounting Series Release no. 144 
(May 23, 1973).
Rule 2(e) mentions only three sanctions available to the SEC: tem­
porary suspension, permanent suspension, and censure. Censure is
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mentioned only as an alternative after a permanent injunction or crimi­
nal conviction involving violation of the federal securities laws (Bialkin, 
1975, p. 824). Starting in 1973, the SEC began to devise innovative 
sanctions against auditors under the rule, among which have been—
1. Peer reviews and inspections of accounting firms to determine the 
extent of compliance with professional and firm auditing standards 
and procedures.7
2. Restrictions for specified periods against mergers with other firms.8
3. Prohibitions for specified periods against undertaking new engage­
ments likely to result in filings with the SEC.9
4. Requirements to develop and implement auditing procedures for 
certain types of transactions.10
5. Censure of firms, other than following permanent injunctions or 
criminal convictions.11
6. Imposition of continuing education programs.12
7. Requirements to give notice of the Commission’s findings to poten­
tial new SEC clients.13
8. Encouragement of a firm to merge with a larger firm, as a condition 
of terminating other provisions of the consent decree.14
9. Prohibition of a partner from acting as or being a partner for a ten- 
month period.15
Many of these sanctions involve agreements to institute new or 
improved control procedures and to subject those procedures to an 
independent compliance review. Sommer views this approach as 
being neither punitive nor retributive, but rather as providing assurance 
that the possibility of recurrence of specific problems caused by per­
vasive control deficiencies will be reduced. He has also denied that "it
7. “ In re Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,” Accounting Series Release no. 
144 (May 23, 1973).
8. ASR no. 144.
9. ASR no. 144.
10. “ In re Touche Ross & Co.,” Accounting Series Release no. 153 (February 25, 1974).
11. "In re Arthur Andersen & Co.,” Accounting Series Release no. 157 (July 8, 1974).
12. “ In re Benjamin Botwinick & Co.,” Accounting Series Release no. 168 (January 13, 
1975).
13. “ In re Lou, Gose & Co.,” Accounting Series Release no. 160 (August 27, 1974).
14. “ In re Wertheimer, Fine, Berger, & Co.,” Accounting Series Release no. 167 (De­
cember 24, 1974).
15. “ In re Benjamin Botwinick & Co.,” Accounting Series Release no. 168 (January 13, 
1975).
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is the ultimate design of the Commission to create situations which 
would result in all the ‘Big Eight’ being under such review procedures” 
(Sommer, 1975, p. 37).
As with all the other sanctions that may be imposed on auditors, 
the question arises of the standard of care that the auditor must follow 
to avoid commission action under rule 2(e).
The types of conduct that can lead to temporary or permanent 
suspension (and presumably to the more innovative sanctions recently 
devised) can be summarized in three categories:
1. A finding of the absence of certain personal qualities (not possess­
ing the qualifications to represent others or lacking character or 
integrity).
2. An adverse finding by a court, the SEC, or a state licensing body of 
actions that for the most part involve something more than ordinary 
negligence.
3. A finding by the commission of unethical or improper professional 
conduct.
The first of these categories “suggests] no objectively determina­
ble standards and hence constitute[s] virtually no restraint upon Com­
mission disciplinary action. The Commission quite properly has not 
sought to use either of [the two grounds included in this category] as 
the basis for any of its recent proceedings” (Bialkin, 1975, p. 831).
The second category generally requires either willful intent or an 
act evidently so reprehensible as to result in a criminal conviction or 
loss of license. However, it also permits the institution of rule 2(e) 
proceedings upon the entering of a permanent injunction. As noted 
earlier, the SEC believes, and an appeals court has agreed, that 
ordinary negligence is sufficient for it to seek and obtain a civil injunc­
tion. Negligence thus appears sufficient to sustain a rule 2(e) proceed­
ing via the injunction route.
With regard to the third category, in Accounting Series Release no. 
73 (1952),
the Commission ruled that a finding of “improper professional conduct” 
under 2(e) does not require a showing of intentional misconduct. The 
Commission stated: “We accept respondent’s assertions that they acted in 
good faith and accordingly do not find any willfulness in the sense referred 
to by them. However, in a disciplinary proceeding under Rule 2(e), we are 
not required to make such a finding. . . . ”
At the present time, however, discussion of the standards in 2(e) proceed­
ings cannot be very informed and is of little practical significance. In only 
one of the recent proceedings did the Commission expressly point to a 
2(e) ground and find “improper professional conduct.” In all the other 
recent proceedings the Commission did not point to a particular 2(e) 
ground. Only noncompliance with various generally accepted accounting
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principles or generally accepted auditing standards was alleged. [Bialkin,
1975, p. 831]
A further issue is whether the SEC’s implied authority to establish 
qualifications for those practicing before it gives the commission the 
authority to impose sanctions under rule 2(e). This has rarely been 
tested in the courts. All of the known rule 2(e) proceedings “were 
imposed by consent in settlement of the proceedings and not after an 
adversary adjudication. Thus, the question of the extent of the Commis­
sion’s authority to impose such sanctions in the absence of consent 
remains undetermined” (Bialkin, 1975, p. 824).
Litigation to test that authority may be moot. As Fiflis (1975b, p. 
187) noted, “the word ‘consent’ in ‘consent decree’ can be likened 
most to the ‘I do’ in a ‘shotgun wedding.’ ” “Consent” may be easily 
obtained to avoid the imposition of the even more severe sanctions of 
criminal or injunctive proceedings and also to avoid the high costs of 
litigation and an extended period of unfavorable publicity.
There have been only two challenges to the commission’s authority 
to proceed against a professional under rule 2(e). In Kivitz v. SEC 
(1973), the court set aside an SEC order suspending the right of, an 
attorney to practice before the commission for two years. The court 
dismissed the 2(e) proceeding because it could not conscientiously 
find that the evidence supporting the commission’s position was 
substantial.
On October 12, 1976, Touche Ross & Co. instituted an action in a 
federal district court to enjoin an SEC rule 2(e) proceeding (Touche 
Ross & Co. v. SEC, “Complaint”). That suit challenged the SEC’s 
authority under the securities acts “to conduct disciplinary proceedings 
or to suspend or disbar accountants or other professionals from prac­
ticing before it.” The complaint asserts that
in the absence of express authority from Congress, the SEC does not have 
the inherent or implied authority to conduct hearings involving accountants, 
attorneys and other professionals, or to discipline them, thus acting both as 
prosecutor and judge in the proceeding, because, inter alia, the authority 
to act as judge and prosecutor should be accorded to administrative 
agencies only to the extent expressly mandated by Congress.
The SEC’s Order instituting Rule 2(e) proceedings alleges not only a willful 
violation of specified statutes and rules, but also states that the acts 
charged constitute "improper professional conduct” . Presumably, this is 
merely a redundancy, but if the Order is intended to assert a power over 
professional conduct independent of violations of the federal securities 
laws, it is clearly beyond any authority that could legally be exercised by 
the SEC.
The Touche complaint states that “ it was a clear abuse of discre­
tion for the SEC not to have chosen to bring its charges . . .  in a 
federal court. . . .The relief requested herein is not intended to fore­
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close the SEC from asserting the same claims contained in its 2(e) 
Order in a complaint filed in a federal court.” In an injunctive action, 
the “scienter” and “ reasonable likelihood of recurrence” criteria might 
impose more stringent tests for determining an auditor’s culpability.
The SEC, in its “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ” filed December 7, 1976, moved “to 
dismiss the complaint in this action on the ground that the plaintiffs 
have improperly failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, which 
are adequate for their purposes, and resort to which will cause the 
plaintiffs no irreparable injury.” 16
Some interesting consequences follow from the settlement of rule 
2(e) proceedings by consent decrees:
These are not the same as findings of guilt, of course, and do not formally 
have the force of law. But publication of a consent decree tends to stir up 
ideas about the party involved: the decree has an effect somewhat similar 
to those lines in old movie credits about resemblance to anyone living or 
dead being a coincidence. The decree states explicitly that the party of the 
second part does not admit any guilt—but that he agrees to stop doing 
whatever it was anyway. The decree also becomes a kind of law because 
it shows, as Commissioner Loomis has helpfully explained, “that the Com­
mission believes the facts in the case are a violation.”
Thus consents can be used to set important precedents, an arrangement 
that has certain advantages from the SEC’s point of view. The conventional 
means of establishing a precedent is for the Commission to put out a 
proposal for comment, review the responses, perhaps hold hearings, and 
then rule. But this is all very time-consuming, and the Commission can 
become impatient coping with arguments against what it believes to be 
right. Consent decrees circumnavigate that necessity. [Guzzardi, 1974, p. 
192]
The very procedures under which rule 2(e) proceedings take place 
have also been criticized. At the most fundamental level is the issue of 
whether the same body that initiates a complaint should be the one to 
determine the validity of the complaint and the resultant penalties 
(Guzzardi, 1974, p. 146). That issue has also been raised in Touche 
Ross v. SEC. Beyond that, the specific procedures used in rule 2(e) 
proceedings have been challenged, although apparently not through 
litigation. The December 1974 issue of Fortune carried an article con­
taining an extensive catalogue of alleged procedural “ peculiarities,” to 
which SEC Commissioner Loomis responded: “ I don’t think you can 
prove that we violate due process” (Guzzardi, 1974, p. 146).
An Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices, 
created at the request of the SEC, consisting of John A. Wells (as
16. The Touche Ross suit is unresolved as of February, 1977.
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chairman), Manuel F. Cohen, and Ralph Demmler, made recommenda­
tions in 1972 to improve the procedures surrounding rule 2(e) ac­
tions.17 Among the Wells committee recommendations were these:
• A statement from the respondent should accompany the report that the 
staff makes to the Commission after an investigatory hearing.
•  The Commission should make clear in its communications to respond­
ents that initiation of an investigation does not mean that the SEC 
believes that there has been a violation. (A similar disclaimer might be 
added in press releases.) And, when the SEC decides to make a 
charge, it should as a general practice advise the people whom it has 
been investigating that an injunction is being brought or administrative 
proceedings started. The defendant should be given a reasonable pe­
riod of time to give his own version of the facts.
•  A list of the witnesses and a statement of the legal theories that the staff 
intends to use at an administrative hearing should ordinarily be made 
available in advance to the defendant.
•  A person against whom no further action is contemplated should be in­
formed that the case is closed.
•  The Commission should designate an SEC official to audit the investiga­
tive practices of the staff, to make sure that the staff is fair, prompt, and 
efficient in all proceedings.
•  Where violations have not injured public investors and are unlikely to 
recur, the Commission should confine itself to issuing a private 
reprimand.
There is no sign that the Commission has any intention of implementing 
these proposals. [Commissioner] Pollack says, “Some Wells recommenda­
tions would interfere with our carrying out our duties in an efficient way.” 
And [Commissioner] Garrett says, “No Wells Committee recommendations 
are under active consideration at the present time.” [Guzzardi, 1974, p. 
196]
Apart from the legal and procedural issues, some of the more 
innovative procedures consented to in recent rule 2(e) proceedings 
raise the spectre of the SEC’s intrusion into the area of the creation of 
specific professional standards.18 This intrusion may take two forms:
1. Language in a proceeding indicating auditor responsibilities not 
prescribed in the literature. (An example is the view expressed in 
Accounting Series Release no. 153 that successor auditors must 
review the work of predecessor auditors. A refusal by the client to 
permit the necessary communication should be grounds for reject­
17. The Wells Report is discussed in Daley and Carmel, 1975.
18. For a discussion of sanctions against auditors and others pursuant to consent 
decrees in civil injunctive actions, see Seidler and Wiesen, 1976.
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ing the engagement. Professional literature at the time did not make 
predecessor-successor communications mandatory. Moreover, the 
present standards, while requiring such communication, leave room 
for the exercise of professional judgment on the effect of a pro­
spective client forbidding such communication.)
2. Language in a consent decree requiring an auditing firm to develop 
specific audit procedures not currently covered by professional 
literature. (An example is Touche Ross’s consent in Accounting 
Series Release no. 153 to develop and submit to the SEC pro­
cedures for the audit of related party transactions. An SAS on the 
subject did not exist at the time of ASR no. 153.)
Burton stated that
it should be emphasized that the enforcement program is not used as a 
vehicle by which fundamentally new professional standards are estab­
lished. The present generally accepted auditing standards of adequate 
technical training, independence of mental attitude, due professional care, 
adequate planning and supervision and sufficient competent evidential 
matter, are perfectly adequate to assure sound auditing if conscientiously 
applied to each case. [1975, p. 20]
That may be, but the SEC has also traditionally left the specific imple­
mentation and interpretation of those standards to the accounting pro­
fession. At the least, rule 2(e) proceedings and the accompanying 
consent decrees provide a vehicle for selective departure from that 
philosophy.
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5
The American Law Institute’s 
Proposed Federal Securities 
Code
The Federal Securities Code, a project of the American Law In­
stitute (ALI) under the direction of Professor Louis Loss (the 
“Reporter”), is an attempt to consolidate present federal securities 
statutes, rules, and, to some extent, cases. If adopted, the code will 
eliminate many of the differences between the 1933 and 1934 acts in 
the standard of care imposed on auditors and the consequences of 
failure to meet that standard. “ In its basic approach to corporate 
disclosure, the Code creates a system of registering issuers rather 
than issues, mandates a regular reporting and disclosure system for 
those issuers and sets forth the disclosure conditions under which 
distributions of securities may be made” (Chalmers, 1974, p. 101).
Through February 1977, the ALI has published four tentative drafts, 
each addressing various parts of the proposed code, and Revision of 
Tentative Drafts 1-3. Completion of the project is anticipated in 1978 or 
1979 after further drafting and revision.
The portions of the code that most significantly affect the auditor’s 
responsibilities and liabilities are considered in this section.
Definitions
Part II of the code, “Definitions,” defines two sets of terms affecting 
auditors that appear in subsequent parts:
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1. Knowledge and scienter1
Sec. 251A. [Knowledge.] “Know” and its derivatives include awareness 
by a person of a high probability of the existence or nonexistence of a 
particular fact, unless he actually believes the contrary.2 
Sec. 296AA [Scienter.] A person makes (or . . . causes, commands, 
induces, procures, or gives substantial assistance to, the making of) a 
misrepresentation with “scienter” if he (a) knows that the matter is 
otherwise than as represented, (b) does not have the confidence in its 
existence or nonexistence that his representation expresses or implies, 
or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that 
it expresses or implies.
The code thus constructs two degrees of knowledge. Knowledge is 
used in its ordinary sense; scienter includes both knowledge and its 
equivalent expressed in terms of recklessness. It would be harder for a 
plaintiff to establish scienter than to establish negligence. However, it 
is easier to establish scienter as defined in (b) and (c) of section 296 
AA than to establish knowledge as defined in section 251A.3 Obviously, 
the establishment of knowledge of a falsity establishes scienter, as 
clause (a) of the scienter definition indicates. Clause (b) is traceable to 
the “ reckless disregard” concept.4 Clause (c) brings the lack of knowl­
edge of the truth of a matter under the definition.5 Also, scienter is 
defined only in relation to misrepresentations, not fraudulent acts.
2. Fact, misrepresentation, and estimates.
Sec. 234A. [Fact.] “Fact” includes a promise, prediction, estimate, pro­
jection, motive, opinion, or law.
Sec. 259. [Misrepresentation.] (a) [General.] “Misrepresentation” means
(1) an untrue statement of a material fact, or (2) an omission to state a 
material fact necessary to prevent the statements made from being 
misleading in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, 
(b) [Estimates, etc.] A statement of fact. . .  is not a misrepresentation if 
it (1) is made in good faith, (2) is reasonably based on facts, including 
whatever investigation is appropriate under the circumstances, when it 
is made, and (3) complies with any applicable rule so far as underlying 
assumptions or other conditions are concerned.
1. All quotations from the code are from the Reporter’s Revision of Text of Tentative 
Drafts Nos. 1-3 (1974) unless otherwise noted.
2. The use of the word “ include,” rather than the word “ is,” suggests that there may 
have been a conscious decision to allow for an expansion of the definition.
3. This hierarchy does not conform with the Supreme Court's usage in Hochfelder. Nor 
does it conform to the Court’s definition of “scienter” as a “mental state embracing 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” It is likely that the ALI will review its 
definitions in the light of recent developments, particularly the Hochfelder case.
4. As was pointed out earlier, the Court in Hochfelder did not determine whether 
reckless behavior is a form of intentional conduct.
5. Reporter’s comment to section 251A of Tentative Draft no. 2 (1973).
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Although forecasts, estimates, and projections are “facts,” it ap­
pears that incorrect forecasts, estimates, and projections would not be 
misrepresentations if they complied with SEC rules and were made in 
good faith after reasonable investigation. “ In any event, the language 
reflects the truism that an estimate (or some other ‘fact’ within section 
234A) does not retroactively become a misrepresentation merely be­
cause the facts turn out differently.”6 However, having language to that 
effect as a statutory provision seems desirable, although the meaning 
of “whatever investigation is appropriate” will be determined only by 
litigation of individual cases.
3. Fraudulent act
Sec. 234D. [Fraudulent act.] (a) [General.] “Fraudulent act” includes an 
act, device, scheme, practice, or course of conduct that (1) is fraudu­
lent, (2) operates or would operate as a fraud, or (3) is likely to deceive 
regardless of whether deception is intended.
(b) [inaction or silence.] Inaction or silence when there is a duty to act 
or speak may be a fraudulent act.
This definition introduces a note of uncertainty into the code. “Mis­
representation” seems adequately defined, but the definition of “ fraud­
ulent act” is circular at best. Problems caused by the inadequacy of 
the definition are discussed later in this chapter.
Prohibitions
Part XIII of the code, “ Fraudulent and Manipulative Acts,” specifies 
prohibitions. Part XIV imposes liability for violation of the prohibitions. 
Most of the sections in part XIII begin “ It is unlawful. . . .”
Sec. 1301. [Purchases, sales, proxy solicitations, tender requests, and 
investment advice.] (a) [General.] It is unlawful for any person to engage in 
a fraudulent act or to make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a 
sale or purchase of a security, an offer to buy or sell a security, or an 
inducement to hold a security. . . .7
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5 
limit the prohibitions to acts “ in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.” The question of whether section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 
encompass “an inducement to hold” has been the subject of consid­
erable litigation. The most recent case, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
6. Reporter’s comment to section 234A of Tentative Draft no. 2 (1973).
7. Similar language in section 1304(a) and (c) prohibits fraudulent acts or misrepresen­
tations in filings pursuant to the code and in press releases or other forms of 
publicity.
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Drug Stores, decided by the Supreme Court in 1975, limited the plain­
tiff class in private damage suits under those provisions to actual 
purchasers and sellers of securities. Section 1301(a) appears on the 
surface to contradict that ruling. However, a comment by the Reporter 
to section 1301(a) in Tentative Draft no. 2 indicates that the phrase 
“ inducement to hold” contemplates an affirmative act, presumably 
more than expressing an unqualified opinion on misleading financial 
statements. In the absence of an affirmative act, part XIV would not 
give a private right of action to mere holders.
Section 1301(a) prohibits both fraudulent acts and misrepresenta­
tions, but, as previously noted, an adequate definition of fraudulent 
acts is not given.
Section 1301(b). [Purchases, sales, proxy solicitations, tender requests and 
investment advice.] [Duty to correct.] It is unlawful for any person to fail to 
correct a statement of a material fact that was made by him or on his 
behalf in a communication with respect to a matter within section 1301(a), 
and that becomes a misrepresentation by reason of a subsequent event. . . 
Section 1304. [False filings, records, and publicity.] (d) [Duty to correct.] It 
is unlawful for any person to fail to correct a statement of a material fact 
that was made by him or on his behalf in a filing, record, document, or 
form of publicity specified in this section, if a correction is necessary to 
disclose a fact of special significance within the meaning of section 
1303(c) that is the result of a subsequent event and is not generally 
available within the meaning of section 1303(d), unless (1) the filing, record, 
document, or form of publicity is not reasonably current . . .  or (2) the 
person makes a reasonable effort under the circumstances to correct the. 
statement.8
Similar language presently appears only in rule 14a-9(a) concerning 
proxies. Section 1301(b) explicitly broadens the rule to cover the dis­
semination of information affecting market transactions, although both 
the SEC and the courts have found that auditors already have a duty to 
disclose subsequently discovered errors in financial statements. Sec­
8. Sections 1303(c) and (d), referred to in section 1304(d), read as follows:
(c). ["Fact of special significance.” ] A fact is “of special significance” if (1) in 
addition to being material it would be likely on being made generally available to 
affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (2) a reasonable 
person would attach special importance to it in determining his course of action in 
the light of such factors as the degree of its specificity, the extent of its difference 
from information generally available previously, and its nature and reliability.
(d). [ “Generally available.” ] A fact is “generally available" when (1) it is disclosed 
in a filing or is otherwise disclosed by means of a press release or other form of 
publicity reasonably designed to bring the fact to the attention of the investing 
public, and (2) one week or any other period that the Commission prescribes by 
rule has expired since the filing or other disclosure. When these conditions are not 
satisfied, the burden of proving that a fact is generally available is on the person 
who so asserts.
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tions 1301(b) and 1304(d) could, depending on their interpretation by 
the courts, extend that duty.
Present auditing standards9 describe the auditor’s responsibilities 
on his discovery subsequent to the date of his report of facts existing 
at that date that might have affected his report had he been aware of 
them. There is no specific responsibility for other types of subsequent 
events after the auditor has reported. For example, a loss on receiva­
bles resulting from a customer’s major casualty after the issuance of 
the financial statements would not require a correction of those state­
ments or a change in the auditor’s opinion. Whether this would con­
tinue to be the case under section 1301(b) is unclear.
Civil Consequences of Violations
Part XIV of the code, “Civil Liability,” specifies the civil conse­
quences of violations of part XIII.
Sec. 1403. [False registration statements, offering statements, and annual 
reports.] (a) [Scope of section.] This section applies . . .  on proof that an 
effective registration statement, an effective offering statement . . . , an 
annual report filed with the Commission . . .  or any other report so filed and 
incorporated by reference in any such filing (1) contained a misrepresenta­
tion, (2) omitted (or failed to incorporate by reference) a material fact or 
document required to be included (or incorporated by reference), or (3) 
was not corrected as required by section 1304(d); but this section does not 
apply to an annual report to security holders except to the extent that it is 
incorporated by reference in, or reflects a misrepresentation or omission in 
(or failure to correct), a filing otherwise covered by this section.
(b) [Defendants.] The following persons are liable for damages under this 
section: . . .  (5) every expert whose consent has been filed . . . (but only 
with respect to statements that purport to have been made by him). . . .
(c) [Plaintiffs.] This section gives a right of action to a person who proves
(1) that, in the case of an offering statement, he bought a security of a 
class covered thereby after its effectiveness, or
(2) that, in the case of a registration statement or report, he bought or sold 
a security of the registrant after the effectiveness of the registration state­
ment or the filing of the report. . . .
(f) [Defense based on defendants’ conduct.] . . . [The auditor] has a 
defense that . . .  (3) . . .  he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable 
ground so to believe and did so believe. . . .
(g) [Standard of reasonableness.] In determining what constitutes reasona­
ble investigation or care and reasonable ground for belief under section 
1403(f) (3), the standard of reasonableness is that required of a prudent 
man under the circumstances. . . .
9. Statement on Auditing Standards no. 1, section 561.
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In consolidating the several securities acts, the code eliminates 
many of the present differences between the 1933 and 1934 acts in the 
standard of care required of auditors. The standard of care required by 
section 1403 (applicable to registration statements, offering statements, 
and annual reports filed with the SEC) is essentially that of the present 
1933 act.10 This would impose liability on auditors for negligence, 
without regard to a privity standard, for annual reports and registration 
statements that presently fall within the purview of the 1934 act (includ­
ing section 18, section 10(b), and rule 10b-5) as well as for offering 
statements that are presently covered by the 1933 act. This represents 
no change from the standard of care presently required by the 1933 
act, but it significantly increases the standard under sections 18(a) and 
10(b) of the present 1934 act, both of which require scienter to support 
a private right of action. However, as discussed below, the effect of 
this expanded liability would be offset in part by a limitation of 
damages.
Limitation of Damages
Sec. 1402 (f). [Measure of damages.] (1) The measure of damages . . .  is
(A), if the plaintiff is a buyer, the difference between the amount that he 
paid and the value of the security determined as of the time specified [in 
other sections of the act] . ..
(B), if the plaintiff is a seller, the difference between the amount that he 
received and the value of the security determined as of the time specified 
[in other sections of the act] . . .
(2) . . . the measure of damages as specified in paragraph (1) is
(a) reduced to the extent (which may be complete) that the defendant
proves that the violation did not cause the loss . . . .
Sec. 1403 (h). [Measure of damages.] The measure of damages is that 
specified in section 1402(f) (1) and (2) (a), except that
(1) in an action involving an offering statement or amendment
(a) the measure of damages is limited .. .  by the amount of the securities 
sold thereunder, [and]
(B) the price paid may not be taken to exceed the public offering price 
. . . , and
(2) the measure of damages, with respect to a particular filing (or with 
respect to substantially the same misrepresentation or omission reflected in 
more than one filing), is limited with respect to each defendant (after
10. Section 11(c) of the 1933 act specifies that the standard of reasonableness is that 
“ required of a prudent man in the management of his own property.” The code 
proposes a lower standard than the 1933 act, but the requirements for determining 
reasonableness in the 1933 act have never been literally applied to accountants. In 
the BarChris case the judge stated that “accountants should not be held to a 
standard higher than that recognized in their profession.” He did not, as he did in 
the case of other defendants, refer to the standard of reasonableness stated in 
section 11(c).
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application of section 1402(f) (2) (A) and the inclusion of any costs as­
sessed under section 1418(d), but apart from interest) to the greatest of
(A) $100,000, [or]
(B) one percent (to a maximum of $1,000,000) of gross revenues in the 
defendant’s last fiscal year before the filing of the action .. .; but this 
paragraph does not apply if the plaintiff proves a misrepresentation made 
with knowledge by the particular defendant.. . .
The limitation of damages in section 1403(h) (2) applies to both 
present 1933 and 1934 act filings. It clearly represents a trade-off for 
the extension of liability for negligence to what are now 1934 act filings, 
an extension that denies to the profession many of the benefits of the 
Hochfelder decision. The limitation is significant, since suits against 
auditors have been settled in amounts well over $1 million.11
The limitation does not apply to a “misrepresentation made with 
knowledge.” As noted earlier, it is harder for a plaintiff to establish 
knowledge than to establish scienter, as defined in clauses (b) and (c) 
of section 296AA. This higher standard of proof should give the profes­
sion some comfort.
However, the particular language used (or the absence of appropri­
ate language) leaves room for uncertainty as to the effect of section 
1403. The section removes the limitation of damages from misrepresen­
tations made with knowledge. It is silent as to fraudulent acts. In fact, 
section 1403 is couched essentially in terms of misrepresentation. The 
term fraudulent acts does not appear. But the intent of part XIV gener­
ally is to impose liability for violations of part XII, and section 1301(a) 
prohibits both misrepresentations and fraudulent acts. Thus, “ fraudu­
lent acts” are not discussed in connection with the limitation of 
damages. Moreover, as noted earlier in this chapter, the prohibited 
“fraudulent acts” are not adequately defined.
The auditor’s liability for a misrepresentation and the limitation of 
damages for a misrepresentation can be tracked through the code. A 
similar tracking is not possible for a fraudulent act. Consequently, this 
introduces a further note of uncertainty into the value of the trade-off in 
the code.
Sec. 1417. [Nonexclusivity of part XIV.] (a) [Implied actions.] A court may 
recognize a private action based on a violation of a provision of this 
Code. . .  even though it is not expressly created by part XIV.. . .
11. The Reporter’s comments make clear that “an accounting .. . firm is a single de­
fendant, whether organized as a corporation or as a partnership” (Reporter’s 
comments to section 1403(g) of Tentative Draft no. 2 (1973)). However, the Report­
er’s comments are just that—comments. The comments may be considered by a 
court in applying the code to a particular case, but there is no requirement that it 
do so. Moreover, all individuals who participated in a violation of part XIII could also 
be individually liable, since under common law an individual is responsible for his 
own torts.
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Under this section, private actions under present rule 10b-5 receive 
formal statutory recognition. The section incorporates the limitation of 
damages discussed above. Whether the section would expose audi­
tors to greater liability cannot be determined without resolution of the 
uncertainties previously discussed surrounding the meaning of “ fraudu­
lent acts” and the current requirements to establish liability under 
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Section 1417 will undoubtedly be recon­
sidered in the light of Hochfelder and subsequent court interpretations.
Sec. 1418. [Relief available.] (a) [Consequential damages.] (1) Nothing in 
this Code .. . precludes the award, in addition to rescission when appropri­
ate or the appropriate measure of damages, of any incidental or conse­
quential damages resulting from the conduct that is the basis of the action.
The effect of this section is not clear. It could be an exception to 
the code’s limitation of damages that might emasculate the general 
principle.
Assessment of Costs
Sec. 1418(d). [Costs: general.] In a private action created by or based on a 
violation of this Code. . . , the court, on a finding of bad faith or lack of 
merit in the action or defenses (as the case may be), may (1) assess 
reasonable costs (including reasonable attorney’s fees) against any party, 
and (2) require any party at any time to give an undertaking for the 
payment of such costs.
Section 1418(d) permits the award of attorney’s fees to the prevail­
ing party, including the defendant. It also permits the court to require 
an “undertaking” of any party, that is, a bond to cover the other party’s 
attorney’s fees. Section 11(e) of the 1933 act and sections 9 and 18 of 
the 1934 act allow filing for an undertaking; section 10(b) and rule 
10b-5 do not.12
This section should have the effect of discouraging frivolous or 
nuisance suits. Permitting an undertaking and allowing the award of 
attorney’s fees to the defendant auditor in all private claims under the 
code would discourage nuisance suits. It is also a necessary part of 
the trade-off for the code’s extension of liability for negligence to all 
filings.
Imposing defense costs on the plaintiff may not be a sufficient 
deterrent to nuisance suits. Defendant auditors and their attorneys 
believe that the source of nuisance suits is not the plaintiff, but rather 
his attorney. Penalizing attorneys who bring ill-founded actions has
12. In the Hochfelder opinion, the Supreme Court stated that the district court’s power 
to award attorney's fees is “sharply circumscribed" in 10(b) cases. Liggio points 
out the court did not use the word “prohibited” (1976, p. 1).
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been suggested as the only means of preventing nuisance suits, and 
this the code does not do.13
Liability as Aiders and Abettors
Sec. 1419. [Persons liable.] (b) [Aiders and abettors] (1) An agent or other 
person who causes, commands, induces, procures, or gives substantial 
assistance to conduct by another person (herein a “principal”) giving rise 
to liability under this Code .. . with knowledge that that conduct is the kind 
specified . . .  is liable to the same extent as the principal.
(2) A person is not liable under section 1419(b) (1) for a misrepresentation 
by a principal that is actionable under section 1404, 1405(b), 1406, or 1407 
unless there is proof of the person’s scienter as to the misrepresentation.
(3) For purposes of any limitation of liability applicable to each defendant, 
a director, officer, or employee of a company is considered to be a 
separate defendant from the company only if he is liable under section 
1403(b) or the foregoing portion of this subsection.
Auditors are frequently drawn into private litigation as alleged 
aiders and abettors. Whether liability exists for negligent aiding and 
abetting, or whether scienter or knowledge must be proved, is pres­
ently an open question. “Most securities law aiding and abetting or 
conspiracy cases have not discussed the knowledge point because 
knowledge was not in question” (Ruder, 1972, p. 632). The Supreme 
Court in Hochfelder left open whether scienter (as defined by the 
Court) was necessary for liability as an aider and abettor.
In its most current draft to date, the code sets a knowledge require­
ment for liability as an aider and abettor under some sections and sets 
a scienter requirement for such liability under other sections. This 
distinction, which does not appear logical, may well be eliminated in 
future drafts. A knowledge requirement for aiding and abetting seems 
appropriate, given that the limitation of damages discussed earlier 
does not apply when a misrepresentation is made with knowledge. In 
that regard, section 1419 (b)(3) is also significant in that each aider 
and abettor is considered a separate defendant for purposes of any 
limitation of liability.
Statute of Limitations
Sec. 1422. [Statute of Limitations.] (a) [Filing requirements, etc.] No action 
under section 1401 or 1411 may be brought more than one year after the 
date of the last act constituting the violation or other conduct on which the 
action is based .. .
(b) [Fraudulent acts, etc.] No action . . . may be brought more than (1) one 
year after the plaintiff acquired knowledge, or by the exercise of reason-
13. See the discussion in chapter 3 on the courts’ power to discipline lawyers under 
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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able diligence should have acquired knowledge, of the underlying facts, or
(2) five years after the last act constituting (A) the violation or other 
conduct on which the action is based .. ., or (B) the plaintiff’s purchase or 
sale. . .
This section provides for a uniform statute of limitations. The pres­
ent securities acts do provide absolute cutoffs for express actions 
permitted under the acts. However, most civil litigation that now takes 
place does so under the implied provisions of rule 10b-5. In rule 10b-5 
cases, the courts presently apply the statute of limitations in the juris­
diction where the suit is brought, and this varies from state to state.14
Reliance and Causation
Conspicuous by its absence in part XIV of the code is the concept 
of reliance.
The basic approach of this draft is to eschew reliance as such with one or 
two exceptions . . .  in favor of a “ lack of knowledge” test when it is appro­
priate . . . and to define cause in the legal sense, but to follow the lead of 
Sec. Act. section 11(e) in adjusting the burden of proof.. . . Since causation 
is traditionally contemplated in terms of damage caused by reliance on 
tortious conduct, reliance may inevitably be implicit to a degree in those 
provisions that refer to “any loss caused by the violation.” But (with the 
stated exceptions) reliance does not figure as a separate element.. . .
Because so many components affect the market in a given security, and 
they are so hard to isolate, and by hypothesis the plaintiff has proved 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant by the time the causation point is 
reached, those sections that create liability by buyers or sellers in connec­
tion with false filings or publicity, deceptive sales or purchases, and manip­
ulative acts follow the lead of Sec. Act section 11(e) by shifting the burden 
to the defendant to show either partial or complete lack of causation... ,15
Section 215A defines “caused” as follows:
A loss is “caused” by specified conduct to the extent that the conduct (a) 
was a substantial factor in producing the loss and (b) might reasonably 
have expected to result in loss of the kind suffered.
As noted in chapter 3, the questions of reliance and causation have 
received considerable attention by the courts, much of it after the 
consideration that led to Tentative Draft no. 2. Consequently, the elim­
ination of the reliance concept will probably be reexamined.
Administration and Enforcement
Part XV, “Administration and Enforcement,” brings together in one 
place the SEC’s present authority over auditors. Section 1503 pre­
14. Reporter’s note to section 1422 of Text of Tentative Drafts nos. 1-3 (1974).
15. Reporter’s comment to section 215A of Tentative Draft no. 2 (1973).
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serves, but does not extend, the SEC’s authority to
(1) define accounting terms, (2) prescribe the form and content of financial 
statements and the accounting principles and standards used in their 
preparation, (3) require the examination of and reporting on financial state­
ments by independent public accountants, (4) establish standards of inde­
pendence for public accountants insofar as they practice before it, and (5) 
prescribe the form and content of the independent public accountant’s 
report.
A comment to section 1503 in Tentative Draft no. 3 by the Reporter 
notes that
after a considerable amount of discussion centering primarily around the 
Commission’s role with respect to the auditing process, there is reason to 
anticipate that the language of section 1503 as a whole will prove to be 
agreeable to both the SEC and the AICPA.
This draft of section 1503 is advanced on the assumption (1) that nothing in 
it is designed to subtract from the authority (express or implied) that the 
Commission has. . . , or to change the basic relationship between the 
Commission and the accounting profession, and (2) that [the section] 
necessarily subsumes a degree of authority with respect to the scope (or 
standards) of, and procedures to be followed in, audit examinations.
Section 1513(e) provides that a hearing in an adjudicatory proceed­
ing (that is, a rule 2(e) administrative proceeding under the current 
statutes) “shall be public when all the respondents so request.” 
However, “ in the absence of such a request, the hearing . . . shall be 
private or public as the Commission determines by rule or order.” This 
does not represent a change from the present authority of the SEC. 
Section 1515(a) provides that
the Commission may bring an action to enjoin a violation of, or to enforce 
compliance with this Code. On a showing that the defendant has engaged, 
is engaged, or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting such a 
violation, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that he will again en­
gage, or will continue to engage, in such acts or practices unless enjoined, 
the court shall grant appropriate relief in the form of temporary or perma­
nent restraining orders and injunctions and orders enforcing compliance.
Section 1517 provides for criminal penalties for “ a person who 
violates with scienter a provision of this Code involving a misrepresen­
tation, or who intentionally or recklessly violates” other provisions of the 
code. This creates a lesser standard of proof (scienter) in criminal 
prosecutions than that required (knowledge) in civil actions in which a 
recovery beyond the code’s monetary limitation is sought. However, 
the standards for criminal liability will be determined by the proposed 
revision of the Federal Criminal Code rather than by the Federal Se­
curities Code.
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6
Effects of the Legal 
Environment on Professional 
Practice
The present legal environment has had consequences that affect 
both the auditing profession as a whole and the practice of individual 
auditors and firms. This chapter develops a framework for evaluating 
those consequences and then examines some of the specific conse­
quences. The basic issue is: How has the present legal environment 
affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit function? The 
question will be considered from the viewpoint of society, the profes­
sion, and the individual auditor or firm.
A Framework for Evaluating the Effects
Davidson stated that role “ is determined by the interactions of the 
expectations of the various individuals and groups having an identifia­
ble relationship to the role position. . . . Formal and/or informal rewards 
and sanctions are used to assure conformity to role expecta­
tions. . .. Failure to conform to the ascribed role or to meet role expec­
tations creates the risk of social action to enforce conformity and to 
penalize nonconformity" (1975, pp. 2-5). Clearly, the existing legal 
environment encompasses many of the sanctions that assure conform­
ity to role expectations. The significant question is whether present 
legal sanctions provide the most efficient way of assuring the auditor’s 
conformity. If the existing legal sanctions do not adequately reflect
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society’s expectations, they can be changed through legislation. The 
paucity of legislation nullifying court decisions suggests that the courts 
have correctly perceived those expectations, although the complexities 
of the process could also explain the legislative inactivity.
Are society’s expectations realistic? Can auditors achieve them? If 
auditors cannot, society will either have to revise its expectations or the 
expectations will be met by another group (Davidson, 1975, p. 2). A 
revision of expectations requires an educational effort by those wishing 
to change the expectations, and this would surely have to be a signifi­
cant part of any effort to change the legal climate.
The assumption of a particular role entails both costs and benefits 
to society. Some of the costs are the result of both civil and administra­
tive litigation, but those costs are not measured by the payments by 
auditors and their insurance carriers to plaintiffs and their attorneys. 
The real costs to society are opportunity costs, that is, the benefits that 
society may be losing if the auditor becomes economically inefficient, 
for example by performing unnecessary work.
To look merely at the amount of settlements as a measure of costs 
ignores the point that the settlements are only transfer payments within 
society. Those payments do, however, result in a redistribution of 
wealth, and consequently may have derivative effects. The redistribu­
tion is not easy to determine. For example, if damage payments to 
investors were ultimately borne by investors through higher audit fees 
and lower dividends, all that would occur would be a redistribution of 
wealth within the investor group. However, this redistribution and inves­
tor awareness of it is probably necessary to support the capital forma­
tion process, which would be diminished without the ability to obtain 
redress for illegal acts in connection with the purchase and sale of 
securities.
This analysis is not intended to suggest either that there is no cost 
to auditors or that there are no further effects on society from the 
redistributive process. An auditing firm probably cannot shift all the 
litigation and insurance costs to the client in the form of higher fees. 
The competitive nature of public accounting practice would prevent 
that. Some of the litigation and insurance costs will undoubtedly be 
absorbed by the firm. That would result in lower incomes of partners 
and staff or economies in recruiting, training, and other quality control 
policies and procedures that would not be in the public interest and 
might be the cause of future litigation. The analysis merely suggests 
that to look at the number of legal cases and the amounts involved is 
not the best way to measure social costs and social benefits that arise 
from society’s having thrust the auditor into a particular role.
Some idea of the redistribution effects of settlement costs can be 
derived from the following estimates.1
1. Data developed from nonpublic sources. 
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Cost Percentage of total
Awards to plaintiffs 33
Attorneys’ fees:
Defense 14
Insurance company 2
Plaintiff 17 33
Underwriting fees 4
Lost time and inside
defense costs 30
Total 100
The total represents the litigation cost to the public accounting firm 
and assumes that the insurance company breaks even. Presumably, it 
is that total that either is included in audit fees and thereby passed to 
clients or is borne by the firms. The estimates indicate that for each 
dollar awarded to injured investor plaintiffs, the investor public as a 
whole pays three dollars. The efficiency of litigation as a determinant of 
the auditor’s role or as a means of providing redress is therefore highly 
questionable. Most other forms of insurance protection are designed to 
achieve a preponderance of recoveries as opposed to “ handling” 
costs. Thus, a major effect of litigation against auditors might well be a 
redistribution of wealth from investors to attorneys and auditors. 
However, this conclusion results from what can be described at best 
as a simplistic model. The redistributive effects are undoubtedly more 
complex.
For example, insurance carriers may not be able, particularly in the 
short run, to recover an unusually large loss through higher premium 
charges to either the insured itself or other firms in the same profes­
sion. The loss may be spread even more broadly through increased 
premiums over a wide range of excess liability policies covering many 
professions or industries. This, in turn, would affect costs and prices 
over a broader range of economic activity than the public accounting 
profession alone. Alternatively, carriers of excess liability insurance 
may simply withdraw from the market when faced with unpredictable 
large losses.
Olson noted the effect of recent litigation on the insurance market:
In summary, Hochfelder will help. But it is not a panacea for the growing 
problem of class action plaintiffs counsel seeking to pick the “deep” 
pockets of independent accountants. Indeed, one major adverse develop­
ment has materialized since the Supreme Court decision in Hochfelder. 
The professional indemnity insurance situation deteriorated dramatically in 
two ways. The cost of primary coverage became prohibitive. One major 
firm with a very good record is known to have concluded that it could not 
economically afford to have any insurance for the first $3 million of any 
claim and has recently dropped its primary professional indemnity insur­
ance coverage. Equally disturbing, it also found that it was simply unable 
to renew over 25% of its catastrophe (excess) coverage.
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Other firms are also believed to have found primary coverage prohibitively 
expensive, and to have lost a significant portion of their catastrophe 
coverage. While some may believe that those writing professional indem­
nity insurance overreacted to adverse developments of the last few years, 
that is, of course, difficult to prove with hard evidence. [Olson, 1976]
In brief, the analysis in this chapter is directed to the following 
issues:
•  How has the changed legal climate affected the performance of 
individual auditors and firms?
•  How has the changed legal climate affected other aspects of the 
environment in which an auditor works, and what have been the 
effects of those derivative changes on audit performance and 
role?
•  Does the auditor’s view of his present role as it has been af­
fected by the changed legal climate lead to the most efficient 
use of economic resources? Is society getting the most benefits 
from the audit function at the lowest cost? Could a changed role 
definition increase the benefits or lower the costs to society?
Unfortunately, in the absence of both a control group and measure­
ment criteria, it is difficult to separate the changes in the profession 
that have resulted from a litigious environment from those that have 
resulted from other variables such as the increasing complexity of 
financial transactions, technological developments, and the growth of 
multinational enterprises. Only a minor act of faith is needed, however, 
to recognize at least some causation between the effects that are 
described below and the growth in litigation over the last decade. If 
the legal environment has in fact produced effects that are suboptimal 
for society, changes in the legal environment should be explored. That 
will be discussed in chapter 7.
Benefits to Society
The litigious environment has encouraged the public accounting 
profession and firms to reexamine and strengthen auditing standards 
and methods of encouraging compliance with them. In recent years, 
the AICPA has issued many authoritative auditing pronouncements and 
revised its code of professional ethics. The Institute has devoted con­
siderable attention to the design and implementation of quality control 
reviews of firms. Individual firms have also devoted more resources to 
their own policies and procedures for maintaining and raising the 
quality of practice.
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Increased Activity of Authoritative Auditing Bodies
From 1965 through 1976, the Auditing Standards Executive Commit­
tee and its predecessor, the Committee on Auditing Procedure, issued 
thirty-five statements. (This excludes Statement on Auditing Standards 
no. 1, which was a codification of previously issued statements.) The 
activity of the committee accelerated in recent years, as the following 
data show.
Number of Authoritative 
Auditing Pronouncements
At least on the surface, a relationship between the committee’s 
annual activity and the increased litigation and SEC activism of recent 
years is present. It is difficult to ascertain whether the level of commit­
tee activity and the “quality” of its work would have been greater or 
lesser in the absence of litigation. To the extent that auditing state­
ments clarify existing responsibilities, litigation may be assumed to 
provide an impetus to a greater number of pronouncements. However, 
both the profession and society may have suffered from either the 
content or the quality of the pronouncements. That possibility is consid­
ered later in this chapter.2
2. This study does not explore the effect of litigation on authoritative accounting (as 
contrasted with auditing) bodies. There has been an increased level of activity in the 
accounting as well as in the auditing area, and the profession has taken various 
procedural steps to enable authoritative accounting bodies to maintain or even 
increase that level of activity. However, the increased activity and improved pro­
cedures are the result of numerous influences, and it is difficult to find specific 
evidence to link the level of activity of the Committee on Accounting Procedure, the 
Accounting Principles Board, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or the 
content of their pronouncements, to either specific litigation or the increased level of 
litigation.
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Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
2
2
2
1
1
2
7
4
0 (plus SAS no. 1)
3 
7
4
35
Increased Attention to Quality Control
Both the profession and individual firms have considered the need 
for more effective controls over the quality of audit practice. Statement 
on Auditing Standards no. 4, Quality Control Considerations for a Firm 
of Independent Auditors, published in 1974, gave authoritative recogni­
tion to the need for quality control policies and procedures. The AICPA 
and state societies of CPAs have encouraged compliance with profes­
sional standards through such devices as the AICPA practice review 
program, mandated continuing education in several jurisdictions, the 
AICPA local firm quality review program, the AICPA local firm adminis­
trative review program, and the AICPA voluntary quality control review 
program for CPA firms.
Individual firms have also designed and implemented programs for 
monitoring practices. Evidence that supports an expanded activity by 
CPA firms in this area includes, among other things,
•  Increased resources devoted to continuing education.
•  Institution of second-partner and interoffice review of work pa­
pers and reports.
•  Practice bulletins directed at both accounting and auditing 
issues.
•  Policy statements on internal quality control programs.
•  Institution of both voluntary and mandatory peer reviews.
•  Engagement of other auditing firms to conduct independent 
quality reviews.
The available evidence does not indicate the extent to which these 
attempts to maintain or raise the quality of professional practice are in 
fact successful. Formal research to measure how the quality of prac­
tice has increased in the past decade is impractical. In particular, 
drawing inferences about the quality of practice from data on the 
volume of litigation is dangerous. As has been suggested regarding 
the medical profession, it may be the more highly skilled auditor who 
undertakes the riskier audits and thereby exposes himself to civil, 
criminal, and administrative proceedings.3
No empirical evidence exists that would indicate the extent to 
which any apparent or real increase in the quality of practice is
3. A recent study of medical malpractice claims indicated a “prevalence of claims 
among highly trained, certified specialists, particularly those practicing in a hospital 
setting.” “Highly Trained Called Targets of Malpractice Claims,” New York Times, 
May 10, 1976, p. 23.
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causally related specifically to the litigious environment. Logically, the 
link should be present. Mautz argued that a litigious environment 
should serve as an impetus to a high level of performance:
An accountant accused of improper conduct will be judged by the stand­
ards of the time in which his “case comes to court” rather than by the 
standards in effect when the engagement at issue was completed. This 
fact alone should urge accounting firms and practitioners to reconsider 
their quality control procedures and to keep their personal standards of 
performance as high as they can. [1975, pp. 50-51]
Sommer cited the second-partner review procedure as resulting di­
rectly from litigation:
It is reported that, as a consequence of the Simon decision, several 
auditing firms have instituted a procedure whereby a partner not involved 
in the audit, as one of the final steps before release of the opinion, steps 
back and considers the financials as a whole in terms of their understand­
ab ly . [1974, p. 24]
To the extent that the quality of professional practice has re­
sponded to private litigation and SEC enforcement, the existing legal 
climate may not be the most efficient way of attaining a specified level 
of auditor performance. Also, the present level of auditor performance 
may not be commensurate with the benefits and costs to society. 
Individual auditors and firms may well reach an optimum level of 
performance that maximizes their private benefits given the revenue 
and cost functions they face, with litigation expense included in the 
cost function. But that does not necessarily ensure an optimum level of 
performance from the viewpoint of society. Society “ pays” for the level 
of the auditor’s performance in terms of foregone opportunities for 
alternative use of its resources, but no model exists that is useful in 
determining whether a given allocation of resources is in fact optimal.
Furthermore, the fear of civil and criminal liability and SEC enforce­
ment programs may not continue to have the same salutory influence 
on the profession in the future. The level of fear may at some point 
exceed the room for improvement. The profession may have reached a 
stage of maturity in meeting its responsibilities that would be threat­
ened and eroded by further escalation of risks facing the profession.
Costs to Society
Society may have suffered several potentially undesirable effects as 
a result of the existing legal climate. Those effects may add indirect 
costs that are borne by society to the direct costs associated with 
litigation such as legal and other defense costs. Some of those effects
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are more in the nature of reduced social benefits attributable to the 
legal environment. All have the potential of causing a misallocation of 
resources. The existence or significance of undesirable effects cannot 
be verified without empirical investigation and a benefit-cost model. 
The strength of the evidence lies largely in the experience and stature 
of those who have alleged the undesirable effects.
Auditor Reluctance to Meet Existing Responsibilities
Mautz and Sharaf suggested that, particularly in the area of fraud 
detection and prevention, fear of litigation has led to attempts by 
auditors to minimize their responsibility, with attendant undesirable 
consequences to both the profession and society.
As important as minimization of responsibility is to professional practi­
tioners at a time when nuisance suits and similar litigation seem to flourish, 
additional considerations merit attention. Until recently there was substan­
tial acceptance of the idea that an independent audit had as one of its 
principal purposes the detection and prevention of fraud and other irreg­
ularities. Currently we find considerable emphasis on elimination or at least 
minimization of this responsibility through audit-client agreements, letters, 
and statements in the professional literature. Whether such agreements 
and statements offer any real protection we are not qualified to state. Even 
if auditors can contract away their responsibility for this particular service, 
serious consideration should be given to the wisdom of so doing. The 
advantage is an immediate release from what may prove to be an onerous 
and burdensome responsibility. The disadvantages may far outweigh this. 
First, the auditor appears to be renouncing his right to an area in which he 
has competence and in which he can be of service; second, as a profes­
sional group auditors are in effect refusing to provide an effective service 
to the business community; third, auditors are emphasizing to clients and 
the world at large their unwillingness to accept responsibility, to provide a 
difficult but useful service, to attempt to cope on even a small scale with 
an evil force that blights business life in no unsubstantial degree. Such a 
position cannot but lessen the prestige of the profession, particularly in 
view of the fact that the service and the responsibility we now deny were, 
at one time, claimed rather forcefully. [1961, pp. 129-30]
Auditor Reluctance to Accept New Responsibilities 
or Expanded Role
Russell Palmer questioned whether
the accounting profession may not be showing some reluctance to extend 
itself into new areas. In connection with two recent controversies—report­
ing on interim financial statements and reporting on forecasts—the profes­
sion chose to debate and discuss rather than actively experiment. True, 
there are some difficult technical issues in each of these areas, but I am 
concerned that we may be using the conceptual questions to shield us 
from possible additional exposure to liability. [1975, p. 62]
Palmer went on to suggest that as a consequence the public interest is 
not being served.
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Added Costs for Marginal Companies
Reiling and Taussig noted that a characteristic common to litigation 
involving auditors is that the cases
involve businesses which have failed. Clearly, as a matter of self-protec­
tion, an auditor must perform a more extensive investigation when he 
suspects financial difficulties. Unfortunately, evidence of business failure 
may be more apparent in retrospect than at the time of an audit. Neverthe­
less, the current cases indicate the wisdom of expanding an audit program 
for a company with declining earnings or weak credit.
The accountant’s dilemma in this area has implications for society at large. 
If it becomes commonplace for stockholders to sue the auditors of every 
failing company, those firms least able to pay will be hindered by above 
average audit costs. Additional barriers to competition will be introduced 
because the cost of raising money and doing business will be higher for 
marginal companies. [1970, p. 45]
Whether and to what extent the audit of a marginal company 
should be expanded are debatable issues. Faced with those uncertain­
ties, auditors may begin to reject marginal companies as clients be­
cause of the greater business risk surrounding them. Since virtually all 
new ventures are “marginal” in terms of their eventual success, that 
development could lead to a general inability of new enterprises to 
obtain auditors. The inability of new ventures to obtain audits would 
introduce an additional barrier to competition that could interfere with 
the optimal allocation of resources.4
The evidence does not suggest that the problem is significant, at 
least not at the present. To the contrary, CPA firms seem highly 
competitive in seeking new or expanding enterprises as clients. If the 
problem does develop, solutions might be found in lesser levels of 
assurance that the auditor might give to marginal companies or the 
granting of a “safe harbor” in those cases.
Creation of Accounting Principles and 
Auditing Standards by the Courts
The question of whether compliance with generally accepted ac­
counting principles and generally accepted auditing standards is an
4. Arthur Andersen & Co., in its March 31, 1973, Annual Report, stated one auditing 
firm’s views: "In the United States many companies which by their very nature are 
developmental, promotional and of the venture capital type have gone to the public 
security markets for equity or debt capital. Our involvement with many companies of 
this type is initiated by clients or directors of clients of long standing. In a private 
enterprise system a substantial number of companies that begin as new ventures are 
likely to fail. We have no crystal ball to tell which will succeed and which will fail, but 
we do not believe it is in the public interest for auditing firms with established 
reputations to decline these engagements.”
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adequate defense for auditors has been explored extensively in the 
literature and in a background paper prepared for the Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities (Radoff, 1975) and is not considered here. 
Rather, this study is concerned with the extent to which the courts 
have ruled on the acceptability and application of accounting princi­
ples and auditing standards and the implications of those rulings.
Questions about the acceptability of specific accounting principles 
were not significant in court cases prior to 1940. Most of the early 
cases involved the auditor’s liability for the inadequate performance of 
auditing procedures. Similar questions continue to arise in current 
litigation, but not to the exclusion of allegations of errors in the selec­
tion or application of accounting principles.
Plaintiffs increasingly allege violations of generally accepted accounting 
principles, a marked departure from such classic cases as Ultramares and 
McKesson & Robbins, in which the decisions were based largely on 
auditing deficiencies. Judges and juries not only are finding deficiencies in 
the way auditors examine financial records, but also are making statements 
on accounting principles and the way in which they should be applied. 
[Reiling and Taussig, 1970, p. 41]
For example, in Herzfeld, the district court ruled that the disclosure 
for a receivable of doubtful collectibility was inadequate even though it 
may have been customary and therefore in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles. In two cases not involving auditors, 
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. (1973) and SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp. 
(1971), the court challenged the adequacy of generally accepted ac­
counting principles with respect to current values that differed signifi­
cantly from book values, an issue not then addressed by authoritative 
accounting bodies.
The concern here is the role of the courts in determining the 
appropriateness of accounting principles. Reiling and Taussig, for ex­
ample, question “whether accounting guidelines which emerge from 
the judicial process will be as well conceived as those resulting from 
the careful method of review and public exposure developed over the 
years by the AICPA” (1970, p. 42).
The authors believe that the development of accounting principles by 
judges and juries as a by-product of their disposition of a series of cases 
will not result in the most desirable formulation of guidelines for financial 
reporting. Present litigation typically involves unusual circumstances, which 
could prejudice a decision on general principles. For instance, in Westec, 
officers of the company have been found guilty on a number of criminal 
counts, including improper security transactions. The moral taint from these 
convictions might affect the Court's regard for the defendants and might 
prejudice its ruling on whether a pooling of interest fairly presented acqui­
sitions by Westec. The authors believe that accounting procedures should 
be generalized from the experience of going concerns run by ethical 
managers, not failing companies run by wrongdoers. [Reiling and Taussig, 
1970, p. 46]
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Also, most of the situations dealt with the adequacy of disclosure in 
unusual circumstances. It would be unfortunate if accounting principles 
were to be generalized from them.
Fiflis noted that the courts have generally applied the standards of 
the profession in auditing areas other than those of communication and 
reporting, but have applied lay standards to questions of reporting 
(1975a, p. 80). (See the further discussion in chapter 7.) Even in this 
limited area, the establishment of auditing standards by the courts 
raises the same questions as are raised with the establishment of 
accounting principles by the courts.
Defensive Actions by Auditors
Allegations have been made that increased litigation has led to 
defensive actions. Three types of defensive actions may be dis­
tinguished. The first is the performance of audit procedures that have 
as their primary or sole purpose providing a defense in the event of 
subsequent litigation or SEC enforcement proceedings. An analogy in 
the medical profession is the alleged practice by doctors of performing 
extra or unnecessary tests or calling in consultants primarily to support 
their judgments in the event of subsequent malpractice litigation. The 
available evidence is insufficient to indicate whether this type of defen­
sive auditing is a significant factor in auditing practice. One observer’s 
impression was that auditors have not “ been driven to ‘defensive 
auditing’—in the sense of audit steps that are plainly useless or even 
harmful” (Andrews, 1975). Defensive auditing may be little more than 
appropriate documentation of audit procedures or more careful selec­
tion of items to be tested.
A second defensive action may be providing users with lower 
levels of assurance than would otherwise be appropriate to the audit 
work performed. This is analogous to the alleged unwillingness of 
medical doctors to use “more innovative approaches in solving pa­
tients’ problems because of concern for the possible legal risks” 
(Palmer, 1975, p. 62). Palmer suggested that evidence for this could 
be found in an increasing number of qualified opinions, which he 
traced to the auditor’s fear of possible future litigation.
A third defensive action is related to the auditor’s reluctance, noted 
above, to accept new responsibilities. There is reluctance to give less 
than audit assurance to users of financial or other information. A 
willingness to accept new responsibilities, for example in reporting on 
interim financial information, may require a willingness to provide users 
with a lower level of assurance than would result from an audit. 
However, there is a fear that the lower level of assurance will be 
misunderstood and serve to stimulate litigation. This results in auditor 
insistence on a level of involvement that will permit audit assurance, 
but which is uneconomical given the needs of users, thereby resulting
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in “overauditing.” Alternatively, the auditor may completely avoid in­
volvement, another potentially suboptimal position.
Reiling and Taussig suggested that, as a result of the BarChris 
decision, heretofore unaudited interim period statements be audited 
and that “the auditor attest to such other data contained in the registra­
tion statement as is capable of being measured” (1970, p. 46). There is 
no doubt that such a stance will, as they suggested, provide underwrit­
ers with more due diligence protection and auditors with a means of 
avoiding “the difficult problem of articulating detailed standards for the 
statutorily implied S-1 review” (Reiling and Taussig, 1970, p. 46). But it 
is far from certain that this would provide prospectus readers with 
more useful information, as is also alleged.
Difficulty in Hiring and Retaining Qualified Personnel
Mautz suggested that excessive litigation, with presumably the pos­
sibility of financial ruin, could discourage the most able from entering 
or continuing in the profession (1975, p. 53). College students, reading 
of the profession’s legal problems, may be unlikely to be attracted to 
the profession. Staff auditors may move to alternative careers where 
their personal assets are less at risk. Even partners may seek early 
retirement or alternative careers. At a time when increased respon­
sibilities are being thrust on auditors, those responsibilities may be met 
by less qualified practitioners. This would lead to more mistakes, more 
litigation, and more adverse publicity.
Only anecdotal evidence exists to support these contentions. Part­
ners and staff leaving a public accounting firm have cited potential 
exposure to liability and the “cookbook” and “ rulebook” nature of 
auditing practice that allegedly has resulted from the litigious environ­
ment as reasons for their decision. Students at times do inquire about 
a firm’s past and current litigation. However, no hard evidence sug­
gests that the problem is significant. Some might even conclude that 
the profession’s stature has been enhanced by the auditor’s position in 
the legal limelight.
Defensiveness by Authoritative Auditing Bodies
The possibility of a relationship between the extent of litigation and 
the quality of official auditing pronouncements was suggested earlier in 
this chapter.
Content of Authoritative Pronouncements. Fifty-four Statements on 
Auditing Procedure were issued between 1939 and 1972; fifteen State­
ments on Auditing Standards were issued between 1973 and 1976. 
With few exceptions, those pronouncements can be described as 
attempts to clarify the auditor’s existing responsibilities in an audit of 
annual financial statements. Only a small portion of the sixty-nine
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pronouncements could be related to extending the auditor’s role. Offi­
cial pronouncements have been issued to define the auditor’s respon­
sibility with regard to Other Information in Documents Containing 
Audited Financial Statements (SAS no. 8, 1975) and a Limited Review 
of Interim Financial Information (SAS no. 10, 1975), but in both cases 
the Auditing Standards Executive Committee was responding to pres­
sure from the SEC. No statements have been issued in other areas 
that might involve an extension of responsibilities to include auditor 
association with, for example, forecasts, financial information not based 
on historical costs, reports on management performance, or social 
accounting reports.
Of the sixty-nine pronouncements (which included two codifica­
tions), nine can be traced to audit failures that led to litigation. Other 
pronouncements can be traced more indirectly to specific audit 
failures. Those case-related pronouncements and the related cases are 
as follows:
SAP no. 1 (October 1939): Extensions o f Auditing Procedure 
(McKesson and Robbins)
SAP no. 27 (July 1957): Long-form Reports (C.I.T. Financial)
SAP no. 37 (September 1966): Special Report: Public Warehouses— 
Controls and Auditing Procedures for Goods Held (Allied Crude 
Oil)
SAP no. 41 (October 1969): Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing 
at the Date of Auditor’s Report (Yale Express)
SAP no. 45 (July 1971): Using the Work and Reports of Other 
Auditors (Atlantic Acceptance)
SAP no. 47 (September 1971): Subsequent Events (BarChris)
SAP no. 48 (October 1971): Letters for Underwriters (BarChris) 
SAS no. 6 (July 1975): Related Party Transactions (Continental 
Vending and U.S. Financial)
SAS no. 7 (October 1975): Communications Between Predecessor 
and Successor Auditor (U.S. Financial)
Even this list does not indicate the full effect that the legal environ­
ment has had on the work of the auditing committee of the Institute. 
Other auditing pronouncements originated from accounting pronounce­
ments that in turn can be traced to alleged misconduct of one kind or 
another that led to litigation. For example, the origin of SAP no. 44 
(April 1971), Reports Following a Pooling of Interest, was Accounting 
Principles Board Opinion no. 16 (August 1970), Business Combinations. 
This in turn had its source in the deterioration of accounting principles 
evidenced at least in part by litigation, such as the Westec case, that 
raised questions of the propriety of the principles selected and applied 
to account for particular combinations.
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Moreover, the sources of a number of pronouncements were pre­
vious pronouncements that required further refinement or clarification, 
with the original pronouncement traceable to litigation involving audi­
tors. For example, the source of SAP no. 1 (October 1939), Extensions 
of Auditing Procedure, was, as previously noted, the McKesson and 
Robbins case. Several following pronouncements involved further clar­
ification of the auditor’s responsibility for confirming receivables or 
observing physical inventory counts, the extended procedures of SAP 
no. 1. These pronouncements are—
SAP no. 3 (February 1940): Inventories and Receivables of Depart­
ment Stores, Installment Houses, Chain Stores, and Other Re­
tailers
SAP no. 12 (October 1942): Amendments to Extensions of Auditing 
Procedure
SAP no. 14 (December 1942): Confirmation of Public Utility Ac­
counts Receivable
SAP no. 16 (December 1972): Case Studies on Inventories
SAP no. 17 (December 1972): Physical Inventories in Wartime
SAP no. 18 (January 1943): Confirmation of Receivables from the 
Government
SAP no. 19 (November 1943): Confirmation of Receivables (Positive 
and Negative Methods)
SAP no. 26 (April 1956): Reporting on Use of "Other Procedures"
SAP no. 36 (August 1966): Revision of "Extensions of Auditing 
Procedures” Relating to Inventories
Once again, speculation on “what might have been” is largely 
futile. However, the auditing committees might have been more in­
clined to consider new areas of responsibility in a less litigious at­
mosphere. Even in the area of defining existing responsibilities, 
attention might have been directed elsewhere in the absence of 
litigation.
Defensiveness in Defining Existing Responsibilities. Several ob­
servers have suggested that the profession has been unwilling to 
define auditing standards rigorously because of the fear of providing a 
basis for additional litigation. This appears to have been particularly 
true with regard to the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraud. 
Carmichael noted that “as the amount of litigation against auditors and 
the size of potential damages increased, auditors became more cau­
tious about describing their responsibilities in authoritative pronounce­
ments and CPA firm manuals” (1975, p. 12). Sommer also noted, in 
quoting John Carey (1969, p. 248), that the AICPA “has become 
increasingly aware that pronouncements and rules which encourage 
higher standards of performance might be used against its members
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unfairly in the courts” (1972, p. 27). However, if the profession defines 
auditing standards at a level below that which society considers appro­
priate, it may discourage a high level of performance by auditors and 
generate even more litigation.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter does not permit an assess­
ment of the overall effect on society and the accounting profession of 
the legal environment in which the audit function is performed. Specifi­
cally, there is no firm evidence about the existence, on balance, of 
undesirable effects or the degree to which they might have resulted 
from a litigious climate. Since the effects are not quantifiable, there is 
no way to determine whether the overall effect of litigation has been 
good or bad.
However, the inability to make this assessment is itself significant. It 
suggests that, despite the views of many auditors, the present legal 
climate has not had an overwhelming negative effect on either the 
profession or society. Consequently, major revisions in the legal en­
vironment might not produce significant benefits to society or to the 
profession.
The absence of evidence indicating an overall negative effect, 
however, does not rule out the possibility of making specific improve­
ments in the legal framework facing auditors. An evaluation of pro­
posals to improve the legal environment requires only the ability to 
ascertain whether they would, on an individual basis, provide or en­
hance one or more desirable effects without creating equal or greater 
undesirable effects. The inability to assess the overall effects of the 
present system of adjudicating disputes between auditors and others 
does not reduce the ability to assess the effects of specific changes in 
the system. We need not know precisely where we are to know if a 
change in that position is for the better or for the worse.
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7
Proposals for Changing the 
Legal Environment
Various proposals have been advanced for changing the legal 
environment in which the audit function is performed. The proposals 
fall into several categories:
1. Limitations to monetary damages for substandard performance.
2. Changing the legal process through which disputes involving audi­
tors are adjudicated.
.3. Changing the institutional framework in which audits are conducted, 
including the mechanism for professional regulation and discipline.
Limitations to Damages
Statutory Limitations to Damages
The potential liability of an expert (including an auditor) under 
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 is the entire offering price of the 
public offering. Class actions under section 10 and rule 10b-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have sought damages equal to the 
decline in the market value of all of the outstanding shares of an 
issuer. Earle argued that the exposure is out of proportion to the audit 
fee for an engagement (1972, p. 228). He and others have suggested 
various forms of limitation to the monetary damages that could be
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recovered from auditors in litigation under the federal securities acts.
The arguments for a statutory limitation to damages are sum­
marized as follows:
1. Society has accepted the concept of statutory limitations to 
damages in other areas. Examples include claim limitations under 
no-fault automobile insurance and in workmen’s compensation 
cases (Hill, 1975, pp. 178-79; Duncan, 1974, p. 457).
2. A statutory limitation would be an appropriate response to in­
creased litigation against professionals and the evolution of a 
higher standard of professional care. “As the trend towards a strict 
(i.e., absolute) liability environment continues, the quid pro quo of 
limitation seems to me appropriate and fair” (Duncan, 1974, p. 
457). Several state legislatures have considered limitations on a 
doctor’s liability.1
3. Other countries provide precedents for statutory limitations to the 
liability of professionals, and professionals generally are seeking an 
extension of this practice. West Germany has statutory limitations 
for accountants. The International Federation of Consulting En­
gineers has also advocated limitations for engineers.2
Professional bodies throughout the world have, at national level, prepared 
submissions to their governments seeking authority to limit liability in one 
form or another. Submissions have been made by the accountancy profes­
sion to the Scottish Law Commission and to the Australian Attorney-Gen­
eral, and the New Zealand Society of Accountants has made submissions 
to the Attorney-General in New Zealand. Also, the International Federation 
of Consulting Engineers, with its headquarters in Switzerland, published a 
year ago the findings of a working Committee on Professional Liability 
entitled, A Guideline for Consulting Engineers on Professional Liability, and 
I am aware of urgent attention being given by consulting engineers in [New 
Zealand] to representations to members along the lines recommended in 
that publication. [Duncan, 1974, p. 451]
4. Sommer noted some sympathy at the SEC for a statutory limitation.
The SEC is not unconcerned with the danger of excessive financial loss, 
for we recognize that an indigent profession, or one blighted with financial
1. “On April 18, 1975, the New York Times reported that Indiana had passed legislation 
which (among other things): (1) sets a ceiling of $500,000 on all malpractice damage 
awards and $100,000 on a physician's individual liability; (2) creates a state-oper­
ated patient’s compensation fund; (3) empowers a medical review panel to screen 
alleged malpractice suits” (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 1976, p. 94).
2. The representations with regard to West Germany and consulting engineers are 
found in Duncan, 1974, pp. 451, 456.
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adversity, will need to reduce its exposure and thereby lessen the protec­
tion afforded investors. Several years ago the American Institute of Cer­
tified Public Accountants proposed an amendment to Section 11 of the 
1933 act to limit the liability on the auditors on the theory that it was absurd 
to expose them to liability for the entire amount of the offering while each 
underwriter was responsible only for his participation. The Commission was 
not unsympathetic to this plea. [1972, p. 24]
Several alternatives have been proposed as a basis of limiting 
monetary damages:
1. The ALI proposal (which “does not apply if the plaintiff proves a 
misrepresentation made with knowledge by the particular defend­
ant” ) for an arbitrary limitation of the greater of “$100,000 or one 
percent (to a maximum of $1,000,000) of gross revenues in the 
defendant’s last fiscal year before the filing of the action.”
2. An arbitrary percentage of the offering price in a 1933 act registra­
tion, such as the 5 percent suggested by Earle (1972, p. 228).3
3. A limitation related to the fees received from a particular client. 
Fiflis suggested that
better tailoring of the lines of liability could be achieved, for example, by 
limiting liability to a multiple of the fee received by the auditor for the 
engagement in which the breach of duty occurred; or a multiple of fees 
received from the client during a particular period; or a multiple of gross 
revenues from all clients for a particular period.4 [1975a, p. 113]
The manner of achieving equity among all parties is a major issue 
that any scheme for statutory limitation to damages must resolve. The 
Reporter’s comments to the proposed Federal Securities Code provide 
the rationale for the ALI’s limitation of damages:
In the absence of arbitrary limits set by section 1403(h) (1), there would be 
no built-in governor of the amount of recovery with respect to a false 
registration statement or annual report as there is [in section 1403(h) (2)] in 
terms of the aggregate public offering price of the securities covered by an 
offering statement. But there must be some maximum, not only to prevent 
the possibility of utterly outlandish recoveries for material but nevertheless 
relatively insubstantial lapses, but also because of the illogic under the 
new scheme of things of imposing a greater potential liability with respect 
to registration statements and reports than with respect to offering 
statements.
The other side of the coin is that, unless the potential liability is high 
enough to attract able lawyers who are willing to undertake class actions
3. Earle did not address specific limitations under 1934 act filings.
4. The third suggestion resembles the ALI proposal, except that the ALl’s “multiple” is 
1/100 of gross revenues, to a maximum of $1 million.
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on a contingency basis, there may not be any practical enforcement; for it 
would be unrealistic to rely solely on the Commission.. ..
The answer suggested is basically an arbitrary maximum of $100,000 per 
defendant. And this is expressed so as to include costs, because the 
attorney’s fees awarded . . .  might otherwise add a substantial amount to 
the $100,000 figure that is arbitrarily selected as the fair ceiling for each 
defendant. But the $100,000 figure is subject to a number of 
qualifications.. ..
So far as offering statements are concerned, [the section 1403(h)(2)] limita­
tion has been made applicable also.. . [to experts] but not to underwriters, 
on the ground that the offering price ceiling available under [section 
1403(h)(1)] is apt to be extremely high.5
The Fiflis alternative to the ALI proposal relates the amount for 
which the auditor is at risk to the compensation he receives for the 
audit. For many auditing firms, a $100,000 liability would be ruinous. 
For a large firm, a $1 million loss might be less significant; it might not 
cover even the audit fees from a particular client.
The plaintiffs bar can be expected to oppose any form of statutory 
limitation to liability, although this may be blunted in part by an ex­
panded concept of liability. Any statutory limitation to liability must 
adequately protect the rights of plaintiffs and be adequate for the 
recovery of costs and a reasonable fee by plaintiffs’ attorneys. The 
composition of the ALI project, especially participants who are law 
professors and likely to have a sympathetic appreciation of the need to 
compensate plaintiffs, probably provides the best assurance that plain­
tiffs’ rights will be adequately considered in the code. Moreover, the 
ALI limitations to damages apply to each defendant, and an account­
ing firm would generally not be the sole defendant in litigation under 
the code.
Fiflis opposed the ALI’s proposed limitation, but whether his op­
position is based on principle or on the specific provisions of the 
proposed code is not clear (1975a, pp. 112-13). If the latter, the opposi­
tion may be based on his misreading of the ALI proposal.6 In his view, 
a limitation to damages would be unjust to injured parties, and the 
specific ALI proposal would not treat all defendants equitably.
The ALI’s limitation is part of an overall proposal that includes 
extending auditors’ liability to acts that under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 would at present comprise mere negligence and thus be 
beyond the reach of plaintiffs in civil litigation for monetary damages.
5. Reporter’s Comments to section 1403(g), Tentative Draft no. 2 (1973).
6. Fiflis stated that an “auditor will, under the Code, be held to a limit of 100,000 
dollars” (p. 112). The code provides that the limitation is the greatest of $100,000 or 
one percent (to a maximum of $1 million) of defendant’s gross revenues.
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This extension will deny to the profession the “ benefits” of the lower 
standard of care permitted in some 1934 act cases by the Hochfelder 
decision and will raise the standard of care to essentially that of the 
1933 act.7
The Court in Hochfelder noted the consequences of such an 
extension:
We do note that the standard urged by [the plaintiffs] would significantly 
broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon 
accountants and other experts who perform services or express opinions 
with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term, in Blue Chip 
Stamps .. .the Court pertinently observed: “While much of the development 
of the law of deceit has been the elimination of artificial barriers to recovery 
on just claims, we are not the first court to express concern that the 
inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of 
the law will ultimately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche .. . Chief Judge Cardozo observed with respect to ‘a liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class.. . .  The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implica­
tion of a duty that exposes to these consequences.’ ”
The Court’s requirement for scienter explicitly rejected the SEC’s 
contention that a reading of rule 10b-5 to support a private action 
against an accountant based upon negligent performance “ is necess­
ary to accomplish its purpose of protecting investors, who are vic­
timized by conduct, whether negligent or intentional, which operates as 
a fraud and deceit upon them.”8 (The effect on investors, the SEC 
argued, is the same regardless of whether the conduct is negligent or 
intentional.)
The profession may view the imposition of a negligence standard 
under what are now 1934 act filings as too high a price to pay for a 
statutory limitation to damages, particularly in the euphoria of the 
Hochfelder decision. But in Hochfelder, the Supreme Court only inter­
preted past congressional intent. Congress will be asked by the ALI to 
consider again the standard of care appropriate to experts under the 
securities laws. However, Congress could also act before a full consid­
eration of the ALI proposal to impose a negligence standard without
7. As noted earlier, however, the standard of reasonableness in the code is lowered 
from that “ required of a prudent man in the management of his own property" in 
section 11(c) of the 1933 act to “that required of a prudent man under the circum­
stances.” Although the language of the 1933 act has not been directly applied to 
accountants, it could be in a future case. Thus, the standard of reasonableness in 
the code is a further advantage to accountants.
8. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Before the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (1976).
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any trade-off in the form of damage limitations.9 The evolution under 
common law noted earlier that has led to expanded responsibilities to 
third parties could easily be extended further by legislation.
Although the Court’s interpretation of the 1934 act distinguishes 
between negligence and fraud, the public may not. Thus, the image of 
the profession and, hence, its credibility could well be enhanced by an 
acceptance of the highest possible standard of care, coupled with a 
limitation on monetary damages. The trade-off of limited monetary 
damages for a higher standard of care may permit the profession to 
meet user expectations regarding the level of care without imposing 
excessive monetary damages for a failure to meet those expectations.
Too many uncertainties, however, are involved to permit an evalua­
tion at this time of the costs and benefits of the proposed code to both 
auditors and users. Among the uncertainties are
•  The extent to which reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability 
under rule 10b-5. For example, an indication by the Court that 
recklessness will not support a private action under rule 10b-5 
would increase the value of what the profession would be giving 
up under the ALI proposal.
•  The extent to which the ALI will revise its definition of “scienter” 
as a result of the Hochfelder decision and its specification of the 
degree of culpability that will render the limitation of damages 
inapplicable. Recent court decisions may have a significant 
effect on the redrafting of the code that is currently in progress.
•  Estimates of the potential damages in fully litigated law suits and 
in settlements under the negligence standard of the proposed 
code. Research on the nature of claims brought against auditors
9. The staff study, The Accounting Establishment, prepared by the Subcommittee on 
Reports, Accounting, and Management of the Committee on Government Operations 
recommended that "Congress should amend the Federal securities laws to restore 
the right of damaged individuals to sue independent auditors for negligence under 
the fraud provisions of the securities laws. Such legislation is necessary to overturn 
the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Olga Hochfelder. . .  that 
‘scienter’—the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud—is a necessary requirement 
of private actions for damages under the fraud provisions of the securities laws. The 
dissenting justices recommended that Congress restore the rights denied individuals 
in order to achieve the remedial intent of the Federal securities laws.
“The few independent auditors who perform negligently should be held responsi­
ble for their actions, and should not be permitted to impair public confidence in the 
competence of all independent auditors. The Federal Government should not estab­
lish any ‘accountant-client privilege’ or provisions which would limit the liability of 
independent auditors. Competent independent auditors already are adequately safe­
guarded, and unnecessary restrictions would impede the operations of Federal 
enforcement authorities and courts of law.” U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting, and Management of the Committee on Government Operations, The 
Accounting Establishment: A Staff Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1976).
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before Hochfelder for negligence is needed as a basis for es­
timating the potential for similar claims under the code.
•  The extent to which litigation in state courts under common law 
will increase as a result of the standards set by Hochfelder. The 
ALI code covers litigation only under federal statutes.
The general proposal to limit damages can be commended without 
endorsing the specifics of the ALI’s proposed code. The scholars 
serving on the ALI project need time to consider code revisions in the 
light of Hochfelder and to undertake or sponsor empirical research on 
the effects on society of the various trade-offs in the proposed code. 
The value of those trade-offs cannot be determined without such 
research.
Liability Limitation by Contract or Disclaimer
Limiting professional responsibility by contract and disclaimer has 
been suggested by Gordon Samuels and R. H. Duncan, writing in an 
Australian and a New Zealand journal, respectively. Samuels proposed 
that auditors include language similar to the following in contracts with 
clients:
X and associates shall not be liable to A Company Limited in damages or 
otherwise for any negligence or breach of contract or duty whatever and 
howsoever caused or arising by them, their servants or agents in or arising 
out of or in any way connected with the performance of this contract. [1971, 
p. 12]
Samuels also suggested that auditors give the following disclaimer 
to users of financial statements, advice, or information:
This advice (or as the case may be) is furnished for the information and the 
use of the X Company only. We do not undertake to the X Company or any 
other party any responsibility for its accuracy. We expressly disclaim to the 
X Company or any other party any responsibility for any misstatement, 
error, inaccuracy, or omission which may appear in it whether as a result of 
negligence on the part of ourselves or our employees or agents or any 
other person or otherwise howsoever. [1971, p. 12]
Would that the solution were as simple as that! Even if it were, it is 
questionable that this kind of solution would be in the public interest. 
Samuels himself noted several problems with the contractual exclusion:
Whether any firm of accountants would be prepared to employ a clause of 
this sort is of course another matter, but in law they could. There are 
limitations upon the effect of this as an exclusion clause. First, no such 
stipulation will be effective to exclude liability for a substantial failure to 
perform the contract at all. Secondly, it will not normally serve to protect 
the accountant’s employees from the consequences of their own negli­
gence, because they are not parties to the contract. [1971, p. 12]
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Moreover, the auditor’s legal problems do not arise primarily from 
the auditor-client relationship. The contractual disclaimer seems to sug­
gest a sledgehammer as the appropriate instrument with which to kill a 
mosquito.
It is difficult to believe that a disclaimer of responsibility to third 
parties would be acceptable in the United States. Third parties are not 
bound by disclaimers under existing case law. Such a disclaimer 
denies to users of financial information the very assurances that the 
auditor is retained to provide. Surely it would be unacceptable to the 
stock exchanges, the SEC, and the public.
Limitation of Damages Through Governmental Insurance
Fiflis suggested that “one way to spread the loss adequately 
among all those who participate in investment activity would be to 
legislate establishment of a single governmental insurance fund, such 
as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, with premiums paid on 
share transactions” (1975a, p. 107).
Proposals of this type, while superficially attractive, have major 
drawbacks. First, an audit environment in which litigation would be 
greatly reduced would prevent the good that does arise from the ever­
present threat of litigation. Second, it is not clear whether such insur­
ance is intended to protect investors against business and market risk 
as well as against information risk. If it is, this would mean a major 
change in the function and structure of securities markets and possibly 
of the entire economic system. If only protection against information 
risk is provided, an insurance scheme would be less drastic. However, 
it is difficult to visualize the “average prudent investor” as being able 
to draw the distinction between information, business, and market risk. 
A “no fault” concept of insurance is appropriate only when a business 
or market risk does not exist. Moreover, since information risk is cur­
rently insured against, in a sense, by underwriters, attorneys, and 
auditors, the cost of that “ insurance” is already partially socialized 
through the fee structure.
Changes in the Legal Process
Referring Accounting Issues to a Master
Civil and criminal actions against auditors generally involve compli­
cated points of accounting, auditing, and law. A judge and, if the 
action is resolved through a jury trial, the jurors as well, will often be 
expected to understand accounting principles and auditing standards 
and their application in specific circumstances. Subtle points of law 
must be explained in the judge’s charge to the jury. Some auditors and 
lawyers have suggested that the burden this places on the judge and
90
jury system is unreasonable. They have proposed alternatives, such as 
the use of court-appointed “masters” in complicated cases.10
Reiling and Taussig discussed the use of special masters in cases 
involving accounting questions:
One implication of the phenomenon whereby judges and juries are shaping 
accounting practice is that defendants may wish to give new consideration 
to the advisability of urging the Court to refer accounting questions to a 
special master. It seems reasonable that a master learned in accounting 
would handle accounting questions more capably than a lay judge or jury. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the District Courts to appoint a 
special master and to refer matters to him. The judge has considerable 
discretion over the scope of the reference. For example, the master may 
be directed to report only on a particular issue, or he may be directed to 
receive and report on evidence only.
Judicial discretion over the use of a master as opposed to the scope of the 
reference is more limited. In a jury trial a judge is authorized to refer 
questions to a master only when they are complicated. In a trial without a 
jury the master may be used only when some exceptional condition re­
quires it. Thus, although a master cannot be used at the whim of the 
litigants or of the court, the option generally is available since many cases 
involving accounting issues would qualify as "complicated” or represent 
“exceptional circumstances.”
Reference of accounting issues to a master both solves and creates 
problems. Difficult questions receive the sophisticated consideration they 
deserve; but selection of the master becomes a point of contention among 
plaintiffs, defendants, and judge. In addition, reference to a master gener­
ally delays the case and adds to its cost. On balance, the procedure 
would seem to have particular merit in cases where the accounting ques­
tions are either particularly numerous and/or difficult.11 [1970, pp. 44]
Masters might be particularly appropriate when the evidence is 
clearly too complex for a jury to understand, and the judge concludes 
that he, too, does not have the necessary background and experience. 
For example, one court denied demands for a jury trial in an antifraud 
case because the accounting issues were held to be too complex for 
jury determination (In Re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation (1976)).
10. See, for example, Solomon, Chazen, and Augenbraun, 1976. They also note that “ in 
civil litigation involving the federal securities laws and questions of financial state­
ment presentation and disclosure, both plaintiff and defendant almost always waive 
their right to a jury trial and permit the case to be heard by a judge” (p. 71).
11. Reiling and Taussig also cited the actual use of a special master in "601 West 26 
Corp. v. Solitron Devices Inc. . . .  There the special master supervised the taking of 
401 pages of minutes which produced findings on 14 accounting questions. The 
questions ranged from whether the accountants had subordinated their judgment to 
that of the client to the determination of whether earnings were artificially inflated or 
otherwise misrepresented. The District Court disposed of the case—vindicating the 
accountants—based on the findings and conclusions of law of the special master" 
(1970, p. 53).
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The court stated “the factual issues, the complexity of the evidence 
that will be required to explore those issues, and the time required to 
do so leads to the conclusion that a jury would not be a rational and 
capable fact finder.” The judge noted his "experience in presiding over 
other complicated cases involving commercial matters.” In other cir­
cumstances, a judge might determine that he did not have the neces­
sary background and experience and might then turn to the use of a 
master in a fact-finding capacity. In another case involving antitrust 
litigation, the extremely complex assessment of damages was referred 
to a special master who conducted hearings and reported his findings 
to the court (Trans World Airlines v. Hughes (1969)).
There is, however, no clear evidence that judges or juries generally 
lack the ability to understand accounting and auditing issues or that 
justice or the public interest has been thwarted by a lack of under­
standing. Specific cases can be cited in which defendants, their attor­
neys, or the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants have 
asserted that misunderstanding, particularly of the judgmental nature of 
auditing decisions, led to inappropriate outcomes. However, the ques­
tion of whether a court did in fact understand some subtle point of 
accounting or auditing is often clouded by whether they should be 
expected to understand it. For example, in its amicus curiae brief to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals in the National Student Marketing (1975) 
case, the AICPA argued that
the trial court committed prejudicial error in its instructions to the jury by 
failing to instruct it as to the distinct difference between the responsibility of 
an independent accountant with respect to financial statements he has 
audited and reported on and his very limited responsibility with respect to 
financial statements which he has not audited and on which he has not 
reported.
Whether the public, as represented by the court, should be ex­
pected to recognize this particular “distinct difference” is arguable, 
since auditors are associated with both audited and unaudited state­
ments, and procedures often are applied to unaudited statements that 
resemble those applied to audited statements. Judges and juries do 
have varying degrees of knowledge, and masters might insure the 
court’s awareness of the underlying issues in complicated cases. 
However, there is no assurance that their use would lead to different 
results.
Two other related proposals appear less promising than referring 
accounting and auditing issues to masters.12 One is the use of arbitra­
tion panels, similar to those used to settle medical malpractice claims
12. For an elaboration of these alternatives, see Solomon, Chazen, and Augenbraun, 
1976, p. 74.
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in some jurisdictions. However, the arbitration model would have to be 
substantially modified to accommodate third-party claims against audi­
tors. Also, an arbitration system might encourage additional claims 
because the process is easy and inexpensive, although the amounts of 
the awards might be lower.
Another alternative would be the use of referee panels of experts 
under the aegis of the AICPA to provide courts with technical assis­
tance, similar to the filing of an amicus curiae brief. Given what some 
have viewed as an extreme reluctance of auditors to testify against 
their brethren, AICPA association with a referee panel might be suffi­
cient to make it immediately suspect to the plaintiff. On the whole, if 
expert advice on technical matters is needed, a master operating as 
an agent of the court would give at least the appearance of an 
independent, unbiased point of view, and that is surely the minimum 
that would be required to make this proposal palatable to the public.
Adherence to GAAP and GAAS as an Absolute Defense
In ascertaining if an auditor has in fact exercised the required level 
of care, the courts look to several standards against which the conduct 
can be compared.13 Those include:
1. The standards of the auditor’s own firm.
2. Customs and practices of the profession.
3. Formal professional standards.
4. Expert testimony.
5. Textbooks and journals.
6. The legal standard of conduct to be established by the court in a 
particular case.
Items 2, 3, 4, and 5 serve as sources of generally accepted account­
ing principles and generally accepted auditing standards. The firm’s 
own standards (item 1) may point out an individual’s performance 
failure. Item 6 indicates that the courts have not always limited them­
selves to items 1 through 5 in determining the appropriate standard of 
care.
The issue here is the extent to which conformity to formal profes­
sional standards should be an effective defense for auditors. Generally, 
it is; the courts have only on rare occasions rejected adherence to 
generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards es­
tablished by authoritative bodies as an effective defense. “The courts
13. Much of the following material is from Fiflis, 1975a, pp. 65-87.
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have generally encouraged the auditor to adhere to these professional 
standards by shielding him from liability when he does” (Earle, 1975, p. 
147). The district court in Herzfeld disregarded authoritative auditing 
standards, but the appellate decision constituted a strong declaration 
that liability was founded on the defendants’ knowing departure from 
recognized professional standards.
However, when specific standards have not been established by 
formal pronouncements or when courts have deemed the standards 
incomplete, compliance with authoritative pronouncements is not suffi­
cient to excuse an auditor from liability. For example, U.S. v. Simon 
(1969) demonstrated that conformity to a formal set of authoritative 
accounting principles was insufficient if that set did not specify the 
appropriate accounting for the item at issue. In Adams v. Standard 
Knitting Mills (1976), the court held that the auditor “ failed to follow and 
apply general accounting principles which was essential for fair pre­
sentation . . .  by not disclosing or compelling . .. management to 
disclose its gross edp deficiencies,” even though such disclosure was 
not then required by authoritative prouncements. Fiflis contended that 
“ communication of financial data to lay readers, based on accounting 
principles and reporting requirements, should be tested by the stand­
ard of meaningfulness to the layman, while those processes of audit­
ing, consisting of data collection, testing and drawing of inferences, 
are a matter for the expertise of an auditor, to be regulated by those 
who know something about the processes” (1975a, p. 81).
Accountants have sought the same type of treatment that physi­
cians receive in the courts.
In the area of medical malpractice the more general view is that: (a) the 
standard of conduct to which the courts will hold a defendant is the 
custom of the profession or, even in the absence of a custom, the view of 
experts; the jury usually is not authorized to question the wisdom of the 
custom or expert judgment as being itself unreasonable; and (b) the 
plaintiff cannot prevail unless he produces expert testimony of nonconfor­
mity by the defendant with custom or expert judgment.
The effect of the dual requirements that the plaintiff show nonconformity 
with custom or expert judgment and that he do so with medical experts 
provides a very real insulation for medical practitioners from the vicissi­
tudes of litigation. The costs in terms of injustice in the cases of nonrecov­
ery is considered to be appropriate when weighed against such benefits 
as the availability of medical practitioners and the willingness to serve— 
benefits that some fear might be lost if a different standard of conduct 
were imposed.14 [Fiflis, 1975a, p. 66]
14. Fiflis pointed out, however, that "in one area of medical malpractice, termed 
'informed consent,’ which deals with the question of whether a patient who con­
sents to a particular treatment has been adequately informed of risks, a few courts 
hold that the adequacy of the practitioner’s communication of the risks is not to be 
tested by practitioners' customary disclosures but is a question for the lay jury. 
Hence, expert testimony of judgment or custom is not indispensable to the plaintiffs 
case. Nor is the defendant’s expert evidence of custom invulnerable to a jury 
determination of unreasonableness" (1975a, pp. 66-67).
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Why should not the legal process provide auditors with the same 
insulation from the “vicissitudes of litigation”? Fiflis suggested reasons 
for the unique treatment given doctors and argued that those reasons 
are not relevant to auditors.
The bases for the view that professional standards should be conclusive in 
the medical malpractice cases have been (1) practicality (viz. it is said that 
judges and juries are usually not competent to determine whether a doctor 
acted reasonably, and hence no other rule is workable) and (2) a policy to 
preserve the profession from second guessing by jurors, which might result 
in inhibiting doctors from exercising their best judgment. A third justification 
might be based on an application of economic principles leading to the 
conclusion that custom always perfectly balances the costs and benefits. 
Whatever the persuasiveness of these reasons for making custom conclu­
sive in the medical malpractice cases, a question we need not consider, it 
does not seem overpowering when the questions involve the reasonable­
ness of accounting principles or the conduct of an audit. First, as to 
practicality, auditing and accounting seem no more complex than certain 
other highly technical occupations when the questions are narrowed down 
by the judge and the lawyers. For example, a case likely to arise some day 
will involve the reasonableness of auditing a computerized set of records 
when none of the auditors on the scene knows anything about computers. 
The question can be made to appear complex but it would seem that in 
some cases, at least, it would not be different from a question of whether a 
reasonable safety precaution for a steel mill is to require high friction stair 
treads in work areas. As to the second basis, encouraging the best 
judgment of auditors, one would intuit that fear of liability would sharpen 
judgment. In any case, these two bases for fixing custom as the standard 
require behavioral study for verification of the asserted practicality and 
enhanced room for professional judgment. The third basis, the assertion 
purportedly based on an economic analysis, suffers from the fact that 
some of its supporters are afflicted with the Pygmalion Syndrome—they 
must not forget that their economic model is not the real world and 
therefore can be nothing more than a basis for establishing hypotheses for 
experimentation. Thus it too requires empirical verification. But logic can 
supply us with help, and we do not need experience in this particular case. 
Even if the model were realistic, to say that custom will rise to a point at 
which the costs of the customary care will be balanced by the benefits in a 
doctor-patient or businessman-customer situation is one thing; to say this 
in the auditor-public investor situtation is another. One of the proponents of 
economic analysis points out that in the doctor-patient situation the patient 
will pay extra for treatment until the last dollar spent buys just one dollar of 
accident cost reduction. “However, no firm [for example, of auditors] will 
have an incentive to take precautions against accidents that are dangerous 
only to people [for example, public investors] with whom the firm does not, 
and due to high transaction costs cannot, deal.”15 [Fiflis, 1975a, pp. 84-86]
Some of Fiflis’s views are at least arguable. He suggested that 
accounting and auditing issues are less complex than medical issues,
15. For an opposing point of view, that the courts should treat doctors and accountants 
similarly in evaluating their performance, see Solomon, Chazen, and Augenbraun, 
1976, p. 72.
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and therefore more amenable to jury evaluation. However, some audi­
tors have suggested that this may be the result of efforts by the 
medical profession to create a mysticism about their specialized learn­
ing, as contrasted with the accounting profession’s traditional desire to 
communicate both the nature of its opinions and all of the supporting 
reasons.
To some extent, fear of liability may sharpen judgment. However, it 
may also lead to a retrenchment from responsibility as the profession’s 
rational response to the escalation of such risks. Even if the fear of 
litigation does lead to greater care, it is not uniquely applicable to the 
accounting profession. Moreover, if potential liability is to serve as a 
stimulus to effective performance, the profession must have some 
confidence that effective performance can be measured in advance of 
litigation. Without the structure of generally accepted accounting princi­
ples and auditing standards to rely on, fear is more likely to produce 
the undesirable effect of attempting to meet the minimum standards of 
a judge or jury rather than efforts to comply with established profes­
sional rules.
However, the unique treatment of doctors may be inapplicable to 
auditors for another reason. Litigation against auditors, unlike that 
against doctors, proceeds not just under common law, but under 
federal statutes that set forth responsibilities and remedies to achieve 
specific objectives. Communication to third parties is an important 
aspect of those responsibilities. It may be inappropriate to ask a juror 
to determine the adequacy or correctness of a particular medical 
procedure in a particular circumstance; it is more appropriate, 
however, to ask a juror if an auditor’s communication is understandable 
to investors. Lay jurors are generally not doctors, but they are often the 
public for whom the auditor’s communication is intended. Perhaps if 
doctors were required to provide detailed memoranda explaining each 
of the judgments and steps they had taken in a professional capacity, 
there might be less distinction between the treatment of the two profes­
sions in the courts.
Extension of the “Safe Harbor” Concept
Two possible adverse consequences to society of the litigious en­
vironment in which auditors work and the fear of creating new bases 
for litigation were noted in chapter 6. One was an apparent reluctance 
by both individual auditors and the profession as a whole to become 
associated with new types of information such as forecasts and current 
values. The other was that the costs associated with audits of high-risk 
clients might become prohibitive in relation to the social benefits to be 
achieved. The granting of an appropriate “safe harbor” by either legis­
lation or SEC action, similar to that adopted by the SEC relating to 
replacement cost disclosures, could remove at least one significant
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impediment to professional involvement with new forms of information 
and high-risk clients. A safe harbor rule provides protection by placing 
a burden of proof on the person seeking to establish liability that a 
certain, specified standard was not met.16
Safe harbor rules might be made available only when auditors are 
asked to assume new responsibilities or significantly extend old ones. 
The safe harbor device would be appropriate only when the proposed 
extension represents a sharp increase in the level of responsibility or 
new, untried, high-risk areas. After an appropriate period of experience 
with the new type of information, the continued need for the safe 
harbor should be reconsidered. Society would be better served if 
auditors were more often involved with new types of information. Such 
involvement would serve to improve the quality of such information and 
hasten the development of improved standards. The involvement would 
be more likely to occur if standards for proper auditor conduct could 
be agreed on in advance that would serve as a means of limiting 
liability if the auditor has performed in accordance with those 
standards.
With regard to marginal enterprises, Mautz argued that
the best interests of the public accounting firm would be to steer clear of 
any client that might possibly pose financial difficulties. One can also 
argue that the best interests of the economy require that every promoter be 
given a chance because we never know when a speculative undertaking 
may prove to have significant social benefits. Perhaps what we need is 
something a little like the public defenders role played by lawyers. Perhaps 
some auditors should be designated or assigned to serve clients who 
otherwise would not be able to obtain the services of a reputable firm. In 
such cases, the “assigned” auditor might require some special protection 
against litigation. [1972, p. 92]
Assessment of Costs Against Unsuccessful Plaintiffs
Several sections of the federal securities acts permit the courts to 
assess costs (including defense costs) against plaintiffs and to require 
plaintiffs to post a bond for those costs. An extension of this power, 
such as that proposed in section 1418(d) of the American Law In­
stitute’s Federal Securities Code, to all sections of the securities acts 
that permit private litigation for monetary damages would serve to 
discourage "nuisance” or “strike” suits against auditors. The ability of 
the court to assess costs against unsuccessful plaintiffs would not 
restrict plaintiffs’ access to the judicial process. The court would be 
empowered, but not required, to assess costs, and that power could
16. See, for example, the language of the safe harbor rule in SEC Accounting Series 
Release no. 203 (December 9, 1976), Notice of Adoption o f Amendment to Rule 
3-17 of Regulation S-X, Relating to Disclosure of Certain Replacement Cost Data.
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be used with discretion by the court when, by objective standards, the 
complaint was frivolous or had little chance of success at trial. Par­
ticularly if the code adopts a negligence standard for private actions 
for damages, the ALI provision would be consistent with the view that 
express civil remedies allowing recovery for negligent conduct should 
be subject to procedural restrictions.
Revised Standards for Class Action Suits and 
Elimination of the Contingent Fee System
The combination of class action suits and the contingent fee sys­
tem has undoubtedly increased the exposure of auditors to litigation. 
Some of the litigation has been meritorious and some has not.
For auditors to advocate elimination of or restrictions on class 
action suits and the contingent fee system might appear to be merely 
self-serving. This is not to suggest that refinements of the system are 
not possible, but the refinements can be achieved by judicial as well 
as by legislative or regulatory action. As noted earlier, courts now have 
the power to prevent abuses of class actions, and they have lately 
begun to exercise that power. The courts also approve the portion of 
an award or settlement that is allowed for attorney fees. Whether 
society has been ill-served by aspects of the litigation process over 
which the courts themselves have the power to exercise control is 
arguable, particularly when there has been a recent trend, evidenced 
in part by the Hochfelder decision, to limit access by private litigants to 
the federal courts in securities cases.17
Moreover, the profession’s image is not enhanced by proposals 
that may even appear to be self-serving. For example, in May 1975, the 
professional ethics division of the AICPA issued a proposed ruling that 
would have made it unethical for a member to serve as an expert 
witness or consult in connection with litigation for a contingent fee. The 
proposed ruling, regardless of its intent, met with substantial opposition 
from the plaintiff’s bar and was withdrawn. The publicity, generally 
unfavorable, that greeted the proposal could not be withdrawn.
Institutional Changes to Improve Auditor Performance
In addition to the proposals for changes previously discussed, 
there have also been numerous suggestions for fundamental institu­
tional changes that would improve auditor performance and thereby 
lessen exposure to litigation.
17. SEC General Counsel's April 26, 7976 Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, Bureau of National Affairs, no. 113, June 10, 1976, p. J-3.
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Publication of Case Analyses
The profession requires thorough analyses of civil, criminal, and 
SEC enforcement cases involving alleged audit failures if it is to under­
stand the expectations of the courts and the SEC and react appropri­
ately to those expectations. The analyses of cases involving alleged 
audit failures by the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities was a 
worthwhile first step in this direction.
The AICPA, with the cooperation of accounting firms and through 
the use of court or SEC documents, could establish a mechanism for 
timely analyses of individual cases as they move through the judicial or 
regulatory system. The analyses should be published in a form readily 
available to practitioners, teachers, and others. They should consider 
the nature and causes of specific audit failures, the changes in audi­
tors’ responsibilities suggested by litigation and SEC administrative 
action, and the implications for the auditor’s evolving role. The analy­
ses would be descriptive of actual court rulings, settlements, or enfor­
cement proceedings; they need not await the outcome of related 
disciplinary proceedings by professional bodies.
Increased Auditor Authority
Sterling (1972) found that “the accountant has been given a re­
sponsibility without concomitant authority.” Earlier parts of this mono­
graph have suggested ways in which the auditor has attempted to 
reduce his responsibility or at least abstain from accepting new ones, 
and Sterling suggests others. However, the courts have generally not 
permitted the auditor to take those courses of action.
The auditor’s lack of authority stems from the power that a client’s 
management has both to select accounting principles and to select 
and dismiss the auditor. One legal scholar suggested that
virtually the only substantive limit placed on management’s discretion by 
the accountants is that the principles management selects in preparing its 
financial statements must be “generally accepted.” Virtually the account­
ant’s only mechanism for enforcing this limit is his power to withhold a 
clean certificate from the corporation’s financial statements. Yet by law, 
and largely by practice, the selection, tenure, and dismissal of an account­
ant is entirely in the hands of the management. Moreover, management is 
not hesitant to use this power. During the 18-month period of November
1971 to April 1973 there were approximately 400 accountant changes 
among the corporations which must file Form 8-K’s with the SEC, and 
during the 18-month period of January 1973 to June 1974, there were 
approximately 700 such changes. At least 10 percent of these changes, 
and almost certainly more, were made against a background of disputes 
over accounting principles.
The accountant’s dependence on management for his tenure, when com­
bined with management’s discretion in selecting among competing ac­
counting principles and the low standards set by the accountants for 
determining whether a given principle is “generally accepted,” result in an
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almost irresistible pressure on the accountant to go along with marginal 
principles. The accountant “can swallow his convictions or he can qualify 
his opinion, or he can resign. Usually the latter two courses are one and 
the same.”18
The pressure on the accountants to go along in marginal (and even less- 
than-marginal) cases is considerably augmented by the fact that if an 
incumbent accountant does balk, a more flexible auditor can almost always 
be found. The result is that an accountant who uses or threatens to use his 
only real control over management’s selection of accounting principles is 
likely to lose his own position without materially benefiting those who use 
the corporation’s financial statements. Many accountants appear to regard 
the withholding of a clean opinion under such circumstances as a quixotic 
gesture. [Eisenberg, 1975, pp. 424-26]
Eisenberg’s analysis suggests that the reporting requirements of 
Form 8-K have provided little authority to auditors in their dealings with 
management over the choice of accounting principles. This may result 
in part from the SEC’s response to 8-K filings. The following exchange 
between Walter E. Hanson, senior partner of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co., and John C. Burton, then chief accountant for the SEC, at the May 
25, 1976, Wharton School conference on “The Public Accounting Pro­
fession and Its Critics” is illuminating:
Hanson: Another area I’d like to touch on, because it does reflect upon 
the relationship of the SEC and the accounting profession, is the disclosure 
on Form 8K whenever an accountant is dismissed or resigns from an 
engagement. When that was made part of the SEC law some three or four 
years ago, I thought that was a major step forward because it would 
pinpoint those areas where there had been major disagreements of ac­
counting principles between the firm and the client, with the client going 
out to seek another accounting firm which might give them a different 
answer. More than a thousand of these forms have been filed, many 
because of mergers and so forth. There have been at least a hundred over 
which there were substantive disagreements between the accountant and 
his client. Unfortunately, I’ve yet to find any action on the part of the SEC 
related to these disclosures. What is happening, Mr. Burton, I would like to 
ask, with your procedures within the SEC, to look into and really punish the 
management that is actually going out and shopping for accounting princi­
ples? You can criticize the accounting profession for what they are doing 
and not doing, but we’re human, and we are entitled to ask why you’re not 
utilizing this very important tool that is available to you as a government 
regulatory agency.
Burton: The facts are slightly, although I wouldn’t say materially, dif­
ferent from those described by Walter Hanson. We have had to my knowl­
edge three enforcement actions growing out of 8K. We have had at least a 
dozen cases where we have written letters asking questions about this. 
There is a staff accountant in my office who regularly reviews all 8Ks
18. Eisenberg attributes the quote to Leonard Spacek. 
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reporting auditor changes and he calls to my attention any items which he 
considers to be significant, worthy of additional follow-up, and then I review 
those. In many cases, we think the purpose of the rule has been served by 
disclosure. Everyone doesn’t warrant an article in the Wall Street Journal. 
But there are times when Fred Andrews or someone else picks up one and 
asks about it, so fundamentally the disclosure objective is being met. It is 
conceivable that we should pursue more vigorously some of the specific 
cases of disagreements. Sometimes the departing auditor does not know 
that we have followed up because our follow-up goes to the company and 
to the successor auditor. On a couple of occasions I have taken it upon 
myself to write the successor auditor calling his attention to the 8K and 
related SEC policy and normally in those cases the result is improved 
disclosure even though perhaps it could be said that in part it comes out 
of the pockets of the accountant who departed. But in most cases, the 
result of such a change is that the successor auditor does not generally 
approve the accounting that the predecessor auditor refused to accept.
Sterling saw “only one other course of action open to us—since we 
cannot lessen the responsibility and since the responsibility outweighs 
the authority, we must increase the accountant’s authority” (1972, p. 
37). This would be accomplished by denying to managements “the 
power to hire and fire accountants and the power to select from 
diverse accounting principles as they see fit” (Sterling, 1972, p. 40).
Eisenberg argued that both of Sterling’s proposed changes are 
required:
Vesting in the accountants responsibility for the selection of accounting 
principles is a necessary condition to ensure the integrity of financial 
statements, but not a sufficient one. As long as selection among competing 
accounting principles is discretionary, the purpose of such a shift could be 
subverted too easily if management itself retained the power to select and 
dismiss the accountants. As a second structural reform, it is therefore 
necessary to shift that power too out of management’s hands. One pro­
posal to accomplish this objective is embodied in the thorough and per­
suasive argument of Douglas Hawes that the power to appoint and dismiss 
a corporation’s accountant should reside in the body of shareholders rather 
than the board. Left to itself, however, that body would undoubtedly look to 
the board for guidance on selection and dismissal, could neither determine 
the scope of the audit nor the compensation of the accountant, and could 
not give the accountant periodic direction and support. A complementary 
step is therefore necessary: Every publicly held corporation should be 
required to have an audit committee, comprised entirely of independent 
directors, which would have the exclusive power (1) to nominate and 
recommend dismissal of the corporation’s accountant on behalf of the 
board, and (2) to direct the accountant’s activities and set the terms of his 
engagement. [1975, pp. 432-33]
The two proposals can be considered individually. Placing the 
authority to dismiss an auditor with an independent audit committee 
would significantly increase the auditor’s authority. In fact, such a 
structural reform might remove the necessity for shifting the respon­
sibility for the selection of accounting principles to the auditor. Reten­
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tion by management of the responsibility to select accounting 
principles is desirable, particularly if other means exist to increase the 
auditor’s authority. At the very least, the selection of accounting princi­
ples cannot be completely divorced from the data recording function, 
and no persuasive case has ever been made that the auditor’s role 
should encompass the recording function. In fact, Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961) have suggested that performing such a role would reduce the 
auditor’s independence.
Strengthening Controls and Discipline Over Auditors
The accounting profession has taken significant steps in recent 
years to strengthen controls over the quality of practice. Still stronger 
controls and improved disciplinary procedures would both increase the 
level of performance and strengthen the profession’s case in seeking 
public support for changes in the legal and judicial process. Among 
the steps that could be taken are better education in preparation for 
entry into the profession, mandatory continuing education, mandatory 
peer review, and a stronger professional disciplinary process. In­
creased levels of auditor performance are not costless, however, and 
benefit-cost models do not exist to determine the optimal level.
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8
Acceptable and 
Unacceptable Proposals for 
Change
As the discussion in chapter 7 indicates, numerous proposals have 
been advanced for changing the legal environment. Some involve only 
minor tinkering with the legal and judicial process, while others involve 
major revisions. Some of these views are undoubtedly caused by 
frustration derived from the genuine belief that the legal system has 
worked to the detriment of the public accounting profession. Other 
proposals suggest changes that would benefit both society and the 
public accounting profession.
Criteria for Evaluating Proposals
In analyzing the impact of the legal environment on professional 
practice, both the desirable and undesirable consequences to society 
were considered. It is impossible to measure the societal benefits and 
costs of the present process for adjudicating charges against inde­
pendent auditors. However, it is possible to evaluate how to obtain or 
enhance some of the desirable consequences (benefits to society) by 
means other than litigation without generating other undesirable conse­
quences (costs to society). Similarly, it is possible to evaluate how to 
alleviate some of the undesirable consequences through changes in
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the legal and judicial process without at the same time reducing the 
desirable consequences of the present environment. The result would 
thus be a net increase in the economy and effectiveness with which 
individual auditors and firms carry out their assigned role in society.
The profession should not support proposals for changes that seek 
merely to benefit individual auditors or firms. For a proposed change to 
be both credible and acceptable, it should enhance the ability of the 
profession to fulfill its assigned role more economically and effectively. 
Proposed changes supported by the profession should not seek to 
relieve the auditor of liability for substandard performance. The goal 
should be to enhance the net benefits of the audit function to society.
Acceptable proposals should not seek changes in the overall judi­
cial system. They should be limited to those aspects of the process of 
adjudicating disputes that have a unique effect on auditors. For exam­
ple, responsibility for specifying auditing standards, including the de­
termination of due care in specific situations, is presently shared by the 
accounting profession, legislatures, the SEC, and the courts. A specific 
error or omission by the auditor, such as poorly supervising an assis­
tant, could be mere negligence, reckless conduct, or willful intent to 
deceive. How and by whom should the degree of culpability be deter­
mined in a specific case? The SEC could set highly specific criteria for 
determining the degree of culpability. The criteria would be known in 
advance and would provide guidance useful in audit planning, but they 
would be inflexible. Alternatively, the criteria could be determined by 
the courts on a case-by-case basis. This would achieve the desired 
flexibility, but the criteria would, in effect, be applied retroactively and 
would not be known in advance.
This philosophical issue has existed for many years; it is not limited 
to accounting and auditing, but affects many professions. Legal schol­
ars and others have long debated whether case-by-case court de­
velopment of specific standards of conduct is preferable to legislation 
or administrative rules.1 This is not an issue to which the accounting 
profession can contribute some unique expertise.
The combination of class action suits and the contingent fee sys­
tem operates to increase the exposure of auditors to both meritorious 
and nuisance suits. But those aspects of the legal climate have the 
same effect on all professionals. They are also, at least at present, an 
integral part of the legal system. Moreover, the courts are empowered 
with the means of preventing abuses of the class action procedure. An 
attempt by the profession to change these aspects of the system 
would probably be viewed as self-serving and unattainable. It would 
probably reflect a misunderstanding of the balance presently achieved 
and achievable by legislation and the courts.
1. See, for example, the discussion in Davis, 1969. 
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On the other hand, other proposals for changes that the profession 
could endorse would not face those criticisms. Such changes would 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit function. Other 
segments of society could accept and implement them. They would 
reflect a degree of expertise and area of interest that knowledgeable 
auditors would reasonably be expected to possess.
Proposals That the Profession Should Support
Proposals that meet the suggested criteria and that should receive
the profession’s support include—
1. Statutorily limit damages, as would the ALI’s proposed Federal 
Securities Code. Some form of statutory limitation is necessary for 
the continued healthy existence of a public accounting profession 
in the private sector. Increasing insurance costs, and even the 
possibility that significant insurance coverage may not be available 
in the future, may place an intolerable burden on the profession. 
The ALI proposal considers the statutory limitation as part of a 
trade-off for a negligence standard in what are now 1934 act 
filings. However, both the precise formulation of the limitation to 
damages and the necessity or appropriateness of any trade-offs 
cannot be determined at this time. Further research is needed to 
determine the precise formulation of the damage limitation and the 
appropriate standard of care that would best serve both society 
and the profession.
2. Increase the ability of the courts to assess costs against unsuc­
cessful plaintiffs. The provision in the ALI Federal Securities Code 
that allows the court to assess costs, including attorney’s fees, 
against any party and to require an undertaking for the payment of 
such costs in private actions would extend the existing provisions 
for assessment of costs and posting of a bond under some sec­
tions of the securities acts to all sections of the acts and thereby 
discourage nuisance suits.
3. Increase the use of “masters” appointed by the court in cases 
involving complex accounting principles or auditing standards. Au­
ditors believe, rightly or wrongly, that judgments against them are 
frequently the result of lay juries or judges making decisions on fine 
points of accounting and auditing without adequate impartial 
advice.
4. Extend the safe harbor concept. Regulatory agencies and legisla­
tures should grant safe harbors when auditors are called on to 
assume new responsibilities or significantly extend old ones. Audi­
tors have been justifiably reluctant to take on new responsibilities in
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the present litigious environment. Society would be better served 
by auditor involvement with types of information beyond the histor­
ical, annual financial statements even without the attendant liability 
that would otherwise attach to that involvement.
5. Analyze and report audit failures. Through an analysis of cases 
involving auditors as they move through the judicial or regulatory 
system, individuals and firms would be able to keep abreast of 
current practice developments at relatively little cost. Educators 
and textbook writers would also have a valuable source of informa­
tion. Knowledge of the nature and causes of specific audit failures 
would have a beneficial effect of discouraging the repetition of 
substandard practices.
6. Decrease the authority of management to hire and fire auditors. An 
increase in the auditor’s responsibility to enterprise audit commit­
tees composed of outside directors would reduce the auditor’s 
responsibility to management and increase his authority in exercis­
ing his judgment in accounting and auditing matters.
Proposals That the Profession Should Not Support
Proposals that do not meet the suggested criteria and should not
receive the profession’s endorsement include—
1. Limit liability by contract or disclaimer. A limitation by contract 
would presumably apply only to those in a contractual relationship 
with the auditor, and expanded liability to clients has not been a 
major factor in the overall litigious environment in which auditors 
work. A limitation of liability by public disclaimer would be no more 
effective than a plea for civil or criminal immunity. It would also 
serve to negate the auditor’s role of providing assurance on the 
credibility of financial information.
2. Provide insurance for investors against losses caused by auditors’ 
substandard performance, such as through an FDIC type of ar­
rangement. An insurance scheme to protect investors against busi­
ness or market risks would entail a major change in the function 
and structure of securities markets and, possibly, of the entire 
economic system. An insurance scheme to protect against informa­
tion risk would be less drastic, but users would likely not under-
  stand the distinction between information risk, which could be 
insured against, and business and market risks, which could not.
3. Advocate that legislatures and courts consider adherence to au­
thoritative auditing standards and accounting principles to be an 
adequate defense in civil and criminal cases. The courts have not
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often rejected generally accepted accounting principles and audit­
ing standards as effective defenses. When the issue has been 
addressed, it is usually in reference to reporting or disclosure rules. 
Thus, the problem is not severe. Moreover, for the profession to 
suggest that it alone has the right to determine its role and respon­
sibilities would appear to be self-serving.
4. Impose tighter standards for class action suits or eliminate con­
tingent fees or both. The profession’s advocacy of these proposals 
would probably be viewed as self-serving. Class actions and con­
tingent fees are not unique to cases involving auditors. The courts 
are already empowered to take steps to prevent abuses in these 
areas and have lately begun to exercise that power.
5. Give auditors, rather than management, the authority to select ac­
counting principles. Increased auditor responsibility to audit com­
mittees would probably avoid the need for specific authority to 
select accounting principles. Moreover, the selection of principles 
cannot be completely divorced from the data recording function, 
and no persuasive case has yet been made that the auditor’s role 
does or should encompass the recording function.
The profession must recognize that it cannot expect statutory or 
judicial relief from litigation unless it takes appropriate measures to put 
its own house in order and unless it is willing to accept added respon­
sibilities in exchange. The recommendations in this paper, taken to­
gether, are designed to achieve that relief in a context of both new 
responsibilities and a higher level of performance for existing 
responsibilities.
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